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CONTENTS

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Naval Disarmament Seminar Opens in Moscow *[TASS]* 1
Disarmament Conference Opens in Geneva 6 Feb *[TASS]* 1
Solton on Troop Withdrawal From E. Europe *[Moscow International]* 1
Defense Financial Chief Interviewed in Vienna *[Moscow TV]* 2
U.S. Plan To Cut Troops in Japan Discussed *[Lebedev on Moscow International]* 2

COMMUNIST RELATIONS

Bloc Foreign Ministers Meet in Sofia *[TASS]* 4
CEMA Restructuring Problems Discussed *[PRAVDA 1 Feb]* 4

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

TASS Reports on Gerasimov's 6 Feb Briefing 5
Lebanon Settlement 5
C. America Arms Shipments 5
Soviet, U.S. Dialogue 5
UK Relations 5
Arms Talks, Baker Visit, Iran 6
Ethiopia Conflict 6
Briefing Summary 7
Criticism of RSFSR Ministry Rebutted *[IZVESTIYA 27 Jan]* 7
European Impact on Superpower Agenda *[IZVESTIYA 6 Feb]* 8
Moscow Against German Unification Within NATO *[Hamburg DPA]* 9
'Open Skies' Preparatory Meeting Held *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 10

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

President Bush Hails Latest Gorbachev Proposals *[TASS]* 11
Agenda for Upcoming Baker Visit Previewed 11
Blinov in IZVESTIYA *[6 Feb]* 11
Bovin in IZVESTIYA *[7 Feb]* 11
Vasilyev in PRAVDA *[7 Feb]* 13
Adamishin Meets U.S. Aide Prior to Baker Visit *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 13
Cheney Reiterates Commitment to Modernization *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Feb]* 14
U.S. Maintaining Forward-Based Naval Strategy *[Vladimirov on Moscow International]* 14
TASS Reports U.S. Missile Launch 7 Feb 15
Agreement With U.S. on Narcotics Trafficking *[TASS]* 15
Bilateral Conference Generates 180 Projects *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 15

China

RSFSR Official on Trade Links With PRC *[Moscow International]* 16

Northeast Asia

Yeltsin Interviewed on Visit to Japan *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 16
Former Mongolian Leader Stripped of Awards *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 24 Jan]* 19
UNEN Editor Cited on Perestroyka in Mongolia *[PRAVDA 27 Jan]* 19
Perestroyka in Soviet-Korean Friendship Society *[Moscow International]* 19

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Ministry, Philippines Reach Visa Accord *[Moscow International]* 20
Philippines Senator Comments on Global Forum *[Moscow International]* 20
Palau Votes To Decide on U.S. Compact *[TASS]* 21

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on 4 Feb Cairo Bus Incident 21
Reactions *[IZVESTIYA 6 Feb]* 21
'International Terrorism' *[Prokofiev on Radio Peace and Progress]* 22
PLO 'Contradictions' *[Vasilyev on Radio Peace and Progress]* 22
Zlatorunskiy Comments on Middle East Policies *[Moscow International]* 23
Cooperation Program With Libya Signed *[Tripoli Radio]* 23
UN Human Rights Investigation in Iran Viewed *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 23
Soviet-Indian Political Consultations Held *[IZVESTIYA 31 Jan]* 24
Committee Discusses Soviet POWs, MIAs *[TASS]* 25

Sub-Saharan Africa

De Klerk Speech Reported, Initial Reactions *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 25
Lukyanov Receives Botswana Envoy's Credentials *[IZVESTIYA 25 Jan]* 26
Envoy to Cameroon Also To Serve on Chad *[PRAVDA 24 Jan]* 26
Commentary Views Kenya, U.S. Military Accord *[Saton on Moscow International]* 26

East Europe

Gremitskikh Comments on German Unity *[Hamburg DPA]* 27
Differing Opinions on German Reunification *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 27
Changes in East Germany's SED-PDS Reviewed 28
Party Official Interviewed *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 28
Board Announces Name Change *[Savvin on TASS]* 30
Some Urge Disbanding Party *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 30
Prague Rally Demands Soviet Troop Withdrawal *[TASS]* 30
Correspondent Assesses Protests *[Moscow TV]* 30
Oil Supplies to Czechoslovakia To Be Reduced *[Bratislava Radio]* 31
Army Command Says No Maneuvers During Elections *[Budapest TV]* 31
MSZMP Chairman's Address to Congress Noted *[PRAVDA 28 Jan]* 31
Hungary's Interior Minister Horvath Resigns *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 32
Hungarian Assembly Debates Secret Services Law *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 32
Debate Runs Almost Two Days *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 32
Housing, Travel Prices Increasing in Hungary *[PRAVDA 2 Feb]* 33
Economy, Scandal Threaten Hungarian Party *[IZVESTIYA 26 Jan]* 33
'Crusade' Against Former Hungarian Rulers Urged *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 34
SFRY Reports of Albanian Demonstrations Cited *[IZVESTIYA 27 Jan]* 35
Newspaper Reports on Aftermath of LCY Congress
[Vostrukhov, Yermolovich in IZVESTIYA 28 Jan] 35
Reportage on Demonstrations, Violence in Kosovo 37
Streets Barricaded; Cars Stoned *[IZVESTIYA 31 Jan]* 37
Attacks Become 'Frequent' *[IZVESTIYA 1 Feb]* 37
'Separatists' Fight Militia *[IZVESTIYA 2 Feb]* 38
PRAVDA on Demonstrations *[2 Feb]* 39
Pancevski Decries 'Nationalists' *[Ovcharenko on TASS]* 39
Kosovo on 'Brink of Civil War' *[IZVESTIYA 3 Feb]* 39
Emergency Situations Described *[PRAVDA 5 Feb]* 40
Army To Prevent Civil War *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 41
Serbian President Milosevic Interviewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 4 Feb]* 41
Serbian Communists Opt for New Party Status *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 42
Changes in East Europe Discussed, Analyzed *[Levin, Shishlin on Moscow Radio]* 43

West Europe

Developing Links With EC Discussed *[Orlov, TASS]* 45
Embassy Comments on Treaty With Finland *[Helsinki Radio]* 46
Yazov Asks Belgian Defense Minister To Visit *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb]* 46
Kryuchkov-led Delegation Returns From Italy *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 46
General Demands Apology From FRG Newspaper *[TASS]* 46

Latin American & Caribbean

U.S. Policy on Latin America, Drugs Viewed *[TASS]* 46
New Brazilian Envoy Presents Credentials *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 47

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Statistics on USSR Supreme Soviet Composition *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 48
Supreme Soviet, Congress Ethnic Make-Up *[SOYUZ No 1]* 48
Phone Numbers of Supreme Soviet Committees *[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 4 Jan]* 51

CPSU Central Committee Plenum

Participants' Debate Speeches 5 Feb 52
Moscow's Prokofyev *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 52
Yeltsin on 'Crisis Point' *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 54
Latvia's Vagris *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 55
Kiev Obkom Head *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 57
Moldavia's Luchinskiy *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 58
Moscow University's Melnikov *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 60
Explosives Expert Fesenko *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 62
RSFSR's Ivanova *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 65
North Osetian Official *[PRAVDA 5 Feb]* 66
Leningrad Worker Arkhipov *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 68
Leningrad's Gidaspov *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 69
Education Chief Yagodin *[PRAVDA 6 Feb]* 71
Ambassador to Poland *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 72
CPSU Central Committee Plenum Continues 6 Feb 74
Plenum Speakers Listed *[TASS]* 74
Plenum Debate Summarized *[TASS]* 75
Plenum Activities, Speeches of 6 Feb Reported 77
Ligachev Warns of 'Danger to Socialism' *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 77
Ligachev Favors Abolishing Article 6 *[AFP]* 79
Ligachev Speech Applauded *[Moscow TV]* 79
Ligachev, Shevardnadze 'Clash' *[Vilnius Radio]* 80
Shevardnadze, Medvedev Speak *[TASS]* 80
Estonian Premier Toome Comments on Plenum *[Moscow TV]* 83
Gorbunov on Calls for Russian Sovereignty *[Riga Radio]* 83
Velikhov Speaks on Party Trust *[PRAVDA 7 Feb]* 84
Delegate Interviewed on Proceedings, Media *[Moscow TV]* 85
Plenum Continues Debate; To Meet 7 Feb *[TASS]* 86
Participants Report Plenum Extended to Third Day *[AFP]* 86
CPSU Central Committee Plenum Continues 7 Feb 86
'Keen Debates' Resumed *[TASS]* 86
CPSU Abandons Power 'Monopoly' *[AFP]* 86
Party Congress Platform Finalized *[TASS]* 87

Political & Social

TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments 87
Flow of Refugees Continues 87

MVD Updates Situation 88
Baku Radio Carries Announcements of Events 88
Dubinyak: Situation 'Peaceful' 88
'Task of Restoring Normal Life' 88
Situation in NKAO Detailed 89
Yerevan Radio Carries Events in, Around Armenia 89
Operational Staff on Situation 89
Officials Visit Villages in Azerbaijan 90
Newsman Finds No Evidence of Army Atrocities *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 6 Feb]* 90
Rome Daily Interviews Ligachev *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 2 Feb]* 91
Moscow Party Chief Interviewed *[Paris L'HUMANITE 1 Feb]* 92
Commission Orders Medical Supplies Resumption *[Moscow Radio]* 94
Estonia Reportedly To Issue Own Currency *[AFP]* 94
Estonian Communists Respond to Gorbachev *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 18 Jan]* 95
Vagris Address at Latvian Party Plenum *[Riga Radio]* 96
Latvian Local Soviets Take First Steps *[TASS]* 105
Latvian People's Front Figure To Leave CPSU *[Moscow Radio]* 106
Front: 'Liquidationist' Trend *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 106
Election Struggle in Latvia Reported *[TASS]* 107
Latvia Power Shortage Problems Chronicled *[TASS]* 107
Ethnic Relations Viewed at Sajudis Conference *[Vilnius Radio]* 108
Conference Concludes Work *[Moscow Radio]* 108
Leader Ozolas Interviewed *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 14 Jan]* 108
Landsbergis Eyes 'Mechanism' To Leave USSR *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 3]* 111
Multiparty System a 'Reality' in Lithuania *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 112
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Pre-Election Session *[TASS]* 113
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 8 Jan *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 9 Jan]* 113
Lithuanian Poll on Parties, Politicians *[LIETUVOS RYTAS 9 Jan]* 113
Vilnius Vigil Ends Outside KGB Premises *[Vilnius International]* 114
Lithuanian Bishop Holds Farewell Service *[Vilnius International]* 115
Lithuanian Workers on Gorbachev's Visit *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 13 Jan]* 115
Turkmen 1989 Economic Development Discussed *[Askhabad Radio]* 116
Turkmen Party Journal To Go on Sale *[Ashkhabad Radio]* 116
Tajik Party Sets Up New Briefing Center *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 2 Feb]* 117
Tajik KGB Conference on Treason Conviction *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 31 Jan]* 117
Data on 1989 Crime in Moscow Announced *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* 117
Further on Crime Statistics *[TASS]* 118
Trade Crime Worse Since Last Major Review *[PRAVDA 2 Feb]* 119
Soviet Printing Industry Abilities Scored *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 31 Jan]* 119
Coordinating Council Takes Over Volgograd *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 120

Military

Yazov Discusses Current Military Issues *[TASS]* 121

Naval Disarmament Seminar Opens in Moscow

LD0602205590 Moscow TASS in English 2034 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Aleksandr Gurov:

An international seminar on naval disarmament that opened here today concentrated on the limitation of the naval arms race, reduction in naval activities in the world ocean and confidence-building measures in the naval sphere.

It was sponsored by the Soviet Peace committee, its "peace and ocean" commission, the Soviet Peace fund and the Law of the Sea Association.

At the opening ceremony of the forum held at the world trade centre, Soviet Peace Fund President Anatoliy Karpov read out congratulatory messages from Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

Joint plenary meetings were held at the seminar today and will continue on Wednesday. Then seminar participants will split into working groups for two more days.

The seminar's sponsors and participants note that the east and west, above all NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, are not so far apart in any disarmament sphere as in questions of improving the military and strategic situation in the world ocean.

The present forum plans to discuss possible ways towards the stage-by-stage limitation of military activities on the high seas on the basis of new approaches and new political thinking.

Retired Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, deputy director of the Centre for Defence Information in Washington, told TASS that NATO and the Warsaw Treaty should move to broad confidence-building measures to achieve security on the high seas.

The admiral added that they should exchange information on construction programmes of their navies, possibilities of deployment conduct of operations and inform each other better of naval actions, as they do with respect to their ground forces.

Carroll believes that the removal of nuclear weapons from warships should be the first practical step towards naval disarmament. Nuclear weapons are unsuitable for combat operations, since they can trigger off a nuclear war.

According to the admiral, the next step should be the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the world ocean.

The seminar is being attended by over 200 representatives from 45 countries, including generals, legislators, scientists, diplomats, representatives of pacifist organisations and movements, men of culture and clergymen and will last until February 10.

Disarmament Conference Opens in Geneva 6 Feb

LD0602092990 Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Geneva February 6 TASS—A regular session of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament opens in the Geneva Palace of Nations today.

The delegations from 40 member states of the conference and about 30 countries with observer status will continue to discuss the basic problems of our times—the removal of the war threat and practical transition to disarmament. The elaboration of a comprehensive convention on a total ban on chemical weapons and on the destruction of their stocks has been occupying a special place for several years now among a broad spectrum of matters concerning virtually all global disarament issues. It is precisely in this effort that major headway towards the goal has been admittedly made.

Unfortunately, matters are not so reassuring as regards other major items on the agenda of the conference. There is no headway in such area as a total nuclear test ban, to which the Soviet delegation invariably devotes special attention, regarding it as one of paramount issues in the package covering disarmament, the removal of the threat of nuclear war, and environmental protection.

The unpreparedness of the American side to hold earnest negotiations is also encountered in the discussion of the problem of averting an arms race in outer space.

Times will show whether the session will succeed in making substantial progress.

Solton on Troop Withdrawal From E. Europe

LD3001155890 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Excerpts] Revolutionary changes have given birth to the movement for the withdrawal of Soviet troops deployed in the Warsaw Treaty countries. [passage omitted] This is a complicated problem. Radio Moscow's commentator Yuriy Solton considers the pros and cons, and this is what he writes:

Czechoslovakia and Hungary have put the question in the most resolute form. [passage omitted] The prominent Polish politician Lech Walesa has called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from his country, however, the Polish Government does not share his view, and Berlin says there must be a simultaneous pull out of Soviet troops from the German Democratic Republic and American troops from West Germany.

Moscow has reacted with understanding to the requests of the East European countries, however, should there be such haste, asks the Soviet army daily KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. On the one hand, the memories are still fresh of how the Soviet Army interfered in the developments in Hungary and helped put an end to the Prague Spring. On the other, the fears that there may be a repetition are unjustified. It was Soviet perestroyka that sparked off democratic processes in East Europe. Besides, hasn't Moscow's favorable attitude to the revolutionary changes shown that it's not going to interfere?

True, the easing of tension in Europe and the lessening of a military threat has created favorable conditions for the withdrawal of troops from foreign territories—of all troops. NATO's leaders are firmly committed to the idea that such a withdrawal can be carried out only within the framework of an all-European disarmament. In the first place, this refers to an agreement to reduce conventional armed forces in Europe which is being discussed at the Vienna talks and, is expected to be ready for signature by the end of the year.

This kind of approach looks reasonable, and let me remind you, Yuriy Solton writes, that the Soviet Union will, before the results of the Vienna talks become clear, withdraw 50,000 troops and several thousand tanks from East Europe by the end of the year. [passage omitted] Further steps along these lines are possible; however, they must be taken on the basis of reciprocity on the part of the NATO countries. The Soviet Union is strictly out to remove its troops from East Europe during 5 years if the United States and other NATO countries do the same to their troops in foreign territories in West Europe. [passage omitted]

Defense Financial Chief Interviewed in Vienna

LD0602121290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0930 GMT 6 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The seminar on military doctrines, which was held within the framework of talks on measures for strengthening confidence and security in Europe, ended in Vienna today. Representatives of the higher military leadership of European states, the United States, and Canada attended it.

[Correspondent V. Mikheyev, off-screen, identified by caption] Our country's delegation explained in detail the Soviet military doctrine to participants. Its essence consists in defense sufficiency, i.e. a minimum level of military potential, which, however, ensures the country's reliable defense and, at the same time, implies the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other kinds of mass destruction weapons. The military doctrine of the United States and its NATO allies consists, as before, in the concept of flexible response at advance positions with the use of nuclear arms. But, according to what Maj. Gen. (Robinson), member of the U.S. delegation, said at the seminar, after the seminar NATO is profoundly interested in studying the Soviet notion of reasonable defense sufficiency.

Issues of military budgets were discussed at the closing meetings of the seminar.

[V.N. Babyev, head of the Central Financial Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, identified by caption] Now that the Soviet Union has started practical disarmament and the reduction of military expenses, we tried to show, using specific examples and real figures, the processes that are under way in our country which already have now made it possible to reduce considerably our military budget. In our estimation, this process will be continued in the future, too, given positive changes in the world.

[Mikheyev] Are NATO member-countries still eager to discuss the offensive potential of the naval forces and the U.S. bases around the Soviet Union, and to continue staking on deterrence as a military doctrine? This will be shown by the talks between 35 countries on the measures for strengthening confidence and security which are reopening in Vienna tomorrow. [video of seminar proceedings: Babyev speaking in a room]

U.S. Plan To Cut Troops in Japan Discussed

OW0602032390 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Lebedev commentary from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Representatives of the U.S. State and Defense Departments and the U.S. Armed Forces Pacific Command have discussed the possibility of reducing the U.S. military presence in Japan. I will now give some details of the discussions.

It is expected that the contingent of U.S. Marines in Japan will be trimmed, and that the U.S. Army Headquarters there will be abolished and merged with the general headquarters. Some members of the 3d U.S. Marine Fleet in Okinawa are expected to be withdrawn. It is widely known that 35,000 of the 50,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan are deployed on Okinawa, where some 20 percent of land is occupied by U.S. military bases and installations. The commander in chief of the U.S. Marine Corps on Okinawa has indicated that the United States does not intend to seek replacements from Japan for some of the installations dismantled on the island.

I would like to recall that Washington and Tokyo signed an agreement in the mid-1970's on returning the 23 percent of the land on Okinawa occupied by U.S. military installations. U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, in his

upcoming visit to Japan, will hold talks with Japanese officials on reducing the U.S. military presence. If such talks produce an agreement on cutting the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, it will undoubtedly strengthen mutual trust and understanding among Asian countries.

International detente has begun to reach this vast region. I must add that Soviet policy is clearly designed to reduce the military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Soviet Union has pursued a clear-cut and [words indistinct] policy of cutting its army in eastern Asia and its navy in the Pacific. It also has taken steps to reduce its military presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. This is the current Soviet stand on military activity. At the end of last year, the Soviet Union withdrew its MiG-23 and [words indistinct] fighters from the bay. Recently, the United States stated repeatedly its plan to cut defense spending and trim its armed forces, including troops deployed abroad. The realization of this plan will have unprecendented significance. I believe that such an innovative plan will usher in a new stage of superpower arms rivalry and [words indistinct].

Bloc Foreign Ministers Meet in Sofia

LD0602230790 Moscow TASS in English 2253 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia February 7 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Stepanenko:

Representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the Bulgarian People's Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic have met in Sofia.

Participants discussed the role of non-aligned countries in the resolution of global and regional issues and expresses readiness to interact with them in this, including within the framework of the United Nations.

The leaders of the delegation met with Foreign Minister of the Bulgarian People's Republic Boiko Dimitrov.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told TASS that the participants in the meeting were unanimous in praising the Non-Aligned Movement as an important factor of the world politics and its increasingly innovative role in strengthening the system of peace, security and cooperation based on the U.N. Charter.

They favoured close cooperation with the Non-Aligned Movement both within the United Nations and outside, along all the major directions of international politics.

The discussion of pressing international issues by allied countries in Sofia, the Soviet deputy foreign minister stressed, is fully in line with the development of the consultation mechanism, as also with the high priority development of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's political functions, the modernisation of its structure and the renunciation of bloc thinking.

CEMA Restructuring Problems Discussed

PM0102152990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[B. Averchenko report under the "In the CEMA Journal" rubric: "New Approaches Are Needed"]

[Text] Important changes are taking place in economic ties between the CEMA countries. They are directly connected with the profound transformations which are currently being implemented in most cooperating states.

CEMA is also being restructured in the light of the new demands. Of course, this radical reconstruction did not appear out of nowhere. Over the last few decades the CEMA countries have accumulated considerable experience in interacting with various sectors of the economy and in jointly resolving problems relating to the scientific and technical revolution. But life requires fundamentally new approaches to the organization of effective interaction.

All these questions have been given extensive coverage in the journal EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV. Its last issues last year (November, December) published a whole series of articles devoted to the restructuring of the mechanism of multilateral ties, problems of economic integration, the creation of a CEMA single market, principles of price formation and development of direct ties, and so on. The journal allots an important position to the circulation of experience, particularly in the quest for the most effective forms and methods of economic activity, and regularly gives scientists a forum. The editorial office urges its readers to freely exchange opinions on questions of improving CEMA and expanding glasnost and democratism in its work.

At the same time I would like to obtain a better idea from the journal of how restructuring directly within the CEMA apparatus itself is going and what steps are being taken to respond with greater flexibility, promptness, and dynamism to the processes taking place within the alliance of fraternal countries and the world economy. Obviously, it is time for the journal to reveal the negative aspects of cooperation in a bolder fashion and oppose outmoded forms and stereotyped approaches to it more resolutely. And, of course, do its utmost to support all the new progressive ideas born today on the difficult path of restructuring and renewal.

TASS Reports on Gerasimov's 6 Feb Briefing

Lebanon Settlement

LD0602163390 Moscow TASS in English 1614 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The Soviet Union believes that the crisis in Lebanon can be settled only through the strict observance by all Lebanese communities, parties and groups of the national accord charter, achieved as a result of compromise among the Lebanese with the assistance of the Arab League, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a news briefing today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov was commenting on reports on a new flare-up of violence in Lebanon.

He welcomed the adherence by President Ilyas al-Hirawi and the Salim al-Huss government to the al-Ta'if accords and said their efforts and the efforts by head of the Lebanese Maronite Church Patriarch Nasrallah Sufayr to end violence in the country should be vigorously supported.

Gerasimov said the responsibility for the bloodshed, victims and destruction in Lebanon "fully rests on Lebanese forces who have embarked on the road of undermining the al-Ta'if accords and who have opposed the international community and the majority of Lebanese seeking national consolidation."

C. America Arms Shipments

LD0602163790 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The Soviet Union neither does nor has any intention to ship arms to Central America, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today. He said that articles to this effect in THE WASHINGTON POST and THE WASHINGTON TIMES, which refer to anonymous sources, were clearly false.

One could disprove every statement in these articles, the spokesman said. But there is hardly any need for this since the assertions of the American journalists are based on lies.

It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has not been supplying arms to Nicaragua, and consequently, to Central America for over a year now, and this is admitted by U.S. officials, Gerasimov emphasized.

These allegations about Soviet policy on Central America made in the run-up to the visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, prior to the general election in Nicaragua, obviously have the intention of hindering the Soviet-American dialogue, which is becoming ever more constructive, and of interfering with a Central American settlement.

It is realised in the Soviet Union that this stand is not in keeping with attitudes prevalent among American people, Gerasimov said.

Soviet, U.S. Dialogue

LD0602164190 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—Soviet-U.S. consultations on a Central American settlement, held last week in Washington, "revealed the sides' common understanding of the need to continue efforts towards a peaceful political settlement of the conflict," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing here today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov said the importance of the forthcoming general elections in Nicaragua for further headway towards a settlement in the region was noted at the meeting.

"The Soviet side emphasised the need to render all kinds of support to Nicaragua in ensuring favourable external conditions for the election campaign in the country and said the criteria for assessing the election outcome should be the conclusions of a mission of international observers, staying in Nicaragua," he said.

The Soviet Union called on the United States to show a similar approach.

The spokesman said both delegations to the consultations favoured the resumption of a dialogue between the Salvadorean government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front with the assistance of the United Nations secretary-general.

UK Relations

LD0602172490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 6 Feb 90

["USSR-Great Britain: Urgent—on Soviet-British Relations"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—"The constructive approaches of the USSR and Great Britain towards the development of bilateral relations make it possible to resolve many problems inherited from the period of confrontation and the cold war." This was stated today at a briefing by Gennadiy Gerasimov, the chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate, commenting on the reaching of accords between both countries regarding quotas for the numbers of personnel of institutions and missions on each other's territory.

In this connection, he recalled that in 1968, as a political gesture, London unilaterally introduced the practice of quota restrictions for permanent Soviet personnel in Britain. Currently the quota for Soviet representatives is 205 people. In May 1989, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, the Soviet side established similar restrictions for British personnel in the USSR.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman further said that as a result of the efforts made by both sides, including on a political level, mutual understanding has been reached regarding the fact that maintaining quotas runs counter to the positive processes taking place in Soviet-British relations. The negotiations held recently have made it possible for the sides to work out a new approach to the issue of the numbers of staff members of Soviet institutions and missions in London and of British ones in Moscow, he said. The sides renounce foisting quota restrictions on each other and take upon themselves "voluntary self-restrictions, which are maintained at the present level."

This accord, which is of great political importance, opens up prospects for the development of Soviet-British relations, Gerasimov stressed. "Taking this into account, the Soviet side states its readiness on the basis of a gradual approach to work towards the complete abolishment of self-limitations, expecting that the British side, too, will act in this area," he said.

Arms Talks, Baker Visit, Iran

LD0602195490 Moscow TASS in English 1934 GMT 6 Feb 90

["Soviet Foreign Ministry News Briefing—Roundup" —TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The Soviet Union favours the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons and hopes that the conference on disarmament, resuming in Geneva today, will achieve a breakthrough in this field, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He noted that the signing of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on 50 per cent cuts in strategic offensive armaments and success at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments could give a good impetus to the conference's work.

Answering questions about U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, Gerasimov said that the Soviet Union "hopes for the success of the visit."

The spokesman said the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will begin the second round of talks on the terms and schedule of a Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia on Wednesday in Moscow.

He expressed hope that the talks "will be held in a constructive atmosphere and the sides will reach a mutually acceptable solution."

"The Soviet Union condemns any national discrimination, including anti-semitism," Gerasimov said, commenting on a report that the leaders of U.S. Jewish organisations on Monday called on President George Bush to ask President Mikhail Gorbachev to denounce "anti- semitism in the USSR."

Gerasimov said a group of experts from the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Consular Department had left for Iran on Sunday. They will discuss in Tehran the crossing of the Soviet-Iranian border by citizens of both countries living in border areas, and terms for family-related and private trips by Soviet Union, the Kashmir problem, which is the main cause of the complications, should be solved by peaceful, non-violent means.

Ethiopia Conflict

LD0602232590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1512 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—The Soviet Union is coming out in favour of a cessation of the bloody, internal conflict in Ethiopia, and of its peaceful, political settlement by means of dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable forms of national reconciliation, Gennadiy Gerasimov, the chief of the Information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared at a briefing today. The Soviet position is well-known both to the Ethiopian Government and the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), with the leadership of which the Soviet side had direct contacts, he stressed, commenting on the course of the settlement of the Eritrean problem.

Having noted that as a result of the two rounds of preliminary talks in Atlanta and Nairobi the representatives of the Government of Ethiopia and the EPLF had reached agreement on procedural issues, Gennadiy Gerasmiov said that "now the path is open for talks on the essence of an Eritrean settlement." Having indicated further that the appropriate platforms for both sides are now being defined more precisely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative declared that the Soviet Union "is ready to assist, with all its strength, the successful holding of such talks and the finding at them of mutually acceptable solutions."

It is very important to put an end to the bloodshed in the north of Ethiopia, from which people are suffering, the Soviet diplomat continued. He, in particular, positively evaluated the fact that with the beginning of a dialogue between the Addis Ababa and the EPLF no serious armed clashes between the two sides have occurred.

Speaking about the role of Soviet military specialists in Ethiopia, Gennadiy Gherasimov stressed that "Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation in the military sphere is directed toward helping construction by the Ethiopan armed forces with the aim of repelling external aggression." Soviet military specialists working in this country are also used correspondingly.

"Participation in the internal conflict is not part of their functions," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative said, "for this reason Soviet military specialists have been moved out of Eritrea and other northern regions which are zones of combat operations."

Briefing Summary

LD0602195490 Moscow TASS in English 1934 GMT 6 Feb 90

["Soviet Foreign Ministry News Briefing—Roundup"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The Soviet Union favors the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons and hopes that the conference on disarmament, resuming in Geneva today, will achieve a breakthrough in this field, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He noted that the signing of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive armaments and success at the Vienna talks on conventional armaments could give a good impetus to the conference's work.

Answering questions about U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, Gerasimov said that the Soviet Union "hopes for the success of the visit."

The spokesman said the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia will begin the second round of talks on the terms and schedule of a Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia on Wednesday in Moscow.

He expressed hope that the talks "will be held in a constructive atmosphere and the sides will reach a mutually acceptable solution."

"The Soviet Union condemns any national discrimination, including anti-semitism," Gerasimov said, commenting on a report that the leaders of U.S. Jewish organisations on Monday called on President George Bush to ask President Mikhail Gorbachev to denounce "anti-semitism in the USSR."

Gerasimov said a group of experts from the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Consulare Department had left for Iran on Sunday. They will discuss in Tehran the crossing of the Soviet-Iranian border by citizens of both countries living in border areas, and terms for family-related and private trips by Soviet Union, the Kashmir problem, which is the main cause of the complications, should be solved by peaceful, non-violent means."

Criticism of RSFSR Ministry Rebutted

PM3101141390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Article by RSFSR Foreign Minister V.M. Vinogradov under the rubric "International Departments' Mailbag": "On the Russian Federation's 'Foreign Policy Inadequacy'"]

[Text] In his article "Soviet Foreign Policy: The Russian Aspect" (IZVESTIYA No. 18), V. Lukin lambastes, to use his words, the "strange, 'half-smothered' foreign policy department," which is what he calls the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Foreign Ministry. He also uses other funereal terms: "half-dead" or, even more prettily, "decoratively half-dead." He thinks that the RSFSR Foreign Ministry does not do what it should. In the writer's opinion, this is to "reveal and formulate specific republican interests and needs." Above all, these are the "special political interest in Europe and the special economic interest in adjoining Asian-Pacific countries." The writer is very interested in the German problem. "After all, we need only recall," he writes, "that Kaliningrad Oblast is part of the RSFSR to realize how many serious reasons for thought and position-honing the Russian Foreign Ministry has when it comes to Europe" (isn't the writer casting doubt on postwar borders in Europe?—V.V.). He goes on to recommend discussing with our country's other Western republics questions "associated with joining the common European home in such a way that it damages neither us nor others (?!)." There is also advice about what to do in the Far East: "We need a republican concept for the development of the Far East in close conjunction with the development of long-term ties with Asian-Pacific countries."

The writer's conclusion is to "return to Russia all the rights and prerogatives of a Soviet republic as a worthy and sovereign member of a union federation." And, of course, to help the RSFSR Foreign Ministry to "finally discover its own identity." Thanks for the kind words.

Nobody is likely to take issue with V. Lukin with regard to the need for greater activeness on the part of the union republics, including the RSFSR, in foreign affairs. He could have acquainted himself with our views on this matter had he bothered to read the article "Russian Diplomacy" in issue No 1 of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN last year, or the speech by the RSFSR foreign minister at the last RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

Quite frankly, we were struck by something else: the writer's ignorance about the RSFSR's foreign ties, on which persistent work is done by the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministry, other ministries and departments, and the RSFSR's autonomous republics, krays, oblasts, and cities.

Had the writer bothered to pay even a half-hour visit to the RSFSR Foreign Ministry and familiarize himself with the state of Russia's foreign ties, he could have learned a great deal. He could have learned about the RSFSR's relations and coordinated avenues of cooperation in various spheres with the governments of the FRG Lands of North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Lower Saxony; about the RSFSR's long-standing and extensive material and spiritual ties with the two SFRY republics of Serbia and Montenegro; about intergovernmental agreements, under which various RSFSR organizations and enterprises cooperate with the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Alberta; and about the RSFSR's rapidly developing ties (not only on the part of the RSFSR's Far Eastern oblasts) with the northeastern provinces of the PRC—

Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning (a Heilongjiang delegation headed by the government chairman was recently in the RSFSR for the first time in the history of Russo-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese relations). He would have learned about the agreements concluded by Soviet-Russian "merchants" with Philippine firms and organizations, and about the close daily contacts between Japanese prefectures and Russian krays and oblasts. He would have learned about the active ties between Magadan Oblast and the U.S. state of Alaska About the cooperation between, for instance, the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] and Vermont, between Stavropol Kray and Iowa, and the talks now nearing completion on cooperation between the RSFSR and Illinois. He would have learned about the RSFSR's extensive contacts with states in Brazil, Argentine provinces, and so forth. In the last year year alone, the RSFSR Council of Ministers received as guests 14 high-level government delegations, held talks on the main avenues of cooperation, and concluded long-term agreements—many of which envisage the creation of joint commissions at the intergovernmental level.

If the writer had known this and much else besides, he probably would not have written: "Where is the Russian team? Where are Comrades Vlasov and Vinogradov?"

It remains for me to recall that more than 170 RSFSR cities are twinned with 270 foreign cities—and this work is handled by the RSFSR Foreign Ministry, since these ties are implemented not by the public but by local organs of power. This is not to mention purely consular work, including the passports and visa service: In 1989 alone, the RSFSR Foreign Ministry arranged official foreign travel papers for more than 100,000 people and carried out numerous other consular duties.

It could, of course, be mentioned that the RSFSR Foreign Ministry's activity was aimed at implementing the USSR's overall foreign policy course, and therefore its work was repeatedly examined by the USSR Foreign Ministry Collegium. Thus, the links between the RSFSR Foreign Ministry and the USSR Foreign Ministry were not formal. The RSFSR Foreign Ministry is also well known for having elaborated a number of conceptual approaches to the topical problem of expanding union republics' external ties.

At the start of his article V. Lukin claims that it would be an exaggeration to state that only a handful of Russians know what the RSFSR Foreign Ministry does. Clearly, he himself is not one of that handful, although for the purposes of writing an article in such a serious newspaper and on such an important subject, it would be useful for him to have familiarized himself, if only briefly, with the actual state of affairs. Knowledge of one's subject is always necessary—even for professors.

European Impact on Superpower Agenda

PM0502224390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Stanislav Kondrashov: "New European Mosaic"]

[Text] Major changes in East Europe since 1945 are encouraging all participants in European policy, in one way or another, to define their position under the new conditions. The former authoritarian one-party power structures have fallen in six countries. This cannot fail to affect their foreign policy, but in what way? The question of German unification has come to the fore and is taking on the outlines of a rushing express train—but rushing where? The recent CEMA session in Sofia directly stated that we must radically reshape old economic ties which have proved inefficient, but doesn't the process of change really primarily concern the Warsaw Pact's military organization? It cannot avoid change if a number of member countries—Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland—have even removed from their official state titles the defining ideological descriptions of "socialist" and "people's."

Although the NATO countries' domestic political structure remains as it was, a change in sentiment, strategy, and tactics cannot fail to take place in this military grouping, too. Because its entire historical, political, and ideological basis—the idea of the Soviet threat and the threat from the East—is shaking under it. Even U.S. Defense Secretary Mr. Cheney—who has also undergone a considerable metamorphosis in his views under the influence of external circumstance, so to speak—has stated that this threat has essentially been reduced to zero not only because the Soviet Union lacks aggressive intentions, but also because as a result of the restructuring of the Soviet Armed Forces and the revolutions in East Europe there is no longer any material base for any aggression from the East.

Thus, the general opinion is that a new and, as yet, unnamed era has been born and has buried the postwar era. How will the infant behave in the expanses of a Europe that has seen it all? Answers to these questions will have to be found not least by the two superpowers which head the two military blocs whose armed confrontation has for many decades created both tension in Europe and, however paradoxically, stability, too.

These questions will not limit the agenda for the Soviet-U.S. talks to be held in the next few days in connection with the visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker. However, it is clear that the talks will largely proceed against this backdrop. It is just two months since the Malta meeting, but the changes that are occurring have taken the even sharper form of revolution in Romania, growing political and economic imbalance in the GDR, and major new efforts to dismantle the old structures and switch to a multiparty system in the other

East European countries. In talks with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have advocated the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on their territories in 1990.

The rapid pace of change is also expediting—if not directly, then indirectly—the Vienna talks between 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states on conventional arms and armed forces cuts in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Accords that have already taken place made it possible at Malta to set the goal of working out and signing an agreement this year.

It was in this respect, wanting to keep up with the development of events and to respond to them in a practical way, that President Bush in his recent "State of the Union" message put forward a new proposal on the number of U.S. and Soviet troops in Central and East Europe. Last May, he proposed cutting them to the level of 275,000, which would be a cut by 10 percent for the United States and by approximately half for the Soviet Union (according to Western figures, Soviet troop numbers in the region are around 600,000). The new level proposed by the President, and already reported in our newspaper is 195,000. That is, the Americans are cutting back by approximately one-third, while we would be cutting by two-thirds.

Washington had given its allies prior information about this step, and Moscow was also informed during a Bush phone call to Gorbachev a few hours before the President's speech in Congress. The U.S. allies reacted positively, although London demanded—and seems to have received—assurances that further U.S. cuts are not envisaged. Moscow showed favorable interest, but left it until the near future to detail its position, which will clearly happen during the talks with Baker.

What can be said, from a journalist's perspective, about the U.S. proposal? The Bush administration, which began with a skeptical attitude toward Soviet perestroyka, now believes in it and its leader, and in a number of practical steps it is already expressing its readiness to reduce military confrontation, particularly in the most dangerous area of that confrontation—Europe. The new step in this direction deserves approval. Admittedly, it is not radical enough when compared with the Soviet position, which currently advocates the complete elimination of the two powers' military presence on foreign territories in Europe within 5 years. Why is it not radical? The short answer is that the Americans want to leave their soldiers in Europe. They cite the wishes of their allies, in line with the previous strategy of meshing U.S. security with West European security. Europe is changing, but the United States believes that only the future will provide guarantees of the irreversibility of change. Moreover, for all the seeming equitableness of the Bush proposal, the Americans are retaining an advantage for themselves—30,000 servicemen over and above the figure of 195,000 outside the Central European zone. Moreover, Washington in its calculations has again failed to take account of the military units of its other allies stationed on FRG territory. These total around 160,000 men. Thus, we have an inequality.

And it is already being supported by a kind of theory, proclaimed by presidential aides, about the lack of "symmetry" between the United States and the USSR, and between the U.S. relationship with its "free allies" in NATO and the still unknown new relationships between the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact members. Here is how it was plainly put by London's THE OBSERVER newspaper: "We should be in no hurry to bury NATO. Simply because the Warsaw Pact has died a natural death (as you can see, they are already talking about death —S.K.), there is no point in NATO committing suicide."

This is a clear example of people letting their emotions run riot at the expense of the sober approach that is so necessary for politicians—particularly in a period of rapid change. Whatever the USSR's relations with its allies were—or will be—our rights to equal security in Europe cannot be infringed. Whatever the changes sweeping away Stalinism and neo-Stalinism in East Europe, they cannot write off the terrible price paid by the Soviet people for winning the Patriotic War. This ought to be taken into account: The Soviet Union cannot agree to less than "symmetry" on security. For all the currently constructive nature of the development of Soviet-U.S. relations, you get the feeling that the United States is tempted to exploit the potential for differences on the issue of a timetable for a Soviet troop withdrawal if such differences were to arise between Moscow and Prague or Budapest. That may be an understandable wish, but it is a patently short-sighted policy.

An even more important question concerns the unification of Germany and its possible military status. Looking into the future, Washington can see a united Germany as a NATO member retaining U.S. troops on its territory. But without any Soviet troops. Need we mention that the pointed lack of "symmetry" in this area, too, cannot be attractive to the Soviet Union, and is hardly likely to make general European understanding any easier along the road to whatever forms German unity may take.

Those are some preliminary remarks which, I think, are appropriate at one of the first stages in the shaping of the new Europe.

Moscow Against German Unification Within NATO

LD0602140490 Hamburg DPA in German 1235 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Unification of the two German states within the context of NATO is in the view of Moscow irreconcilable with Soviet interests. Nikolay Portugalov, the German expert of the CPSU Central Committee, says in the latest edition of STERN magazine: "That is an unlikely as reunification within the framework of the Warsaw Pact." According to STERN he also said: "It seems that in Bonn a majority fears the

term of military neutrality as much as the devil fears holy water, although the postwar history has clearly shown that the FRG's NATO membership and German unity are mutually exclusive."

Portugalov, who claims to welcome German unity and believes that the process of a gradual growing together is irreversible, said this according to STERN about the observation by NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner at the International Defense Forum in Munich last weekend: "Herr Woerner believes that a unified Germany within NATO would also benefit the Soviet Union. Don't make me laugh!"

The Central Committee expert also advocated material aid from the Federal Republic for the GDR which should be made available at once and without preconditions. This is now much more sensible than "the unscrupulous and illegal interference by Bonn politicians in the GDR elections," the magazine quotes the Soviet expert as saying.

An edited version of the article was released to DPA.

'Open Skies' Preparatory Meeting Held

PM0602160390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent F. Lukyanov: "West-East: On the Path to Open Skies"]

[Text] Budapest—The three-day talks among experts in Budapest last week were the final stage in the preparations for an international conference on the "open skies" program involving the foreign ministers of 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, which is to open 12 February in Ottawa.

The fact that experts from the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, and other members of the two military-political alliances met in Budapest to prepare for the conference in Ottawa is no accident at all. After all, it was here quite recently, at the beginning of January, that a major experiment was conducted under the "open skies" program. During the experiment an unarmed Canadian Air Force Hercules aircraft overflew extensive areas of Hungary, with the permission of the Hungarian and Soviet military authorities, in order to check the possibility of making flights in accordance with the program, which envisages, aside from anything else, monitoring the observance of arms reduction agreements.

As a matter of fact, the experts' meeting on the eve of the Ottawa conference was devoted to analyzing the results of the Hercules flight and also to elaborating the standing orders and procedure for the minister's conference. Judging by what Canadian representative (F. Bild) said at the international press conference following the experts' consultations, the ministers' meeting in Ottawa has been prepared in record time. The experimental flight over Hungary by the Hercules, which was by and large successful, demonstrated (F. Bild) said, that monitoring of observance of international agreements from the air was a realistic possibility, certainly played a big part in this.

But this does not mean that the problems of preparing a future agreement within the context of the "open skies" program have now been resolved. Some experts noted that there were different approaches.

Moreover, as Soviet delegation leader V.A. Lukyantsev said in an interview with your IZVESTIYA correspondent, there are many difficulties of a technical nature which emerged during the Hercules flight and which have to be resolved during the Ottawa meeting. What we are talking about above all is the system and methods of checking apparatus on board an aircraft, the procedure for notification of observation flights, and coordination of the system for gathering and processing the data so that neither side gains an advantage.

Of course, the existing problems, as practically all the participants in the experts' meeting stressed, can easily be solved given the political will and mutual consideration of interests. And then, I believe, one really can be optimistic that the agreement on the "open skies" program will be a significant step on the path of confidence-building measures between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

So now it is up to the participants in the Ottawa conference.

United States & Canada

President Bush Hails Latest Gorbachev Proposals

LD0702070690 Moscow TASS in English 0656 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] San Francisco February 7 TASS—President George Bush on Tuesday hailed Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals to "expand steps toward political pluralism in the Soviet Union".

"Americans will always welcome measures which promote the growth of democracy, and it is especially encouraging to see anything which might bring the day of true democracy a bit closer for the Soviet people," Bush said before viewing troops at Fort Irwin military base in California.

However, Bush said that even in the new era of superpower cooperation, "It is important not to let these encouraging changes—political or military—lull us into complacency. Nor can we let down our guard against a worldwide threat."

"The Soviet Union still maintains formidable forces," Bush said.

"Military challenges to democracy persist in every hemisphere."

Bush defended his plan to make cuts in 20 minor weapons programs while seeking one billion dollars in new funds for star wars research and moving ahead on major weapons systems.

Bush said his spending blueprint offers a chance to "restructure America's defenses," and make them "smaller but more agile and flexible," like those that invaded Panama.

During his three-day visit to the western United States, Bush will tour Livermore Laboratory, a key Strategic Defence Initiative research centre outside San Francisco, and the Strategic Air Command's headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska.

Agenda for Upcoming Baker Visit Previewed

Blinov in IZVESTIYA

PM0602123290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Commentary by own correspondent A. Blinov: "On the Eve of Baker's Visit"]

[Text] Washington—The participation of U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker in hearings to be held in Moscow by the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee will, in THE WASHINGTON POST's opinion, be an unprecedented event in Soviet-American relations.

The leader of American diplomacy will meet with the committee members to explain the content of U.S. foreign policy. Under the agreement reached, the session, scheduled for next Saturday, will last about 90 minutes. The main part will consist of Baker's answers to the Soviet deputies' questions.

Secretary of State J. Baker arrives in the European continent on Monday. His schedule includes a meeting with French Foreign Minister R. Dumas at Shannon Airport in Ireland, a one-day visit to Czechoslovakia, and then he travels to Moscow. Baker will spend four days in the Soviet Union. The American press believes that at the end of the Moscow visit there will either be a meeting with a European leader, or a meeting with the foreign ministers of Egypt and Israel, which is still the subject of discussion.

During his stay in the USSR, as we know from the announced program, Baker will be received by M.S. Gorbachev and will have talks with E.A. Shevardnadze. On the eve of his departure for Europe, Baker announced that the United States will support the Soviet proposal to hold a meeting of heads of state and government of the European countries, the United States, and Canada this year to continue and develop the Helsinki process. The main attention at the Moscow talks will be devoted to preparations for the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting scheduled for June of this year. There will be a discussion of the questions forming the subject of the talks on conventional arms reduction in Europe and the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms. The "German question" also will be broached.

Speaking at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not long before his departure for Europe, Baker stated that the Bush administration wants to "form new global relations with the Soviet Union." "In our relations with the USSR we are striving to find mutually beneficial aspects so as to transform zones of conflict into areas of cooperation wherever possible.... The President and I already have stated that we wish perestroyka success," Baker said. "Our aim is to consolidate new strategic relations with the Soviet Union by means of a verifiable treaty in the area of arms control and confidence-building measures."

Bovin in IZVESTIYA

PM0602202590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

["Political Observer's Opinion" by A. Bovin: "Discussion Will Be Difficult"]

[Text] It is proposed that M.S. Gorbachev will visit the United States in June. It is also planned that during the visit a treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons may be signed. U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker will arrive in Moscow on the evening of 7 February to engage in practical preparations for the visit. Intensive talks with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze are planned. J. Baker will meet with M.S. Gorbachev, and the secretary of state will also address the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee.

The main avenues of the preparatory work are determined by the prevailing agenda at Soviet-U.S. summits. Apart from an overview of world events, this means five points: disarmament, human rights, regional conflicts, Soviet-U.S. relations, and global (transnational) problems. Needless to say, different weight is given to each of these points during the talks. At any specific instance different issues may be at the center of attention, depending on the situation and the parties' wishes.

Experience shows that, as a rule, disarmament issues come to the fore. That will undoubtedly be the case this time as well, with one substantial proviso. It seems to me that the discussion in Moscow will begin with an assessment of the changes in central, southeastern, and Eastern Europe.

These changes, as is now clear to everyone, are truly revolutionary. Political regimes associated with the Soviet-exported model of Stalinist "barrack-room socialism" have been collapsing. Communist parties, losing their monopoly on power, are initiating profound transformations. Private ownership and the market system are being rehabilitated. Relations with the Soviet Union are losing their specifically socialist ("fraternal") aspect and are being wholly geared toward peaceful coexistence. The postwar setup in Europe is receding into the past. A new historical reality is emerging whose future still holds much that is uncertain.

For understandable reasons Moscow and Washington have different emotions about these changes. But for equally understandable reasons both Moscow and Washington are trying to ensure that policy is based not on emotion but on reason and common sense. As far as I can surmise, both capitals believe that events should take their course, so to speak, and that it would be dangerous either to artificially impede or encourage them. At the same time, there is mutual understanding on another issue too: We should strive as far as possible to ensure that the pace and nature of the transformations in this part of Europe do not undermine general European stability or the Helsinki process.

Americans realize that the shifts in East Europe and the acute collisions and difficulties within the USSR weaken the positions and narrow the room to maneuver on the part of the Soviet leadership. So they do have trump cards, but they cannot play them. They cannot because the Americans consider it not in their own interest to undermine the forces advocating perestroyka and the further evolution of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of new political thinking.

All this is the highly subtle and delicate stuff of political psychology. The temptation is great. But the slightest wrong move or attempt to "trick" the other partner could snap the fine threads of trust which already link the USSR and the United States to each side's mutual advantage.

In European affairs the greatest priority will be given to German statehood, the conventional arms limitation talks (Vienna 1), and the possibility of holding an all-European summit (Helsinki 2) this year. There are considerable elements of agreement on each of these issues. As for differences in position, in my view these can be narrowed and recast as an acceptable compromise, despite all the difficulties.

The U.S. President's recent proposal to lower the ceiling for U.S. and Soviet troops in central and East Europe from 275,000 to 195,000 shows how easy it is to expand the field of agreement if the willingness is there. Admittedly, G. Bush is adding 30,000 for himself, made up of U.S. troops stationed in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. If the Americans think that this additional figure will guarantee full security for them and their allies, perhaps there is no point in arguing with them.

The talks on strategic offensive weapons cuts are well-advanced. I did not say "50-percent" cuts because for all intents and purposes the USSR would have to cut around 35 percent of its launch vehicles, while the United States would cut 20 percent. Sea-launched cruise missiles will be left out of the agreement. Unfortunately, General B. Scowcroft's idea to scrap mobile land-based multiple-warhead missiles (our SS-24's and the American MX's, which are to be rail-mobile) is unlikely to be implemented. But, as they say, one step at a time. It is important that the ministers clear as much of a path as possible into the final stretch.

Afghanistan will probably be the most talked about of the regional conflicts. I don't know what conclusions Under Secretary of State R. Kimmitt—who visited Pakistan, India, and Saudi Arabia to assess the current situation and the mujahidin's weak and strong points—took back to Washington with him. But the Americans' hopes proved manifestly unjustified. This opens up the possibility of testing some common approaches. Reaching agreement, for example, on ending supplies of arms and ammunition to the warring sides and involving the United Nations more actively in settling the conflict.

It is much easier to analyze and write about the need to reach agreement than it is to conduct negotiations and seek agreement. Irrespective of any talk about the general human condition, each side has its own interests, its own ideas of what is good and what is bad, its own ideological preferences. And it is extremely difficult to fit them into a single category, especially since our American partners are continuing to practice a kind of political bodybuilding and like to admire their muscles. Let me quote G. Bush: "In the current changing world one thing is clear: America must retain its readiness. And for all my enthusiasm for the changes toward the transformation of Europe, Eastern Europe into a more peaceful region, America must nevertheless be strong. And a strong America does not only need a strong economy; as before, strength must presuppose reliable defenses and defensive forces in a state of readiness and high combat capability. And if proof of this were ever needed, we saw

it in the superb and excellently coordinated operation carried out last month. We saw this proof in our servicemen's bravery in Panama."

I hope that J. Baker, while defending the United States' right to have reliable defenses, is not going to cite his boss' argument. I fear that in Moscow this argument would be misunderstood.

Vasilyev in PRAVDA

PM0602221390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Gennadiy Vasilyev "Political Observer's Notes": "On the Path Toward the Summit"]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. dialogue is gaining momentum and becoming increasingly substantive. Malta, the working meeting of the two countries' leaders, seems as though it was held only yesterday. And today sees the start of another political event directly linked with the previous one and leading to the next, which will be even more significant: U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker is arriving in Moscow on a visit. The talks that the head of the U.S. diplomatic department will hold with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev and other events planned for the visit are seen both in our country and abroad as a new manifestation of useful cooperation between the two countries and as an important stage on the path toward the full-scale Soviet-U.S. summit planned for June.

As well-informed Soviet circles note, a thorough examination of the entire range of questions which have recently become the subject of concern and interaction between the two great powers—disarmament, regional, trade and economic, humanitarian, and transnational questions—is expected in Moscow. This interaction is designed to give impetus to the formulation of decisions, find solutions to disputed questions, and make better and more thorough preparations for the upcoming top-level meeting.

Military-political problems have always played a key role in the overall range of Soviet-U.S. relations. It is expected that the talks about to begin in Moscow will examine questions linked with the finalization [dorabotka] of the agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, which is being prepared so that its fundamental provisions are ready for the summit meeting. Work to ensure that a multilateral agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces and arms to be signed this very year will be continued. It can be assumed that in this context U.S. President G. Bush's recent proposal to reduce the numbers of U.S. and Soviet troops in central and East Europe to 195,000 on each side will also be examined. The ministers and experts will also work on the bilateral Soviet-U.S. agreement for a radical reduction in chemical weapons stocks which is being elaborated. They will also work to ensure that protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes can be signed in the very near future.

A favorable tendency of not fueling but extinguishing conflagrations in the planet's hot spots has become clearly evident recently. But more will have to be done. And a great deal here depends on the USSR and the United States. It is expected that an appreciable place in J. Baker's talks with Soviet officials will be taken by regional conflicts: Afghanistan, Central America, the Near East, Lebanon, and some others. Differences exist here, sometimes considerable differences. But it is important that a more businesslike and sensible approach has emerged which could bear fruit.

At Malta the U.S. President announced that he intends in the very near future to take the necessary steps to lift the restrictions retarding the development of Soviet-U.S. trade and economic relations. The need for such measures is long overdue. It is to be hoped that the U.S. secretary of state's talks in Moscow will also be productive in this area.

The range of questions to be discussed at the Moscow talks is vast. They also will include humanitarian and transnational questions (such as the struggle against terrorism and the drugs trade, and joint efforts to protect the environment) and, of course, European problems—both in the broad plane of the all-European process and as they relate to the dynamic events in East Europe. Europe, and to a large extent our entire planet, is at a crucial stage. The world is moving out of one era and into another. And here the role of interaction between the USSR and the United States and of the realization by the two countries' leaders that it is necessary to operate with an extremely well-considered and cautious manner in these conditions is greater than ever.

A WASHINGTON POST article devoted to the visit includes the following lines: "Secretary of State J. Baker is going to Moscow at a time when U.S. officials are seeking to complete important arms control negotiations, settle continuing regional conflicts, and, first and foremost, ensure that they are not left behind by the rapid changes in East Europe." Indeed, not left behind! It is not only a question of being able to keep up with the development of events. Something more is required—the ability to rise to the challenge of tasks which yesterday were inconceivable but are now facing mankind on the eve of the 21st century.

Adamishin Meets U.S. Aide Prior to Baker Visit

PM0502124490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] Within the framework of the forthcoming visit to the USSR by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.L. Adamishin received U.S. Deputy Secretary of State R. Shifter on 2 February.

R. Shifter also had talks with USSR Justice Minister V.F. Yakovlev and USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev, and met with IZVESTIYA Chief Editor I.D. Laptev.

Cheney Reiterates Commitment to Modernization

PM0602151390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "R. Cheney's Statement"]

[Text] Washington, 5 Feb—The United States does not intend to abandon the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney has stated. Speaking on the CBS TV program "Face the Nation," he acknowledged that the profound changes that have gripped the USSR and the other European socialist countries have had the result that the Warsaw Pact now poses "less of a threat than at any time in the past 40 years." At the same time, Cheney justified the need to develop the U.S. strategic programs by saying that changes in the military sphere in the USSR have affected only conventional armaments. "Their ballistic missiles are still targeted on the United States," the Pentagon chief asserted.

"The core of our strategy is still strategic deterrence, the possession of sufficient nuclear forces to ensure that they do not attempt to use their forces against us," Cheney said. Furthermore, the secretary stated: "Even if we reach an agreement on strategic offensive armaments we will still need to move forward in modernizing our strategic forces."

The U.S. defense secretary's comments are in stark contrast with the opinion of the majority of U.S. legislators and many political figures. Comments in Congress and in the mass media in the past week have expressed criticism of the administration's proposal in the fiscal 1991 draft federal budget to increase spending on the improvement and development of the strategic arsenal, including the "star wars" program, the creation of the brand new B-2 Stealth bombers, another Trident missile-carrying submarine, and ICBM's. For example, the administration has been left virtually in isolation by insisting on almost doubling the appropriations for the MX and Midgetman missile programs.

The "peace dividends" of reducing spending on strategic forces, many in Washington believe, must be used to develop social programs and to combat the federal budget deficit.

U.S. Maintaining Forward-Based Naval Strategy

LD0602182290 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Commentary by Viktor Vladimirov]

[Excerpts] The United States intends to keep unchanged its strategy of forward-based naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, Rear Admiral Henry Mauz, has made this understood in an interview with the Japanese paper ASAHI, Viktor Vladimirov comments.

Although Admiral Mauz admitted that since the Second World War East-West relations had never enjoyed more relaxation, he claimed this country had been building up arms in the Pacific. And that was why, he added, the United States had to keep deployed some of its naval force near the Korean peninsula and toward the South China Sea. This clashes with fact. It's common knowledge the Soviet Union is reducing troops in the east of the country by 200,000, including 120,000 in the Far East, and withdrawing Air Force units and warships from the Pacific. [passage omitted]

True, the United States recently announced the reduction of its overseas military facilities, and one could expect the move to affect the Philippnes, but nothing of the kind happened. The United States is not scaling down its military presence in the region. What it does reduce is the personnel at the (San Miguel) communication base only. It does so because it is updating the local equipment. The Pentagon is only slightly changing the character of its annual large-scale military exercises in the Asian-Pacific region. The annual American-South Korean maneuvers "Team Spirit" will begin in the middle of next month. Washington and Seoul have announced the scale of the exercises will be dramatically reduced from the usual 200,000 troops to 180,000. These exercises will be followed by "Rimpac" multilateral maneuvers. Once in two years the Pentagon stages a large-scale military demonstration in the central Pacific with the participation of the carrier-borne aviation of its Pacific allies. Australia, Canada, South Korea and Japan will reportedly place their ships and planes at the Pentagon's disposal.

There is the impression the U.S.-announced reduction of its military presence in the Asian-Pacific region will entail no change in the Pentagon's strategy. This conclusion is confirmed by a recent message from U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to his Philippine colleague Fidel Ramos. It follows from the message the Pentagon does not intend to rid the Philippines of American bases. Obviously the United States counts on support from both some of the Filipinos and politicians in the neighboring countries. Ample evidence is the recent statement of the Singapore Prime Minister, Le Kuan Yew. Nonetheless, antibase sentiments in Southeast Asia are such that Washington will have to bend every effort to win consent from Manila at the talks due in March and April to extend leases. The tour of the Philippines and other southeast Asian countries that Dick Cheney expects to carry out this month will serve the same goal. The ASEAN nations are likely to discuss the American military presence shortly. The discussion will definitely leave an imprint on the future Philippine-American talks for the fate of the largest American overseas bases.

TASS Reports U.S. Missile Launch 7 Feb

LD0702070290 Moscow TASS in English 0655 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] San Francisco February 7 TASS—The United States carried out another test of the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile.

The blank missile was launched from an underground silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, and hit the designated target near Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific after covering 4,200 miles in 30 minutes, according to a U.S. Air Force spokesman.

Agreement With U.S. on Narcotics Trafficking

LD0102123890 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 1 TASS—The USSR and the United States signed in Washington on Wednesday an agreement on mutual understanding in the joint efforts to fight narcotics trafficking.

The document was signed by Vitaliy Boyarov, head of the main department of State Customs Control at the USSR Council of Ministers, and John Lawn, director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.

The agreement was signed on the final day of the Soviet delegation's visit. They conducted talks with senior executives of the U.S. Customs Service and at the State Department.

During the visit the sides initialled the first agreement on cooperation between the Soviet and U.S. customs services. It will be signed during the visit of Carol Hallet, head of the U.S. Customs Service, to the Soviet Union this summer.

During their stay in the United States the Soviet delegates also familiarised themselves with the U.S. Customs' training system, the organisation of the local customs service, and expertise in combatting narcotics trafficking at American border checkpoints.

Bilateral Conference Generates 180 Projects

PM0602170590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "Cowboys Awaited in Cossack Villages"]

[Text] We have grown accustomed to the fact that international public conferences frequently do not have a practical result and, at best, they often end with the adoption of a final document or an appeal to governments. At the recently concluded second Soviet-U.S. top-level meeting of citizens, organized by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the (U.S.) Center for Soviet-U.S. Dialogue, approximately 180 specific projects, ideas, and proposals were advanced! As the organizing committee of the forum reported, they were all examined during the work of 18 specialized sections and four "roundtables" in which 500 Soviet and U.S. representatives of the public participated.

A specific result was achieved in the "Resolution of Conflicts" group. A permanently functioning center, which is being set up, will train specialists in mediation in the resolution of interethnic conflicts and labor disputes, and for the study of international conflicts and problems of preventing terrorism.

The "Human Rights" group discussed problems—which are so topical for our country—of the rights of peoples and ethnic groups, as well as questions of citizens' rights and duties in the sphere of ecology—questions which so far have not been elaborated to any great degree. The project entitled "The Destinies of Small Ethnic Groups and Peoples in an Interdependent World" has already been launched on a practical footing. The group finalized and supported a draft joint Soviet-U.S. declaration of the rights of the individual and the chief ways to ensure them.

Offers from U.S. representatives of the business world to help in the training of Soviet managers and administrative specialists were very timely.

I would like to point out the project "Cossacks and Cowboys Are Brothers," which proposes the creation of an international camp with an invitation to cossack villages for U.S. cowboys.

The "Global Perestroyka" group will continue work on the creation of an international multilateral structure, a kind of "brain trust" uniting various countries' researchers in the quest for prescriptions for global perestroyka.

Among the many dozens of projects in the "Ecology" section, the practical ones attract attention: the creation of a Soviet-U.S. enterprise in the Crimea to produce ecologically clean solar and wind energy plants and equipment for tidal and wave power stations.

The "Health, Psychology, and Healing" group came up with very humane projects—for example, the creation of a Soviet-U.S. center of nonorthodox [netraditsionnyy] treatment methods.

The organizational committee from the state of Kansas advanced an initiative to hold a meeting of 1,000 Soviet and many thousands of U.S. citizens in the United States in October 1990 devoted to the centenary of Dwight Eisenhower's birth.

It is very important that absolutely all the proposals—both the "raw" ones that got no further than an idea and those that reached the stage of practical implementation—have been fed into the memory of powerful computers. The Center for Soviet-U.S. Dialogue in the United States and the Political Research Center under the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in Moscow will now have a full computerized data bank on who proposed which projects, what their essence is, and to whom Soviet and U.S.

activists and public organizations should turn if they wish to find partners in the other country to implement their plans in peacemaking activity.

China

RSFSR Official on Trade Links With PRC

OW0602125290 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0600 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Dear listeners: The trade volume between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and China reached 500 million Swiss francs in 1989. Last December, the RSFSR Trade Ministry and the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry signed the 1990 cooperation protocol in Beijing. Under the protocol, bilateral cooperation will be further expanded to include not only the field of trade alone. On this, Tikhonov, RSFSR deputy trade minister, has the following to say:

True, our current cooperation with China is not limited to trade alone. The RSFSR and some Chinese border provinces established joint ventures such as hotels. So far, eight joint venture-hotels have been built. These hotels are managed in different ways. Some cater to foreign tourists and accept foreign currency only. Others take only rubles and renminbi. More hotels of the latter kind will be built later this year.

In addition, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation was signed recently during our talks with the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry representatives in Beijing. According to the agreement, the two sides will jointly design and construct a number of cold storage and other engineering projects in the Soviet Union and China. Initially the agreement seems (?unrealistic). However, we believe that we should not consider our self interests alone. If we have sufficient funds, why can't we satisfy the consumption needs of our citizens while cooperating with China at the same time? For example, we can build guesthouses and highways in the border areas. Due to the poor quality of highways and the lack of transportation means in China, our Chinese partners have difficulties in loading, unloading, and transporting goods supplied by the Soviet side at border stations. This is a major obstacle to expanding trade volume between the RSFSR and China. Therefore, it should be pointed out that we have yet to explore the great potential in trade. We are seeking new ways of cooperation in order to create better conditions for expanding trade between the RSFSR and China.

Northeast Asia

Yeltsin Interviewed on Visit to Japan

PM0602234190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Interview with Boris Yeltsin by observer Pavel Voshchanov; interview conducted in Japan on an unspecified date; published under the rubric "Topical Interview"; first two paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Why Yeltsin Went to Japan"]

[Text] The guns fell silent 45 years ago, but legally the USSR and Japan are still in a state of "truce." A "dialogue between deaf and dumb" was how Boris Yeltsin described the state of Soviet-Japanese relations in conversation with our observer Pavel Voshchanov.

Thus, the tour of Japan, on which B.N. Yeltsin was accompanied by his Moscow colleague Deputy V.N. Yaroshenko, is over. His meetings with the prime minister, foreign minister, leading politicians, representatives of the business world, academics, university students, and workers are behind him. As are, of course, the dozens of interviews given to Japanese and accredited foreign correspondents over here. And yet one point of the program which Yeltsin had agreed to back in Moscow remains unfulfilled: his final, closing interview in Japan—specially for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA....

[Voshchanov] You often meet with voters. You will obviously have contacts with them on your return home. I'm sure that you will often have to answer the following question: Just why did you go to Japan?

[Yeltsin] The way the question is formulated smacks of our usual, prejudiced attitude to such trips. Some people think as follows: "Why go abroad, we should set our own house in order!" At the last Supreme Soviet session one of the speakers complained that "certain deputies" were traveling abroad too often, that some sort of brake should be put on these trips.... But we have lived with an "immobile" parliament for dozens of years. Generally speaking, our official delegations have been composed (and still are) mainly of top civil servants and those to whom they feel favorably disposed. Our foreign partners have often chuckled about this: They say that Soviet deputies are the quietest in the world! And indeed, as a rule it would be the delegation leader who would speak, while the ordinary members would listen politely and express "complete unanimity" by their very demeanor. But did that do us any good? I'm convinced it did us nothing but harm. Our deputies' ignorance of foreign policy matters created the fertile environment in which tragic decisions such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan became possible. Unfortunately, many such examples could be quoted. If we want to finally create genuine parliamentary democracy, our corps of deputies needs to conquer as quickly as possible its fear of foreign policy problems and deprive the narrow layer of top party and state functionaries of their monopoly on solving them.

[Voshchanov] But that could be said to be a general principle. If we get down to specifics: Just what did prompt your decision to visit Japan?

[Yeltsin] I don't think it's any secret that this country is now the acknowledged leader of world scientific and technical progress. Judge for yourself, it has 2.4 percent of the world's population and 0.3 percent of the land

area. But how much does it produce? Around 14 percent of total world output! For the second year in succession, this country has been number one in the West in terms of per capita GNP. It is now achieving world-class social labor productivity. Many specialists believe that in the next century Japan will be the birthplace of the most important scientific and technical achievements, particularly in the sphere of supermodern communications systems, new materials, biotechnology, electronics, and the aerospace industry. Excellent initial conditions have been created here in those areas, and they are already producing striking results. There is now no country (although we are an unhappy exception) where goods made in Japan or produced using Japanese technology are not on sale. They are reasonably priced, of high quality, and technically one step—if not two—ahead of their competitors. It is no accident that Japan is currently the third largest exporter in the world.... And all this literally a "stone's throw" from Russia, which accounts for barely more than one percent of Japan's foreign trade turnover!

[Voshchanov] But is there any real possibility of expanding our economic contacts with Japan? Perhaps there's just no mutual interest in it?

[Yeltsin] We once lost a real chance of organizing mutually advantageous cooperation. Remember that in the sixties, Japan was experiencing serious difficulties with raw materials. At the time it was very much attracted to cooperation with the USSR, it could have completely solved its problems with raw materials. So what was the stumbling block? The generally unsettled nature [neuregulirovannost] of our political relations. The sides were incapable of meeting each other halfway. Let the Japanese assess the political wisdom of their former leaders, I want to deal with ours. There was a view among the then leadership that Japan's dependence on raw materials would grow with time, which would make it even more pliant on all disputes. Was that forecast borne out? No. Within a brief period, the Japanese managed to radically change their economic structure and thereby sharply reduce their demand for raw materials.... If I might digress, I would like to note that we just can't shake off the illusion that vast stocks of raw materials can feed a country or that the whole world needs them. I would be more specific: It still needs them, although by no means all of them and no longer to the extent it did 25 years ago, for instance.

[Voshchanov] But raw materials are still the basis of our exports to Japan. Timber, coal, fish, oil, petroleum products, valuable and nonferrous metals, cast iron—this list hasn't changed for many years. And if Japanese demand for raw materials is declining, won't we find ourselves knocking at a door that nobody is going to open?

[Yeltsin] No, that's not quite the case. First, I wouldn't write off the potential of our industrial sectors. The economic reform—if it is taken to its logical conclusion, of course—is capable of giving them their "second wind." And what about our intellectual potential? Unfortunately, we do not properly value it and think that all the most valuable ideas these days inevitably emerge abroad. But here in Japan we often felt that Japanese entrepreneurs are very interested in expanding scientific and technical cooperation with the USSR. There's one other point too: In time, I think, the competition Japan faces from the so-called group of "newly industrialized countries" will grow. Their goods (whose production, incidentally, has largely been developed on the basis of Japanese technology and capital) are cheaper and their quality is in no way inferior. In order to maintain its economic stability, Japan, I think, will be forced to look for new and very large markets. So I don't see our relations as "one-way traffic." The benefit will be mutual, so we don't need to tug our forelock....

[Voshchanov] And yet facts are facts—Japanese businessmen have no particular desire as yet to expand economic cooperation with us.

[Yeltsin] Objectively speaking, both our countries need a major breakthrough in economic relations. And not in the distant future, but right now. I'm convinced that we should be reckoning this up not in percentages but in round figures [razy]! For instance, I take little comfort from the assurances from both sides that our ties are being strengthened. In our 10-day stay here we have repeatedly heard that Japan is the Soviet Union's third-largest trading partner in the capitalist world, whereas it was number five just three years ago. But is that really sufficient for two countries seemingly made for cooperation and collaboration? Unfortunately, behind the facade of the quantitative increase there is as yet no new quality to be seen in Soviet-Japanese economic relations. Moreover, our numerous contacts in political and business circles unfortunately allow us to conclude that there has recently been a certain decline in the Japanese business world's interest in the Soviet market. There are several reasons for this: the gradual weakening of the radical nature of our economic reform, the interethnic conflicts, and domestic tension. Moreover, certain circles, it seems, have worked out a new formula as far as their behavior toward our country is concerned: Let the economic situation in the Soviet Union deteriorate still further, they say. That will make it more amenable on the question of the fate of the northern territories.

[Voshchanov] Incidentally, most Japanese with whom we met indeed think that resolution of this matter would remove many if not all of the obstacles in our relations. Is that so?

[Yeltsin] Partly. But, at any rate, the territorial dispute between us has continued on and off for more than 40 years. No oriental etiquette with its emphasis on courtesy and its assurances of good-neighborliness and love of peace can hide the fact that Soviet-Japanese relations are now deadlocked because of this issue. Japan will not sign a peace treaty until the four South Kurile Islands—Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai—are returned to it. The USSR invariably talks about "illegal and

unsubstantiated territorial claims." The sides' positions have not come an inch closer in 40 years! Is that normal? It's nonsensical—from the legal standpoint we are still warring parties who have only concluded a temporary truce! I'm convinced that the problem must be solved. We need to meet each other halfway, and it is possible that we will have to take the bigger steps.

[Voshchanov] If that's the case, why haven't you supported the idea of unconditionally and immediately handing the islands over to Japan while you're here?

[Yeltsin] I'm convinced that solving the problem "head on" won't get us out of the deadlock. Such statements are only good for "eliciting" applause—and even then only from audiences who are not very well-schooled in the subtleties of politics. A serious policy must be based on realities, which demand a more flexible approach. What do Soviet people know about the "northern territories" problem at present? The numerous meetings with voters on the eve of our departure convince me that they either know nothing about it or only know one side of it—the side that has been covered for many years in our official press. Is our public opinion ready for any radical solutions at the moment? No. We need time to explain to people, convince them, and point things out to them. After all, it's the people who will ultimately decide the matter.... In 1957 N.S. Khrushchev stated that if the Americans returned Okinawa to Japan, then he would go to the government and propose that it return Habomai and Shikotan Islands to Japan even before a peace treaty were concluded. But did that bring a solution to this very serious problem any nearer? I think it merely played into the hands of the opponents of the democratic course that was then gaining strength. Isn't that the reason why, after his removal, it was immediately stated that the "attempts to revise the border existing between the USSR and Japan as a result of World War II have no foundation and are doomed to failure"?

[Voshchanov] But you will agree that we cannot move forward without knowing our ultimate destination. What is it? Should Soviet sovereignty over the islands be retained or should they ultimately be handed over to Japan?

[Yeltsin] I can see five phases in solving this problem. First and foremost, we need to officially recognize that a problem exists. I think that our Supreme Soviet should do this. In the second phase we must demilitarize the islands, and in the third phase open them to free enterprise. Then a peace treaty could finally be signed with Japan. What about the fifth phase? I think that a new generation of politicians will have to find the answer to that question. Perhaps they will work out some original scheme. But I can currently imagine a few options. These would include a joint protectorate or the granting to the islands of free-territory status. But, I repeat, this question would have to be decided by a new generation in strict accordance with the domestic political situation in public opinion in the two countries.

[Voshchanov] If we go down that road, it is clear just what the Japanese side will gain. But what are its attractions for us?

[Yeltsin] In political terms—prestige, which is perhaps the most valuable point of all. In economic terms—an opportunity to attract Japanese potential to resolve large-scale and long-term programs on Russian territory. I think the first step down this important road would be the conclusion of a separate treaty between Russia and Japan. During our trip we've repeatedly seen for ourselves that this isn't an illusion but an entirely realistic idea. We just need to tackle it seriously. For instance, during our meeting the Japanese minister of construction suggested thinking about a joint project to build a supermodern highway from Japan to West Europe across the length of the USSR—the "Silk Road," as he put it. The project would be financed entirely by Japanese investment, while utilization of the highway would be on a joint footing. Was that an advantageous suggestion? In my opinion, it was. It would allow us to largely defuse our transportation problem. The idea was repeatedly put forward of Japanese participation in setting up modern tourist areas in our country. Our proposal for Japanese construction firms to cooperate in developing modern housing complexes and in modernizing our cities was received with interest. The president of a world-famous industrial robotics firm—it controls approximately 50 percent of the world market in robotics!—proposed annually training around 1,000 of our specialists.

[Voshchanov] These are undoubtedly tempting proposals. But I think that not everyone in our country will be overjoyed about them. Some people will probably sound a note of caution, wondering whether we will become dependent on Japanese capital. As a reader said in a letter to me: God preserve us from experiencing the exploitation suffered by the Japanese proletariat.

[Yeltsin] Unfortunately, it wouldn't be a bad idea for our proletariat to enjoy the same living conditions and social guarantees that the Japanese have achieved in 40 years and we have been unable to achieve in 70. Judge for yourself, Japan currently has the lowest inflation rate of all the industrially developed countries. It is seven to eight times lower than our rate. Retail prices here are virtually static. Average monthly wages increase annually by approximately five percent and, on average, are above $3,000. Unemployment in Japan is very low. Japan is number one in the world in terms of the longevity of its citizens and has the lowest rate of infant mortality. The Japanese don't know the meaning of the words "shortage" and "line"—we can borrow a lot and learn a lot from their economic model. We should avoid political shortsightedness. It is high time that we turned our attention from the West to the East, actively developed parliamentary ties, and trained cadres. The world in general is moving toward economic unification. In time, borders will crumble and customs posts disappear. We need to recognize the objective and inevitable nature of this process—if, of course, we don't want to be left on the margins of world civilization.

Former Mongolian Leader Stripped of Awards

PM2601144190 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 p3

[Own correspondent L. Arikh report: "Stripped of Their Awards"]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar—Following a decision by the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League [Revsomol] Central Committee Bureau, Yu. Tsedenbal, former leader of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] and the Mongolian state, and his wife, A.I. Tsedenbal-Filatova, have been stripped of their Revsomol awards.

Yu. Tsedenbal's political shortsightedness, the Revsomol Central Committee Bureau decision says, had a negative impact on the principles of party leadership of the Revsomol and distorted the true role of the Revsomol as a mass youth organization.

Yu. Tsedenbal's wife, A.I. Tsedenbal-Filatova, the Revsomol Central Committee Bureau resolution continues, constantly interfered in the activity of the Revsomol and the Pioneer organization in her capacity as chairman of the central commission of the Mongolian Children's Fund.

Despite this, the former Revsomol leadership did its utmost to shed glory on the activities of Yu. Tsedenbal and his wife, of which the numerous Revsomol awards conferred on them are evidence.

UNEN Editor Cited on Perestroyka in Mongolia

PM3001094590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Lodongiyn Tudeb, chief editor of the Mongolian newspaper UNEN, by own correspondent A. Krivel under the rubric "PRAVDA Guest": "'I Know For Sure...'"; date and place unspecified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Excerpt] Lodongiyn Tudeb, chief editor of the Mongolian newspaper UNEN, paid a visit to our editorial office. He met with I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, and members of the editorial collegium and answered questions from our correspondent.

[Krivel] What is the most striking feature of Mongolian working people's actions today, in this period of perestroyka and renewal?

[Tudeb] Their enthusiasm. Yes, their enthusiasm. Perestroyka, as noted by the recent Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee plenum, has entered a difficult, exceptionally intense period and is sweeping through more and more new spheres of life. People understand this. They are playing an active role in the process. A considerable number of people have appeared who could be called true champions of renewal. I would like to give a special mention to livestock breeders. They sometimes surpass people living in the cities. Shepherds, horse herdsmen, and dairymaids are transferring to contractual work methods and the lease system. There are already definite improvements.

This activeness is mirrored in our newspaper. The editorial office has begun to receive three times as many letters as in 1986, say. There has been a massive increase in the number of suggestions made by working people. We print many of them. Really incredible things happen sometimes. For example, a very experienced communist drew up his own draft statute for the MPRP and sent it to us at the editorial office. We published the draft in full. We set aside a whole page for this purpose. Then we published proposals for the concept of national economic development which had been drawn up by three economists. These were followed by a draft national education system, compiled in detail by a teacher. I will tell you that high-ranking commissions have been set up to study all these questions.

[Krivel] Are journalists finding it easier or more difficult to work in the perestroyka period?

[Tudeb] Much more difficult. In the past, no one tried to refute the newspaper's assessments. There was unbounded flattery and sweeping criticism. In short, we were an appendage of that very same administrative-edict system and had a kind of monopoly on the truth. But now competence and objectivity are coming to the forefront. There is no doubt that it is more difficult to be competent and know how to analyze. [passage omitted]

Perestroyka in Soviet-Korean Friendship Society

SK3001104990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 29 Jan 90

[From the radio magazine "Perestroyka"]

[Text] The process of perestroyka [words indistinct] the work of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society. In a recent regular meeting of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee, [words indistinct] the new situation. (Viktor Likov), secretary general of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee, delivered a report on the work of 1989 and the work plan for this year.

After pointing out that introducing the process of fundamental restructuring underway in Soviet life to Korean social circles and propagandizing the Soviet Union's peace-loving external policies to them is an important part of the work of the Soviet-Korea Friendship Society, (Viktor Likov) said: [Words indistinct] were under way in the Soviet Union and the DPRK in 1989, and Days of DPRK were celebrated at the society's chapters in (Novosmusk), (?Khabarovsk), and (Hamorsk). The (Chuhanchikone) and (Amursk) Chapters of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society were inaugurated.

[Passage indistinct]. In their speeches, participants at the meeting discussed the need to restructure the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, considering the changes in the situation in all of our society, a need that arose long ago. The fact that there is no [words indistinct], that [words indistinct] organizations have not been openly operated, and that various functions are just ceremonial are problems that the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society must solve today. [passage indistinct] This means that state assistance will be cut for the activities of the society, and the number of functions and the scale of some of them will be curtailed. Under these circumstances, it will be difficult for the society to [words indistinct] continue its activities. [passage indistinct]

In their speeches, active members of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society paid greater attention to the nature of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, that is, as its name indicates, its nature as a society for friendship with all the Korean people rather than only with the DPRK. The active members thought that this would also help dialogue between the two Koreas.

A proposal was also advanced in the meeting that functions common to the North and South of Korea be held in the Soviet Union. We cannot but point out that the association of ethnic Koreans in the Soviet Union, associations of experts, and various other social organizations [words indistinct]. [passage indistinct]

Next, (Andrey Milov), responsible official at the Soviet [words indistinct], explained a Korean revolutionary drama [word indistinct] to be opened in Moscow and a Soviet [word indistinct] center to be opened in Pyongyang. [passage indistinct]

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Ministry, Philippines Reach Visa Accord

HK2701023290 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] An official agreement was reached between the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Philippine Embassy in Moscow last Wednesday on the issuance of visas for nationals of the two countries within 20 days. The new agreement is expected to further promote relations between the two countries.

Philippines Senator Comments on Global Forum

HK2901061090 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 28 Jan 90

[Excerpts] [Radio Moscow reporter] A meeting called the Global Forum was recently held in Moscow to discuss environmental and other issues. The Philippine delegation attending the conference was headed by Senator Leticia Shahani, and I was able to interview the senator. I asked for her opinion on the Global Forum. [Passage omitted]

Senator Shahani, as chief of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, you recently commented that cold war thinking is no longer valid today. What can you say about the Soviet initiatives, as spelled out in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk dealing with the Asia-Pacific region?

[Shahani] That pronouncement by Mikhail Gorbachev that his government is giving priority to the prosperity of Vladivostok, I believe, is important. First of all, such a plan will greatly benefit the Soviet Union, since it is also part of Asia. But that portion of Asia known as the Soviet Far East is not yet well developed. The port of Vladivostok is still a closed city. But I saw, when I went to Khabarovsk, that many Japanese and Korean businessmen are going there. And I was told that Nakhodka will become important as well. So if commerce is established there and if the region is also made, let us say, a center of tourism, then we Filipinos will be able to do business in Vladivostok. We are versed in the construction business, for example, and also in the hotel business. I was able to see that in Vladivostok, people need goods like fruits and vegetables, which we in the Philippines could supply. We also produce garments and shoes in Manila, which I think we could export to that region. Perhaps there are also items which we could import from that region, even though I don't know what those things are, although I know it is a rich area. So Mr. Gorbachev's proposals are very sound. The ASEAN nations would surely also like to help this region. We Filipinos would be glad to help in its development, and we would welcome our Russian friends to go to the Philippines to see what joint ventures we can embark on.

[Reporter] You are a member of the Senate, the majority of which is opposed to the retention of the military bases. What is your view on this?

[Shahani] For myself, if the Soviet Union and the United States are on amicable terms and we can see an end to the cold war, then both countries need not have any more conlicts in Asia, in the Pacific Ocean. If they agree on this, then it will be possible to remove the military bases from the Philippines. In the old days, it was said that the military bases were needed because of the disagreement between the U.S. and the USSR, and in case war breaks out. But if this possibility is no longer there, then we small countries are saying that we no longer want to have these military bases on our territory so that we can use it for our own people's benefit.

As chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I think it would be good if in 1991—because that is when the military bases agreement expires—then perhaps a short period, perhaps 5 years, could be a phase-out period for the bases. We will then be able to use the area for our own projects. Even though we want the Americans to remove their bases, we also want to maintain good relations with them. As a former diplomat, I think it best if countries—when they end one type of relation—still keep contact with each other.

[Reporter] Radio Moscow has learned that this is not your first visit to the Soviet Union. What is your view of perestroyka and glasnost?

[Shahani] I am delighted because glasnost and perestroyka give us Filipinos the chance to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union, even with those who are not connected with the government, the ordinary people. It is now easier for us to speak to ordinary people, to ask questions, and reply to their questions. In the Global Forum, I was able to meet students from schools here and we had very good exchanges. Likewise, Russian citizens have been able to hold dialogues with various nationalities. This is what should happen because we want to learn what life is like here and in the other countries. It is good to have agreement on some things. Now that we know what is going on here—the good things and the problems—we have been able to behave in a similar manner by telling new friends what is going on in the Philippines. In this way glasnost and perestroyka are conducive to establishing friendship throughout the world, so that we are all like members of one family.

[Reporter] What will you be proposing to strengthen ties between the Soviet Union and the Philippines?

[Shahani] This morning I went to the office of Valentina Tereshkova, the head of the Soviet Friendship Society. We discussed things to do to promote friendship between both our countries. I was delighted that Mrs. Tereskova is sincere in her desire to maintain our good relations. There are many areas in which we can cooperate. [Passage omitted]

For my part, I think keeping up good relations and setting up projects is important, especially since President Aquino has plans to visit this country. I think that before she comes, we should have some ventures going so that we can show both President Aquino and President Gorbachev what we can accomplish.

Palau Votes To Decide on U.S. Compact

LD0602135890 Moscow TASS in English 1245 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] New York February 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Sitov:

Voters in the western Pacific archipelago of Palau vote today on whether to enter a compact of free association with the United States, in what is their seventh vote in as many years.

The agreement needs the approval of 75 per cent of residents to go ahead.

After the second world war, Palau was turned over to the United States as a trusteeship. At the U.S. insistence, Palau was split into four separate state formations.

After several decades under the trusteeship, the islands economy is a shambles, modern industry is non-existent, nearly all food is imported from the United States and Japan, and unemployment in the federated states of Micronesia, where most people live, is over 80 per cent.

But despite the economic mess, observers point out that Washington is keen to retain the territory as its test site and turn it into its Pacific forward defence area. To this end, Washington is prepared to pay annual hand-outs to boost Palauans standard of living.

On the Bikini and Eniwetok Islands alone, the United States has carried out more than 60 nuclear and hydrogen bomb tests.

Currently, the Marshall Islands are used to test Star Wars technologies. Micronesia has a good strategic situation, offers ideal natural harbours for ships and its airport can easily be convered for military purposes.

The agreement will give the United States full control over Micronesia's trade, defence and finances. Washington has already suceeded in wooing the people of three other islands.

Sam Mcphetres, whom Washington dispatched to monitor the ballot, said even before it began that the United States will increase its presence in Palau even if its people fail to approve the compact.

"However, this is not to say that there will not be another act of self-determination by Palau's people at some future date if the plebiscite fails," he said.

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on 4 Feb Cairo Bus Incident

Reactions

PM0602165290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

["IZVESTIYA Press Service" report: "Tragedy Near Cairo"]

[Excerpts] Last Sunday evening a quiet suburban highway east of Cairo was the scene of a bloody tragedy. A tour bus carrying a group of tourists from Israel, on its way to the Egyptian capital, suddenly found its road barred by a pale green Peugeot. Two masked figures jumped out and opened fire with submachineguns. After firing several rounds they threw four hand grenades into the bus, then got into the car, and disappeared from view at great speed. Eight Israelis were killed and 17 seriously wounded. [passage omitted]

Egyptian President H. Mubarak called Israeli Prime Minister Y. Shamir and expressed regret over the incident. A statement issued by the office of the Egyptian head of state stresses that the attack on Israeli tourists was "aimed primarily at undermining efforts to achieve lasting peace in the region."

Reports of the incident prompted an explosion of indignation in Israel. Special statements were delivered on the subject by the leaders of virtually all political parties and parliamentary factions. In Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, there were spontaneous demonstrations demanding that the terrorists be caught and the Israelis' lives avenged.

Some representatives of extreme right-wing organizations in Israel hurried to take advantage of the incident for their own narrow political purposes. They stated that the responsibility for the incident rests not only with the Egyptian authorities for failing to ensure the safety of Israeli citziens, but also with the Israeli left-wingers who intend, it is said, to go to Cairo soon to meet with PLO representatives there.

'International Terrorism'

TA0602120390 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1600 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Commentary by Dimitriy Prokofiev]

[Text] What happened yesterday, when innocent civilians, including women, were attacked, was a case of international terrorism. No matter what the terrorists' slogans are, what is clear is that no national struggle or struggle for freedom from oppression can justify these abominable murders.

I hope that the Egyptian authorities will capture and punish the terrorists. So far, no one has claimed responsibility for the lethal attack—with the exception of a totally unknown organization which apparently serves merely as a means to divert the investigators' attention. This is natural, because terrorists are usually cowards who launch attacks from ambushes and, having done their job, flee the site. It seems that in this instance, however, the nature and timing of the attack unequivocally point to the culprits: those radical Arab circles who strive to undermine the political process in the Middle East out of a desire to prevent the formulation of a compromise solution for the Palestinian problem.

The attack on the Rafah-Ismailia road dealt a severe blow to the moderate elements in the PLO, to Egypt, and to the peace-seeking circles in Israel. Consequently, the PLO headquarters are in a state of turmoil—and it does not matter whether the terrorists were radical Palestinians or radical Muslims from Egypt. If the first is true, the attack is a blow to the entire Palestinian struggle; if the second is true, the immediate result is bound to be an awakening of the Palestinian camp's Muslim radicals.

The position of the Egyptian leadership has also been shaken, particularly in view of the fact that Cairo had assumed the role of mediator between the Israeli Government and the Palestinians.

And in Israel, the elements that will probably come out reinforced are those which look at the Middle East problems through the viewfinder of a gun. Minister Sharon has already said that nothing has changed in the Middle East and that Arabs still want to destroy Israel.

In has been learned from Cairo that the investigation is being conducted along two alternative possibilities: One says that the terrorists, who—according to an Egyptian Interior Ministry statement—spoke a non-Egyptian Arab dialect, are Arabs from outside Egypt. The other version avers that the clues lead to Thawrat al-Masr, a radical Muslim organization which has perpetrated lethal attacks against Israelis in the past. However, whoever the terrorists were, there is no doubt that they, as well as their patrons, will have to give full account to both a criminal court and the court of the Middle East nations—the Israelis and the Arabs.

PLO 'Contradictions'

LD0602210490 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic 1430 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Information media in the Middle East and in the entire world are still commenting on the attack of the terrorist elements last Sunday [4 February] on a bus carrying Israeli tourists in the Sinai peninsula. This incident, as was expected, has greatly complicated the situation in the region.

Our radio commentator, Andrey Vasilyev, wrote saying it is unlikely for one to doubt that those terrorists were motivated first of all not only by the desire to satisfy their covetous bloody ambitions—although these desires were there—but also to satisfy political motives. We must admit the basic objective of these extremist elements is to hinder or to freeze all attempts to draw up the paths for the dialogue betweeen Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

This incident naturally does not improve relations between Israel and Egypt, either. Yahoshu'a Matza, member of the Israeli Knesset, Likud, has said the Egyptians have to prove their noninvolvement in this crime by only one way—namely by severing all contacts with the [Palestinian] Liberation Organization and its institutions, and by breaking all contacts with Yasir 'Arafat generally. If this terrorist action was seeking to provoke such reaction, then this has been successfully done.

It seems the responsibility for this bestial crime has been claimed by the small coalition groups that were split from the PLO and by some elements of the Muslim fundamentalists. Although there is no confirmation for these reports and it is unlikely in such cases, however, the extremist groups, such as the one controlled by Ahmed Jibril, have carried out such terrorist acts in the past.

What is noticeable in the PLO is the incoherence between its strategy and its tactics. Internal contradictions are getting worse. The recent intransigent and unyielding stand of the moderate wing, led by Yasir 'Arafat, to find political ways for solving the problem has evoked such contradiction. The shots which echoed in Sinai would most likely lead to the cancellation of a meeting scheduled for next week between the foreign

ministers of Israel, Egypt, and the United States of America, which was to discuss questions relating to the preparation for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

It must also be said the blow dealt to the line of Yasir 'Arafat was strong and sensitive. The PLO representative in Cairo, Sa'id Kamal, has declared that the organization opposes all forms of terrorism and condemns the attack, which serves noone except the enemies of a just peace.

On the other hand it cannot be said that the news of what has happened in Sinai has provoked many commentaries in the Soviet Union. The news from the south of the country where ethnic contradictions were strife were reminiscent of military communiques, while scores of people were being killed and the fate of hundreds of thousands of refugees surely disturb humanity much more. [as heard]

In light of these events, the news carried by foreign news agencies does not always attract the attention. However, it can be said frankly that the Soviet citizens have been able to see the faces of those who are prepared to solve political questions by means of bombs, machineguns, and rifles, and they definitely deserve condemnation, scorn, hatred, and no more.

Zlatorunskiy Comments on Middle East Policies

LD2601212490 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Aleksey Zlatorunskiy commentary]

[Text] It is not difficult to highlight articles published lately in a number of papers and other mass media organs—regrettably including those of Arab countries—which attempted to shed erroneous light on the Soviet Union's Middle East policies. The reason behind the publication of such articles is the statement made by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who asserted that it is not possible to talk at all about returning the occupied territories to Arabs, because the number of Soviet Jewry immigrating to Israel is on the increase. We are going to settle Soviet Jews in those territories, Shamir added. However, what is really the situation?

We would like to point out, before anything else, that Moscow has considered Shamir's statement as a political provocation; the spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry described it as an attempt by the Israeli leadership to torpedo efforts aimed at bringing about a settlement, one of whose necessary conditions is Tel Aviv's abandonent of occupied Arab territories in the Middle East. This time Shamir's statement drew protest from the majority of countries, including the United States. It has become evident, furthermore, that the current Israeli leadership has yet to give up the old dream of driving a wedge between the Soviet Union and the rest of Arab countries as well as depriving Arabs from the traditional Soviet assistance for their just struggle to regain their national rights. It is logical to suppose, moreover in this respect, that any statement made in Arab countries in this direction will be met in Israel with deep satisfaction.

Our commentator Aleksey Zlatorunskiy added: The Soviet Union's exertion of its committed efforts to bring about a political settlement to the Middle East problem, on the basis of balanced interests, grows daily. The Soviet Union holds active consultations on this problem with all countries which have direct or indirect interest in the Middle East countries, including the United States and Israel—a conclusion which is as logical as the logic behind Egypt's similar talks with the representative of Israel. Palestinian President Yasir' Arafat has, furthermore, announced his readiness to begin direct negotiations with the Israeli Government.

Does this mean, however, that the Soviet stance on the principles for a settlement in the Middle East has changed somehow? No, never. The Soviet Union calls, as usual, for allowing the Palestinians to regain their just rights, including their right to the establishment of their own independent state. Does Moscow's recent decision to upgrade the PLO's representation to the Soviet Union to the State of Palestine Embassy status not mean so? And does the Soviet Union's firm stance on the need for the PLO's participation, on an equal footing, at all negotiations on a Middle East settlement not mean so?

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze received yesterday in Moscow Munsif al-May, the Arab League's first representative to the Soviet Union. The Arab League's delegate highly praised in his talks with the Soviet foreign minister the Soviet Middle East policies aimed at finding a political solution to the dispute in the region. Eduard Shevardnadze affirmed, on his part to the Arab League delegate, that cooperativization in the search for a solution to the Middle East problems between Arab cvountries and the Soviet Union will be bolstered in the future. And I think this is the main element upon which Soviet-Arab cooperation, which has been tested many times over given the longer years of consolidated economic and political cooperation, should be based.

Cooperation Program With Libya Signed

LD2601204890 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1330 GMT 26 Jan 90

[Text] The cooperation program in the information field for 1990-1991 between the Great Jamahiriyah and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow this morning. For Libya, it was signed by the brother secrtary of the General People's Committee for Information and Culture and for the Soviet Union, by the first secretary Soviet foreign minister.

UN Human Rights Investigation in Iran Viewed

NC3101101690 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 29 Jan 90

[Unattributed Commentary]

[Text] Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, an El Salvadoran legal expert from the United Nations, visited Iran at the behest of the UN Human Rights Committee to investigate facts regarding human rights violations in Iran. The Iranian leaders, who refute such allegations, invited the UN emissary.

What we get from the Iranian mass media is that right from the beginning, Galindo Pohl faced a complicated and tense situation. His residence in the Iranian capital was besieged by family members of those who had been executed for belonging to the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO]. Relatives of victims of the MKO's terrorist acts also demonstrated. In addition, those who had been imprisoned earlier, but were released after promising a complete break from the MKO also clamored to meet the UN emissary.

Representatives of pro-Iranian religious groups from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait also visited the UN emissary's residence to protest against their government officials' antidemocratic acts.

What conclusion can be deduced from such events? Perhaps the UN legal expert's visit to Iran was in vain, since the Iranian press tried to portray restrictions in Iran solely as a reaction to the MKO's terrorist activities. It can be said that these restrictions apply to other groups as well if viewed in light of the official statements on restrictions against the Tudeh Party, the Feda'iyan-e Khalq—majority group, the Kurdish Democratic Party, and other groups with different theological or secular beliefs.

This was deduced from only what was obvious in this matter, based on certain incidents (?stemming from) the regime's armed confrontation with the opposition. As history indicates, this confrontation was the result of the leaders' fundamentalist policy and the elimination of their own associates in the antimonarchical revolution.

Clearly the issue of human rights violations in Iran is a corollary of this fact. It is only by retrospectively looking at the events that we can gauge the level of responsibility for such violations. Of course the goal of Galindo Pohl's mission in Iran is probably to show him the model prisons set up by the regime and the so-called prison reform. However it is difficult to believe that the Iranians themselves will be able to satisfy those in international circles who are (?well aware) of the human rights violations in Iran, not only past violations, but also those since the new Iranian leaders came to power.

As you know, the new Iranian leadership has (?pledged to) lift the former restrictions, but this is not an easy task. The conservative forces in the Iranian clergy oppose democratic developments and impose their supervision on the people's thoughts and deeds. They want to keep Iran a (?center) of (?retrogression). They reject the call by human rights proponents in Iran to coordinate human rights regulations in Iran with the Human Rights Charter. It appears that as a result of the conservative forces' influence, the Iranian leadership's steps to improve the human rights situation and democracy mean nothing.

Let us consider for example, the recent general amnesty in Iran. In no way does it compare to the amnesties earlier announced in Iran, and even those were not truly considered amnesties by Iranians or by international human rights associations. Clearly true progress in human rights in Iran is impossible because of the leaders' banning political activity by political parties and because patriotic Iranians who have been incarcerated in the prisons have not been released.

It appears that cooperation between the new Iranian leaders and the United Nations in human rights matters could assist in truly democratizing the country.

Soviet-Indian Political Consultations Held

PM3101134190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Consultations Held"]

[Text] Soviet-Indian political consultations have been held in Moscow. Taking part were S.K. Singh, Indian Foreign Ministry secretary for foreign affairs, and Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister.

The consultations reaffirmed the coincidence of the approaches of the USSR and India to the solution of a key task—building a world free of nuclear weapons and violence.

In the sides' opinion, more practical importance attaches to the elimination, under strict international control, of two classes of nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States. An agreement on a 50-percent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States, accords on ceasing nuclear weapons tests, and a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be the next and very important milestones on the path of disarmament.

The participants in the consultations welcomed the process which has begun to eliminate conflict and crisis situations and the constructive contribution which the United Nations is making to this process. The representatives of the USSR and Indian foreign ministries announced their states' intention to continue a persistent search for the solution of the Afghan and Cambodian problems in conjunction with all interested sides.

In examining questions of bilateral Soviet-Indian relations, the mutual desire was confirmed to seek the implementation of the accords reached in recent years on the further development of cooperation between the two countries.

The consultations took place in the friendly atmosphere, which traditionally distinguishes Soviet-Indian meetings.

On 28 January, S.K. Singh left Moscow for Delhi.

Committee Discusses Soviet POWs, MIAs

LD3101212190 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] Moscow January 31 TASS—By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov:

Additional measures to help release former Soviet servicemen now in captivity in Afghanistan were discussed on Wednesday at a regular session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs in the Kremlin.

In his opening address acting chairman of the committee Aleksandr Dzakhosov said that additional efforts were required to coordinate the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet, various departments and public organisations to achieve results.

Iona Andronov, chairman of the national association of mothers and relatives of Soviet prisoners of war and people lost in action in Afghanistan, recalled that the letter, addressed by mothers and relatives to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, contained two requests, the first one being to send a provisional mission, comprising one specialist in international relations and two mothers, to Pakistan for talks on the return to the homeland of former Soviet servicemen who are now languishing in captivity. The association also asked to set up a special sub-commission to help rescue Soviet prisoners of war.

"The 290 signatures under the letter," Andronov stressed, "are 290 hopes".

The session was told that the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Soviet Peace Fund had been entrusted with the task to meet the first request. The second assignment was delegated to the USSR Supreme Soviet, represented in the matter by its Committee for International Affairs.

Committee members recommended that the USSR Supreme Soviet form a sub-commission for the affairs of Soviet servicemen who were captured or lost in action in Afghanistan.

The session was attended by members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defence and State Security, people's deputies who had participated in action in Afghanistan, and representatives of a number of state agencies and public organisations.

Sub-Saharan Africa

De Klerk Speech Reported, Initial Reactions

PM0602145690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent B. Pilyatskin report: "RSA Announces Measures To Liberalize Regime"]

[Text] Maputo—The most significant event for several decades in the country's political life and extremely important for southern Africa as a whole. This is how one could evaluate RSA [Republic of South Africa] President Frederik de Klerk's program speech, which he delivered Friday afternoon at a parliamentary session in Cape Town.

As the president announced, the decision was made to immediately lift the ban on the activities of the African National Congress [ANC], the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC], and the South African Communist Party [SACP], which have for many years been outlawed and considered "subversive." People subjected to judicial proceedings for belonging to these organizations are accordingly eligible for release.

All restrictions imposed under state of emergency laws with respect to 33 organizations are lifted. Restrictions on mass media activities and in the educational system in connection with the state of emergency are completely revoked.

The intention to reduce the number of death sentences and review corresponding legislation, and until then to suspend execution of sentences already passed, was declared.

And finally, near the end of his hour-long speech, delivered alternately in Afrikaans and English, F. de Klerk announced the government's decision to free Nelson Mandela unconditionally. He did not, however, name a specific date.

Incidentally, had N. Mandela wanted to go free without waiting for the president's speech, his lawyers could have achieved this without particular effort. However, as it became known, he himself categorically forbade any such pleading on his behalf.

Mandela's release must obviously be linked to a whole package of coordinated decisions. F. de Klerk confirmed this in reporting that N. Mandela, who could play an important role in the negotiating process on South Africa's future, expressed his readiness to make a constructive contribution to the peaceful resolution of South African problems. As we can see, hope has emerged that such a resolution can get under way in a practical sense.

It was no easy thing for the president to embark on the measures announced. The South African press has noted more than once of late that the so-called securocrats—conservatively inclined people from the higher echelons of the army and intelligence service—have in no way yielded their positions. It should also be taken into account that conservative decisions are almost a hereditary trait in South African politicians. And on this occasion the president did not fail to mention that his government is against any form of radicalism, whether from the left or the right. But the change in the general atmosphere in the country is evident if only from this remarkable detail: When F. de Klerk announced the

lifting of the ban on the activities of the ANC, the Communist Party, and other organizations, applause rang out in parliament.

The president's speech was addressed in many respects to the international community, which he called on to reevaluate its relationship with the RSA and to take a positive position in the light of the "dynamic evolution" taking place. He also touched on the irreversible changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe, where "Stalinist communism" has collapsed, which he said has great significance for South Africa. However, the president drew from this a conclusion not based on facts, that the changes "have weakened the ANC's position."

The president's speech itself, impossible to imagine even six months ago, is evidence of the real influence and weight of the ANC and other organizations standing for a free and democratic South Africa. Now nobody doubts any longer that the country is experiencing a decisive moment in its history. This moment could mark the starting point of the farewell to apartheid and open the door to the future, or else it could bury hopes of early reforms and exacerbate the antagonism within society, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences. Confrontation continues and there is still too great an abyss dividing the positions of the sides. But there is no turning back to the past. In these conditions flexibility, the willingness to make a reasonable compromise, and breadth of thought must prevail over short-term interests, dogmas, and obsolete stereotypes.

In Soweto, the largest African settlement in the RSA, and in the center of Cape Town, where parliament sits, immediately after F. de Klerk's speech, mass demonstrations took place, expressing joy and exultation in support of the ANC. Among the first reactions from abroad was a statement from Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, who congratulated the South African president on a "job well begun." A White House spokesman reported that U.S. President G. Bush intends to invite N. Mandela after his release, and separately President F. de Klerk, to come and discuss the question of a political settlement in South Africa. British Prime Minister M. Thatcher has made a similar offer.

Lukyanov Receives Botswana Envoy's Credentials

PM2601115190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general headline: "Presentation of Credentials"]

[Text] A.I. Lukyanov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, received the credentials of Alfred U.M. Dube [initials as transliterated], Botswana ambassador to the USSR, in the Kremlin 23 January.

The people of Botswana, the ambassador said, welcome the policy of perestroyka and glasnost in the Soviet Union, the success of which is also having a beneficial effect upon developing countries. The ambassador highly rated the USSR's foreign policy course aimed at safeguarding peace and international security, and particularly noted the Soviet Union's great contribution to the search for a settlement in southern Africa.

Accepting the credentials on behalf of the Presidium and the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.I. Lukyanov noted that the ideas of the new political thinking are gaining an ever stronger hold in the world, including on the continent of Africa, where positive changes are also under way. People in the USSR value Botswana's support for Soviet peace initiatives and its contribution to the southern African front-line states' efforts to bring about a political settlement in the region.

Both sides stressed their readiness to further develop and deepen Soviet-Botswana relations.

After the presentation of credentials A.I. Lukyanov and A.U.M. Dube held a friendly conversation in which Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister, took part.

Envoy to Cameroon Also To Serve on Chad

PM2601120390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 90 Second Edition p 8

[Unattributed "News Item"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has appointed Vladimir Ivanovich Fedorov, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Cameroon, as nonresident USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Chad.

Commentary Views Kenya, U.S. Military Accord

EA3001171490 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 29 Jan 90

[From the "Africa As We See It" program]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] According to many observers, the present visit of the Kenyan president [to the U.S.] concentrates above all on economic issues. Although the Kenyan economy is in a good condition at present, the country's financial situation is as complex as that of the rest of Africa. The issue of foreign debt is especially alarming. The debt owed by the country in 1988 was over $4,000 million, about 41.7 percent of the GDP. It is known that the U.S. is Kenya's biggest creditor. Kenya owes the U.S. about $1,650 million out of which the U.S. Administration has promised to cancel one-third in the current year. This has greatly attracted the attention of the Kenyan authorities. [passage omitted]

There is also another special issue in Kenyan-American relations. As is known, in accordance with a defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries, the Pentagon has the right to use the port and

airport at Mombasa and other military centers. Although Kenya gets a limited benefit from this agreement, the matter has worried its neighbors. For this reason it is also harmful. In the other Indian Ocean port of Lamu, America is reportedly intending to build an air base. This has aggravated the worries and suspicions of neighbors. The Kenyan leader is expected to discuss these issues with Washington officials.

Finally, some observers believe that an attempt might be made to resolve some procedural matters between Kenya and America—especially the propaganda campaign waged against Kenya by the American press, which has not suited Nairobi. There is special resentment over missionary and journalistic activities, which have been worsening, the discovery of opposition groups, and the murder of an American tourist in one of Kenya's game parks. American media comment on these issues have not pleased the Nairobi Government. This being the case, it is the practical side of the issue rather than the emotional that worried the Kenyan Government. Hundreds of thousands of rich foreign tourists, including Americans, visit Kenya every year, contributing millions of dollars to the country's economy. Therefore, the American media criticism bitterly offends Nairobi. Will the Kenyan president reach understanding and reconciliation with the American journalists? It is difficult for me to answer this question, says our commentator (Georgiy Saton).

East Europe

Gremitskikh Comments on German Unity

LD0202163190 Hamburg DPA in German 1512 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] East Berlin (DPA)—The Soviet Union is in favor of the two German states leaving the relevant military blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. "We are prepared to disband the blocs today," the deputy spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Gremitskikh, told correspondents in East Berlin. The Soviet Union is in favor of disbanding the alliances or transforming them into political alliances.

It is unrealistic and unacceptable to start from the premise that a united Germany could remain either in NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The solution has to be found between the two, he stated. Gremitskikh pointed out that GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow (SED-PDS) [Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party for Democratic Socialism], who presented a plan for German unity yesterday, had spoken of the military neutrality of a united Germany and not just of neutrality. He considered leaving the blocs "a good solution."

The plan for German unity is currently being studied carefully. None of the four victorious powers of the second world war had spoken the final word. The statements to date have been overhasty reactions, "simply insufficient and incomplete," he remarked critically. Modrow's concept should be discussed "more thoroughly." The plan had "most certainly" been agreed on in its rough outline by Modrow with Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to Moscow a few days ago, Gremitskikh said.

German unity is only possible within the framework of the process of European unity and with the cooperation of the four victorious powers. There must be negotiations on this at various forums and eventually at the conclusion of the Vienna disarmament talks. He thought the four powers would be interested in "discussing the problem." However, Modrow's concept is only 24 hours old. The four powers would "be co-actors" on the German question. They are not "bit players." Germany's neighbors should not be passed over.

Gremitskikh had also talked with representatives of opposition groups such as New Forum and the SPD [Social Democratic Party]. During this, he had discovered that they are prepared to be close friends of the Soviet Union even after the elections. "We will always remain a loyal friend of the GDR," the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Differing Opinions on German Reunification

PM0502102790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[V. Lapskiy dispatch: "Unity—How and When?"]

[Text] Berlin—The subject of German unification was already a leading topic in the GDR. But now that H. Modrow has set out his idea on the issue, it has overshadowed everything else. Of course, by no means everyone in the GDR dreams of unification with the FRG; there is no single view among supporters of unification about how to achieve it and within what timescale (some are prepared to "merge" with the FRG tomorrow, others not for 10 years). The main thing is that the overwhelming majority of GDR citizens today believe that the German people should be united; the unification process may be accelerated or delayed, but it must not be stopped. And one more thing: It seems that even the most emotional supporters of a "single German fatherland" are increasingly aware that unification is by no means a purely personal matter for the Germans; it concerns all Europeans, and not only them.

H. Modrow's idea in this area is being extensively and ardently discussed. Almost everyone agrees on one thing: It is gratifying that it has been proposed and that the chairman of the Council of Ministers is not lagging behind the unification movement but at least marching in step with it.

Opinions often differ on specific positions. The local Christian Democratic Union [CDU] (like the CDU leaders in Bonn, incidentally) considers the proposal to make the GDR and FRG militarily neutral to be "unrealistic." It is opposed by the Democratic Peasants' Party

of Germany, which expresses the opinion that the neutrality of the two German states would be the only possibility for observing the interests of all Germans in Europe as a whole.

I will quote a commentary which appeared in a recent issue of the Berlin evening newspaper BZ AM ABEND: "Anyone who rejects military neutrality, it seems to us, is making a wrong assessment of the course of events in East Europe. The reforms geared to the internal market in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union are becoming more and more widespread and are advancing the cause of European unification. Should the system of military pacts be retained forever in its present form? As Europe unites, these pacts will become increasingly political and more neutral. Shouldn't the GDR and the FRG be in the forefront of this process?"

Manfred Gerlach, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany [LDPD], held a press conference Friday. In his party's opinion a referendum should be held in the two German states 2 December this year—the day of the FRG Bundestag election. The German people would thus be exercising their right to self-determination, the LDPD leader believes. Following the referendum, whose result is clearly beyond any doubt, both German parliaments could hold a joint session and elect FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker president of a united Germany.

There are, however, forces in the GDR—they are clearly in a minority—which do not want to hear about unification at all. The "United Left" movement withdrew its representative from the government in protest at H. Modrow's idea. It called it an "illusory hope of millions that direct association with the FRG and the introduction of its currency would provide GDR citizens with the same living standards as the West." The movement accused Modrow of "overstepping the bounds of left-wing politics."

Gregor Gysi's visit to Moscow and his talks with the M.S. Gorbachev are also being seen to a considerable extent from the standpoint of the prospects for German unification. The newspapers have been quoting the Soviet leader's words that in resolving the German question it is necessary to carefully think over every step so as not to upset stability in Europe. The position adopted by the Soviet Union on the German problem has been welcomed here on the whole.

Changes in East Germany's SED-PDS Reviewed

Party Official Interviewed

PM2601150390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 6

[Dispatch by own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov: "The Party is Starting With Itself"]

[Text] Berlin—The external appearance of the building which used to house the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) Central Committee and now the Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism (SED-PDS) Board has changed.

You do not immediately appreciate in what way it has changed. It is only when you look closer that you notice that the glass booths alongside the building, in which sentries used to be permanently stationed, now stand empty. The same change can be observed inside: There are no armed guards at the main entrance or on the second floor, where the offices of Politburo members used to be located. This building, which previously created an impression of particular exclusiveness and watchfulness, now looks just like any other establishment.

My interlocutor in this building was Wolfgang Pohl, deputy chairman of the SED-PDS. At the moment he also holds the post of first secretary of the Magdeburg district party committee. Party conferences at the regional and district level are planned for February, when he will be replaced in this latter capacity and be able to give his full attention to his work on the board.

At the beginning of our conversation, he confirmed:

"Yes, we no longer have our paramilitary guards. This can be seen as one sign that the nature of the party has now changed. The extraordinary congress held in December last year not only added the words 'Party of Democratic Socialism' to the party's name but also formulated our objectives anew. It showed that the party has turned to face the people and real life, with all its complexities and contradictions."

There are a considerable number of historic achievements in the life of the GDR, the socialist state which has arisen on German soil, and these achievements cannot be wiped out. They can be credited to the people and the party of the working class, which has played a leading role in society. But, in addition to these achievements, there also have been distortions of socialism, which have given rise to serious problems and have set like a heavy burden on the party, placing it in an extremely difficult position. This has been further exacerbated by the fact that a number of former members of the top party leadership abused their power and fell prey to corruption. They have now been expelled from SED-PDS ranks and many are awaiting trial.

Now, with the renewal process that has begun, members of the government, the mass media, and the broad strata of party members and working people have been given the opportunity to openly speak the truth about painful issues. It transpires that sham had even gripped that sphere in which the GDR has made unquestionable achievements: providing the population with housing. Every resource was thrown into building new housing complexes, which was eagerly broadcast to the whole world. But, at the same time, tens of thousands of apartments in old buildings had fallen into a state unfit

for habitation. Vast construction capacities were drawn from the districts into Berlin. But, meanwhile, sturdy old buildings, entire residential districts in Leipzig, Dresden, and Halle fell into decay and took on a forlorn appearance: crumbling plaster, collapsed balconies, leaking roofs.

Large capital investments were channelled into sectors considered to be the key sectors: microelectronics and machine tool manufacture, in particular. Some combines have something to show for this: new enterprises or workshops fitted with modern equipment and manufacturing excellent goods. But there have not been sufficient resources to develop associated enterprises, which sometimes have equipment that is antediluvian. They deliberately have been permitted to fall into a condition where they are unable to maintain the pace established by the plan. There have been disruptions in deliveries, interruptions along all the production chains, which have had a domino effect on those who manufacture the end product. And what has happened? Year after year, the plans have been "amended" and the statistics touched up.

Serious contradictions have been brought to light in every sphere of life. The working people would have been willing to roll up their sleeves and get down to resolving these contradictions. But, instead of unleashing the people's initiative and bringing the levers of democracy into play, the leadership of the party and the country drove these contradictions even deeper under the surface and tried to intensify still further the administrative-edict methods of management and to regiment everything. The party has lost the people's faith as a result. Those people in the Central Committee Politburo and at other party and state levels who voiced criticism and sounded the alarm met with incomprehension. Those who offered criticism were persecuted, expelled from the party, and lost their jobs.

Party members looked on with indignation while the SED leadership tried to cut itself off from the ideas of perestroyka-developing in the Soviet Union. The press reproduced only what was impossible to conceal—official CPSU documents and the most important speeches. Distribution of the Soviet journal SPUTNIK, which enjoys great popularity in the GDR, was simply forbidden. At the same time, there was a hint of inappropriate arrogance, haughtiness, and pride in the official speeches of some SED leaders.

It will not be an exaggeration to say that, just as the Soviet Union has gone through all the pain of its perestroyka process, the GDR is now experiencing the same pain with its renewal program. The former SED leadership tried to erect obstacles in the way of renewal: This added to the party's difficulties when the turnabout in the country's life was begun from below by mass demonstrations and rallies. There were a considerable number of people in the party's ranks who felt deceived, confused, and led into an impasse.

W. Pohl told me that the party's numbers have been virtually halved and that this process has not stopped yet.

The complexity of the situation in which the party has found itself is also reflected in the fact that different trends with their own platforms have appeared in the party recently. Despite the decisions of the extraordinary congress, voices are still being heard insisting that the SED-PDS disband and a different party be formed in its place, a party that would be able to make a fresh start. In some cases, regional party organizations are disbanding of their own accord. At its recent session, the SED-PDS Board did not agree with the idea of disbandment but did indicate that the party's renewal must be accelerated.

The SED-PDS is just one of the political forces in the country. Alongside it, increasing their influence, other parties and social organizations are at work. Each of them has its own program for resolving the crisis in which the GDR now finds itself. Almost all see this solution as being the abandonment of socialism and the transfer to an exclusively market economy, as well as drawing as close as possible to the FRG economically, which will subsequently lead to the unification of the two German states. In these conditions, while not denying the need to form a "contractual community" with the FRG and establish closer cooperation with it, the SED-PDS still defends the need to preserve the GDR as a sovereign, independent state. That is the only way the social interests of its working people can be protected. The GDR also has a great role to play in preserving European stability and in the building of a "common European home."

One form of collaboration between all the political forces and movements now active in the GDR political arena is the "roundtable." Its recent sessions have been broadcast on television, which allows every citizen to judge for himself as to whether the stand taken by the 16 parties and social movements represented at the "roundtable" is positive or negative and to what extent its participants are helping or impeding the coalition government in fulfilling its main task: ensuring that the national economy functions normally and maintaining law and order in the country.

A public opinion poll conducted in the GDR showed that 73 percent of the population favors independence and sovereignty for the country and 71 percent favors socialism and its renewal. At the same time, those who, despite the real conditions, would like to see the immediate unification of the two German states are still making their presence felt at demonstrations and rallies.

"The transition to political methods of work," W. Pohl said, "has forced the SED-PDS to think about what its own structure should look like in the new conditions."

There is no longer any need for a cumbersome party apparatus and it is going to be considerably reduced in size.

Admitting their responsibility for the distortions and mistakes made in the past, party members are taking decisive measures to ensure that they can never again be repeated.

Board Announces Name Change

LD0402192790 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] Berlin February 4 TASS—By TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin: The Socialist Unity Party of Germany-Party of Democratic Socialism [SED-PDS] will henceforth be called the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). This was announced today in a statement of the party board, circulated by the ADN agency.

This was done in response to the party rank-and-file members' demands that the party dissociate itself from the party's past, including its name.

The taking out of a new party card will be regarded as an act of support for the aims of the Party of Democratic Socialism, the PDS Board pointed out.

Some Urge Disbanding Party

PM0602152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "Not Only the Name Has Changed"]

[Text] Berlin, 5 Feb—The party called the Socialist Unity Party of Germany is now part of the past. An extraordinary congress late last year decided to add to its former title an indication of its new formula for its aim—the Party of Democratic Socialism.

The abbreviation SED-PDS has begun to be part of our lives. At yesterday's session of the party's board it was decided to abandon the first part of the title. Henceforth, it will operate solely as the PDS.

The changed name reflects the fact that profound changes have occurred since the extraordinary congress. The party has renounced everything associated with its monopoly on power and has become an equal political force operating in the GDR. The spirit, structures, and methods of its work have changed.

The renewal of the PDS is proceeding in complex conditions of acute political struggle. Opponents are exploiting the painful legacy left by the leadership of the former SED to discredit the party in the eyes of the people. An atmosphere of persecution—to which honest totally irreproachable people have been subjected—has been created around the party.

The question of the need to disband the SED-PDS to set up a different party in its place, free from the burden of the past, has begun to be raised in a number of party organizations in the localities under pressure from political opponents. In certain districts and bezirks, party bodies have decided to disband and resign. However action groups, generally comprising young communist who are in favor of the party continuing to live and carry out its work, have taken their place.

The PDS Board stressed the following: It is a highly important task to speed up the formation of the party afresh. Its members are part of party organizations in their place of residence. They must join in the election struggle in a businesslike fashion. The PDS is now preparing for its own congress devoted to the coming elections to the People's Chamber. The congress has been scheduled for 24-25 February in Berlin. It will at the same time also be the First PDS Congress.

Prague Rally Demands Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD0602191290 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Prague February 6 TASS—A protest rally against Soviet troops' presence in Czechoslovakia was held in Wenceslas Square in Prague on Monday evening. The meeting was sponsored by the Independent Information Student Centre. Hundreds of people gathered, they were shouting slogans: "Occupiers, out," "Russians, out." Speakers demanded that troops be withdrawn within a week.

After the rally, demonstrators went to the Club of Soviet Science and Culture in Prague, and then to the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakia media did not report these rallies.

The action coincided with the beginning of the second round of Czechoslovak-Soviet talks about the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

The monument to Lenin in October Revolution Square in Prague was desecrated yesterday. The monument was covered with polyethylene film and insulting words where daubed on the pedestal.

Correspondent Assesses Protests

LD0602211490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A demonstration took place in Prague today, in which the participants demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

[Correspondent S. Andreyev] This is Old Town Square in the center of the city. The demonstration was organized on the appeal of the recently created or, rather, the recreated Social Democratic Party. So far there have been no new demands to compare with the position of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, which proposes the withdrawal of troops before the end of the year. It is thought the action was arranged to demonstrate support for the Czechoslovak delegation before the second round of talks, which will be held in Moscow.

I should stay in the square but we cannot and we must get to the studio and transmit the material; it is already about 1900, Moscow time [1600 GMT]. Permit me to offer you just a brief explanation of the reasons behind this and other similar actions, explanations given to me by one of the leaders of a leading public organization that is part of the Civil Forum. We remember 1968 only too well, he said. We support Gorbachev; we wish him well and success; but we do not know and we are not sure how events will develop in the USSR. If there is a turning of the screw toward conservatism, that means the troops may be used again as they were 21 years ago.

It may be that to some people such a point of view may seem serious, and to others groundless and naive, but that is how many people feel in Czechoslovakia. That is why we decided to acquaint you with their view and to tell you about this demonstration, which is by no means the only one. In recent weeks rallies and demonstrations calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops have been held in many towns in the country. But let us remember, concern over the fate of democracy surely does not have to be expressed in insults and other actions incompatible with democracy. Yesterday such an action in Prague ended at the walls of the Soviet Embassy. The demonstrators climbed onto a fence and tried to hoist the Czechoslovak flag on the territory of the embassy. [video shows crowds in square, Andreyev speaking to camera, crowds holding banners urging Soviet troops to leave the country]

Oil Supplies to Czechoslovakia To Be Reduced

LD0202192190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] A recent report that supplies of Soviet oil to Czechoslovakia are to be cut in the first quarter of this year has been the subject of much speculation and rumor. Therefore, CTK correspondent has requested an interview with Lubomir Martak, the director of the relevant department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Martak said that the Soviet Union, because of internal problems, has asked to be allowed to make a proportional reduction in supplies to all its consumers. In Czechoslovakia's case, this amounts to a cut of four percent of the first quarter's volume, on the understanding that this quantity is to be made up during subsequent months. The Soviet Union, therefore, guarantees to fulfill its annual deliveries, a contract for which has been signed this week.

At the moment, the Czechoslovak side is engaged in intensive negotiations with its Soviet counterparts on ensuring that the total agreed quantity for the first quarter is, indeed, delivered, or at least on reducing the four percent cut already mentioned to a smaller proportion.

Army Command Says No Maneuvers During Elections

LD0602190790 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1830 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] The command of the Soviet Southern Army Group stationed in Hungary has sent us a statement saying that they will not hold any kind of military maneuvers in the country during the election campaign and elections. The troops will be staying in barracks, or on the exercise grounds. They will carry out the tasks in their annual training plan. At the same time, the Southern Army Group command also announces that on 17 February, in a number of Soviet barracks including Esztergom, Veszprem, Szeged, and Sarbogard, programs entitled Open Gate will be held. Those interested are cordially invited to attend, including representatives of the various parties and organizations.

MSZMP Chairman's Address to Congress Noted

PM3001085790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov and TASS correspondent S. Ivanov: "Second Stage"]

[Text] Budapest, 27 Jan—The first stage of the 14th Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] Congress was held in mid-December. It was then that its leading organs were elected. Party organizations received for discussion a draft political statement by the MSZMP, and preparations began for the elections to the country's parliament. What else has happened in these 6 weeks? The Communist Party's membership has grown from 65,000 to 82,000. The MSZMP has reached the second stage of the 14th Congress, which started today, better organized and more cohesive.

The congress resumed its work in the Palace of Construction Workers. There were around 800 delegates and 300 guests in the hall of sessions. The slogan above the presidium read: "Labor! Security! Freedom! A Secure Existence!—This Is What the MSZMP Offers. Vote for Us and You Vote for the Future!"

The morning session was opened by MSZMP Chairman Gyula Thurmer. He said that the renewal of the MSZMP is evident in the fact that it has dissociated itself on a principled basis from the mistakes of the past.

Talking about the MSZMP's organizational problems, the speaker noted that party organizations are finding it difficult to adapt to the new conditions. Although their activeness is increasing, they are still preoccupied with their own problems in many places. We are faced with a long and painful period of renewal, the result of which will be a new socialist society.

Concerning the situation in Hungary, G. Thurmer noted that the situation has deteriorated of late and the danger of the restoration of capitalism has arisen. The government is placing more and more burdens on the shoulders of the people, of working people. Rising prices have

placed millions of working people in a desperate position. People get worried when they see collective property being sold off and handed over to foreign capital. It infringes national interests and feelings. The MSZMP will not support this kind of economic policy.

G. Thurmer disagreed with the government's foreign economic policy. The limit on ruble exports could lead to the loss of market positions gained in the socialist countries and to unemployment in Hungary. Scientific exchange with the socialist world has been suspended because of these methods.

The economic problems are accompanied by an increase in political tension, the keynote speaker said. There is overt incitement; threats are being made against left-wing forces; individuals are being persecuted. The MSZMP resolutely condemns the vogue for labels and the vulgar tone of politics.

Talking about relations with the Hungarian Socialist Party, he said that the MSZMP is willing to have civilized contacts and even political cooperation with the MSZP, but there is no sign of reciprocal willingness.

In conclusion, the MSZMP chairman stressed that the MSZMP is a workers' party and therefore it is most important for it to cooperate with organized working people, with trade unions. We need to win over young people and the intelligentsia.

Hungary's Interior Minister Horvath Resigns

PM3001130590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 90 Second Edition p 7

[Unnamed own correspondent dispatch: "Minister Resigns"]

[Text] Budapest, 24 Jan—Istvan Horvath, Hungarian interior minister, has handed in his resignation. On the eve of this event another two leading employees of the state security service resigned from their posts.

This was the first result of a campaign aimed against the Interior Ministry, the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], and the government, which started in the country around two weeks ago. Two radical parties, the Union of Free Democrats and the Union of Young Democrats, protected by Western financial and political circles, supplied secret documents to the public that testified to the fact that their activities were being followed by state security agents, their telephones were being bugged, and their letters were being opened.

Both parties demanded that the leaders of the Ministry of the Interior be removed and the state security services reorganized. Attacks were made against the MSZP and Miklos Nemeth, chairman of the Council of Ministers.

"The carefully coordinated attack is aimed at helping certain political forces to come to power and discrediting a number of members of the government. This is the overture to a new 'inquisition.' Those very people who started the renewal in Hungary, will be 'disposed of,'" I. Horvath said at the parliament's session, while admitting that the security service must be reorganized. It is operating as it did before. A new law on the state security service and the Ministry of the Interior is now being prepared.

Hungarian Assembly Debates Secret Services Law

PM3001143790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "The Law and the Secret Services"]

[Text] Budapest, 25 Jan—At the session of the Hungarian State Assembly under way here the deputies continued discussing the provisional law on regulating the activity of the secret services. Answering deputies' questions regarding the cases revealed of unlawful gathering of information about opposition parties by the Interior Ministry's internal security service, Zoltan Gal, state secretary of the Hungarian Interior Ministry, rejected claims that Soviet KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs advisers work in the Interior Ministry. However, links are maintained between the services of the two countries, he noted.

There was a heated discussion about who can give permission to use certain particularly secret methods typical of the special services. For example, the opening and inspection of correspondence and the use of special technical means. Two options were proposed for the solution of this problem. Under the first, the country's prosecutor general should have this right, and under the second, a parliamentary representative should. But the deputies did not manage to reach a common denominator. As a result, it was decided to hand over the draft project for revision to the appropriate parliamentary commission.

After this question had been discussed in the parliamentary commission, the deputies adopted by an overwhelming majority the provisional law on regulating the activities of the secret services.

According to a proposal made by M. Nemeth, chairman of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, K. Kulcsar, Hungarian minister of justice, will oversee the functioning of these services.

The session is continuing its work.

Debate Runs Almost Two Days

PM0202124690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov report: "A Dramatic Debate"]

[Text] Budapest—Discussion in the Hungarian Parliament on the question of legislative control of security service activities took up almost two days, the question

having been submitted for discussion following the resignation of Interior Minister Istvan Horvath.

Despite the fact that a draft law was already prepared, which was to be submitted for parliamentary discussion after the sensational bugging scandal (see IZVESTIYA No. 26), the deputies decided to postpone consideration of it. The adoption of such an important law will be the task of a newly composed parliament, which will be formed by free elections on 26 March. Until then a temporary provision on the security service and its procedures for using secret methods of gathering information will be in force.

On this question the session listened in particular to Constitutional Court Deputy Chairman Laszlo Solyom. He spoke of how, in the court's opinion, in the light of international practice it is possible to maintain "the delicate balance between the protection of civil rights and the effectiveness of the secret services."

The most difficult thing of all for the parliamentarians was to decide which body will monitor the execution of the secret operations that are necessary in any country to safeguard the security of the state and its citizens. Eventually all party factions and independent deputies agreed that the minister of justice, at least in the immediate future, will exercise this monitoring function.

All the same, some political parties have not abandoned attempts to link the scandal with the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] leadership, thereby weakening the positions of their rival in the election struggle that has started. Socialist Party Chairman R. Nyers stated in an interview with the newspaper NEPSZABADSAG: "It looks like our opponents are using the very same methods as the former Interior Ministry; that is, they are introducing secret service methods into public life, the same old Stalinist methods, although they themselves appear under the banners of anti-Stalinism."

What these methods are is revealed by a fact given publicity by a MSZP press spokesman. According to him, the MSZP decided to take libel proceedings against a member of the independent party of small businessmen who stated in the newspaper MAI NEP: "Whoever does not break with Bolshevik principles uses fascist principles; this applies to the MSZMP, which did not break with Bolshevik policies, and to the MSZP, which clings to what it owns and to its previous positions."

Government head Miklos Nemeth was right when from the session platform he spoke out harshly against attacks on the country's leadership and against inflammatory accusations that Hungary, formerly in the vanguard of reforms, has now slipped back to the rear ranks. The premier asked rhetorically: "What does being in the vanguard mean today? Does it mean staging 100,000-strong street demonstrations, causing clashes, and making attacks on official institutions, settling scores by spilling blood?" M. Nemeth again called on political parties and social organizations to be partners of the government in securing a peaceful transition to a civilized social order.

Housing, Travel Prices Increasing in Hungary

PM0202124190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Gerasimov: "A Narrow Path"]

[Text] Budapest, 1 Feb—A new price explosion has rocked the Hungarian Republic. Whereas the first, at the beginning of the year, affected foodstuffs, this one affects apartment rents, transport, and various services.

On 1 February apartment rents increase by 35 percent on average. The cost of rail travel increases by 20 percent. The cost of a streetcar or subway ticket rises from five to eight forints and the price of a bus ride increases to 10 forints (around 50 kopecks). Telephone charges will increase by 30-35 percent and telex charges will double. The prices of certain types of foodstuffs which missed out last time will also rise on 5 February.

The process of switching the country to the new economic model, given the fact that it owes a total of $20.7 billion to the West and has been forced to reduce exports paid for in rubles, which means redundancies at many enterprises, is this year following a narrow path above an abyss. The social tension, the growing number of rallies, the unemployment, and the improvised accommodation created by homeless people outside parliament threaten the disruption of political stability.

Economy, Scandal Threaten Hungarian Party

PM3001144590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Opposition Making Capital"]

[Text] Budapest—The election campaign has officially begun in Hungary and will last through 24 March. On the eve of its opening the capital's transport workers held a strike during the morning rush hour, demanding increased wages in connection with the recent price hike.

Another unusual event happened at the session of parliament. Deputy I. Horvath asked to speak out of turn and announced his resignation from the post of the country's minister of the interior in connection with a scandal over the tapping of telephone conversations on the part of the so-called internal security service, which is part of the Interior Ministry (and now disbanded). IZVESTIYA briefly described the start of this affair (see IZVESTIYA No. 13).

The scandal, inflated by opposition parties, highlighted the problem of the lack of legislative regulation of the security services' activities. I. Horvath spoke of this in his statement to the deputies and admitted as his chief

mistake his tardiness in drawing up a draft law on state security which would strictly stipulate the forms and methods of this activity in a rule-of-law state. M. Nemeth, the head of government, also cited the need to urgently adopt such a law as the chief lesson of the scandal.

With the start of the election campaign many people in Hungary are asking this question: How will "Danubegate," as it has been scathingly nick-named here, affect the population's attitude toward the various political parties? Has the opposition managed to ensure that the scandalous affair is linked in the voters' consciousness with the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] (I. Horvath is a member of the MSZP Presidium) and thereby made considerable political capital for itself?

The impression has been formed recently that, with a view to securing dividends in the election campaign, a number of parties are making use of the country's complex economic situation and the unpopular but forced measures of M. Nemeth's government. It has already become the norm for certain parties to hold demonstrations to protest the government's measures.

It has to be said that the attacks on the government and then also on the ruling MSZP have reached such intensity that the MSZP leadership recently warned the opposition: If this continues, it will recall its party members from the government. Assumptions of the possibility of a government crisis have appeared in the pages of the Hungarian press. And this two months before the general election!

In the situation which had taken shape M. Nemeth appealed to the opposition on the very first day of the National Assembly session's work to refrain from steps that could destabilize the situation in the country and, primarily, from organizing demonstrations and strikes. He gave a reminder that the government's present program cannot be considered the MSZP program, for it was drawn up in the interests of the whole nation and was agreed with the leading opposition parties. The government hoped and continues to hope for an honest partnership with the opposition at such a complex time for the country.

Answering deputies' questions about the presence of Soviet troops on Hungarian territory, M. Nemeth declared that talks will begin in Budapest within the next few days on the possibility of withdrawing all Soviet troops from Hungary. According to the Hungarian premier, the change in the international situation has led to the disappearance of both the military and the political reasons for the presence of Soviet troops in the country. During the work of the present session of parliament, which will apparently last through the end of the week, the deputies have to examine a whole number of draft laws, including ones on the press, on private enterprise, and on freedom of conscience and religion.

'Crusade' Against Former Hungarian Rulers Urged

PM0602170190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent F. Lukyanov dispatch: "Hungary: Election Battle Crossroads"]

[Text] Budapest—The just-ended session of the Hungarian National Assembly coincided with the start of the election campaign for the country's new parliament, and this circumstance had a very substantial impact on the work of the top legislative organ.

As a result of interim elections the present composition of the National Assembly has somehow imperceptibly become multiparty in recent months; several factions have arisen in parliament, including opposition parties such as the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Union of Free Democrats.

It is no coincidence, therefore, that the majority of the draft laws examined at this session are connected in one way or another with the upcoming elections or reflect particular peripeteias of the election campaign. This can apply equally to the interim statute on state security (see IZVESTIYA No. 28), to the additions to the press law which permitted the founding of newspapers by private persons, and to the decision to allocate state subsidies to the tune of 100 million forints to prepare for the elections. Nor is it a coincidence that several draft laws were deferred at once, including one on the deputy's status, and because of this, the session was nicknamed "the session of deferred decisions."

One draft law, however, attracted the special attention of not only parliamentary deputies. Under this draft law, which was discussed during the last two days of the session's work and, in the end, was adopted by a majority of votes, all party and state figures who were in power after 1980, including those who hold leading posts today, will be obliged to report on their property status to a special parliamentary commission which includes representatives of all the factions. The commission, which is being set up following a proposal from the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], will have to determine whether or not a particular figure used his official position for mercenary purposes.

It has to be said that the decision of parliament was passed against a background of increasingly strong appeals from the opposition to begin a kind of "crusade" against "those to blame for the present crisis situation in the country." Oil was also poured on the flames by the recent exposures of the machinations of a number of former statesmen, including former Defense Minister L. Czinege, who held this post from 1960 through 1984 and managed during that time to have several villas and "hunting lodges" built for his own personal use. An investigation into the "Czinege affair" began recently, and he was forced to return to the state a nine-room apartment with an area of 500 square meters and to renounce his general's rank.

In the situation that has come about, particularly taking into account the approach of the elections, some people are not averse to using all these "debits" against the MSZP with a view to pushing it aside in the election struggle. However, the MSZP itself is resolutely dissociating itself from figures who besmirched themselves. The Socialist Party's position is this: Yes, the country must know its "heroes," but, as MSZP Deputy C. Hamori declared at the session, to launch another "witch hunt" would be contrary to European political and moral norms. Criminal proceedings must be instituted on the basis of a real violation of the law, and the transition to democracy must not be accompanied by antidemocratic, illegal measures.

The work of the January session of the Hungarian parliament was also marked by another event: the removal of the big red star from the spire of the parliament building. Very different views and explanations in this regard can be heard now. The idea is most frequently repeated that, given a multiparty system and a multiparty parliament, the symbols of one particular party must not predominate in the paraphernalia of state establishments. In the words of parliament Deputy I. Varga, a well-known Hungarian sculptor, the red star—the symbol of the working class—now arouses negative emotions in many people not because it is the symbol precisely of the working class but because it was long used by party functionaries who governed on behalf of the working class but frequently forgot about the interests of that very class.

The final fate of the dismantled star, which will be kept for the time being in parliamentary storage, while a "neutral" weather vane will be erected in its place, will be decided by the deputies of the new convocation who will arrive here after the general elections.

SFRY Reports of Albanian Demonstrations Cited

PM3001092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On Situation in Albania"]

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Jan—Yugoslav newspapers, citing the evidence of a group of people who have fled from Albania, report that spontaneous demonstrations occurred in the Albanian city of Shkoder on 11 January.

The participants, numbering almost 3,000, wanted to destroy the monument to Stalin as a symbol of the antidemocratic political regime ruling in the country. The demonstration was broken up by special police subunits and its organizers were arrested and sent to Tirana. A new demonstration pursuing the same aim occurred in the city on 14 January. Around 7,000 people took part. The police used smoke pots and nightsticks against them. Army subunits were not used in the repressive actions. Reinforced police forces are now stationed in Shkoder and have been patrolling the city and its outskirts for 24 hours. Similar demonstrations were planned for Tirana but police intervention prevented them from taking place.

According to Albanians who fled to the SFRY recently, R. Alia, first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee, is making certain concessions to satisfy the people's demands to some extent and alleviate the population's discontent. In this respect he will clash with N. Hoxha, widow of the former Albanian leader. Contrary to previous practice, for example, peasants are allowed to keep one hog and three or four sheep. The actions of the police are more in conformity with the law now. However, the further development of the internal political situation is completely unclear.

TANJUG, citing Radio Tirana, reports that the Ninth Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Plenum was held in the capital 22-23 January. R. Alia opened the plenum with a speech devoted to the fulfillment of the previous plenum's decisions on "revolutionizing the party and the whole country, deepening socialist democracy, and enhancing the role of the masses." There was a broad discussion of the items on the agenda and the corresponding resolutions were adopted.

Newspaper Reports on Aftermath of LCY Congress

PM3001143090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by special correspondents Ye. Vostrukhov and N. Yermolovich: "Yugoslavia: Overcoming the Split"]

[Text] Belgrade—So, after three dramatic and intense days of work at the 14th (extraordinary) LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress, silence has fallen in the Sava Center auditorium. The congress on which so many hopes were pinned, the congress of which crucial decisions for the country were expected, and the congress of the "revival of the Yugoslav model of socialism" ended with a virtual split in the LCY.

The ostentatious, preplanned walkout by the Slovenian delegation headed by Stefan Korosec, secretary of the LCY Central Committee Presidium, a Slovene by nationality, and the boycott of the congress that was then declared by the Croatian delegates not only thwarted the adoption of party program documents, but also curtailed the forum's plenary sessions. Today the Yugoslav public and mass media are asking: What happened in the main auditorium at the Sava Center? What lies in store for the party in future, and what, in this connection, are the prospects for the radical reforms that have been announced? And what will become of the federation if the united league of internationalists disintegrates into "national parties"?

So although an intermission was announced at the congress, the discussion that began there is now continuing everywhere—at party meetings, in the shops at enterprises, in families, even on public transport. This is

further confirmation that the working people of the SFRY still take the Communists' problems and concerns to heart.

How is the Yugoslav press assessing what happened at the congress? The newspaper BORBA, as usual, having promptly carried out a public opinion survey, is publishing from day to day the opinions of people of the most diverse professions, ages, and nationalities. Opinions differ, although everyone, without exception, laments the split that occurred at the congress. Many of those polled note that much work was done in three days at the congress. The Central Committee report "The LCY and Social Reforms" and the discussion of the draft declaration "For Democratic Socialism in Yugoslavia" showed that the party has renounced its former vision of socialism and is trying to restructure itself in the light of the new demands and to regain the people's all but shattered trust. BORBA's readers approve the fact that the new LCY program platform is based on the principles of democratic socialism and broad pluralism of views and does not rule out the appearance of other movements and parties on the Yugoslav political scene.

A commentary in the newspaper POLITIKA notes that in the course of the discussion of program documents various viewpoints were agreed and hundreds of proposals from delegates were analyzed and utilized. And then, when all the documents were prepared, immediately before their ratification, the Slovenian delegation left the forum, calling on the Communists to "disperse to their national apartments" and form autonomous republican party organizations and later some kind of "league of leagues."

The beginning of the split in the LCY made many people anxious for the fate of the radical reforms. There is no reason for anxiety, in the opinion of Ante Markovic, chairman of the Federal Executive Council (government), whose answer to a question on the country's fate was published by nearly all the newspapers here: "The fate of the reforms and of Yugoslavia does not depend on the possible disintegration of the LCY...." The course of reforms will remain unchanged. But interrepublican clashes and interethnic conflicts, many observers stress, create difficulties for the changes and for the implementation of economic reforms. The creation, for instance, of a single market within the country has already come up against republican barriers. Everyone knows about the disastrous consequences of the economic blockade of Slovenia by Serbian enterprises exclusively for political reasons. Now similar barriers are beginning to surround the Communists.

At the same time some people think that the Slovenian delegation is entirely innocent and cannot be accused of separatism: The action of the Communists from Slovenia reflects a profound, long-standing crisis in the party.

TANJUG quickly reported sessions of the Central Committee Presidiums of the Leagues of Communists of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the League of Communists of Serbia, as well as a plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia. "The situation in the LCY is now the same as in society as a whole: We are at a crossroads," a resolution adopted in Sarajevo says. "However, the forced interruption in the congress' work cannot be regarded as a defeat, still less as the disintegration of the LCY. In the new circumstances it is necessary to seek ways of surmounting the different views which objectively exist within the LCY. The present situation is above all a component part of the process of democratization in the party and society. By means of rapid, radical reforms, both the social crisis and the party crisis could quickly be overcome. The League of Communists of Bosnia and Hercegovina will do everything to preserve the LCY's unity on the basis of the new democratic program for transforming it into a modern, democratic political organization."

The League of Communists of Serbia Central Committee Presidium is of a different opinion. It believes that the intermission in the work of the congress is a blow against reforms in the society and weakens the party—a blow against the unity of the LCY and the future of Yugoslavia. The presidium outlined political measures for strengthening the unity of the Communists of Serbia and the entire country. A plenum of the League of Communists of Slovenia Central Committee unanimously approved the actions of its delegation in Belgrade. It was announced at the plenum that the League of Communists of Slovenia will maintain future relations with the LCY only on a treaty basis. Nevertheless, until 2 February—that is, until the republican party conference—relations with the LCY are "frozen."

The sharply exacerbated crisis in the party is also reflected in the sociopolitical situation in the country. The situation in Kosovo has again improved. As the Belgrade newspapers reported, in Pristina 40,000 citizens of Albanian nationality gathered in the square in front of the provincial party committee building and held an impressive rally "from a standpoint of Albanian separatism." In the form of an ultimatum, the participants demanded the immediate resignation of all the provincial leaders, the lifting of special measures imposed by the SFRY Presidency last year, the release of political prisoners, the ending of political trials, the holding of free elections and the introduction of a multiparty system. Unless these demands are met in the next few days, it was stated at the rally, a general strike will begin in Kosovo.

The demonstration was accompanied by acts of violence and gangsterism. Extremists broke the glass in store windows, attacked "traitors"' homes, and threw stones at cars from other cities. In order to stop the acts of hooliganism the militia was forced to use water cannon. Order was restored in the city.

At an extended session of the provincial League of Communists Presidium held on the same day, a principled assessment of events was given. It was also noted

that the mass demonstrations by extremists in Pristina were largely provoked by the statements of Slovenian delegates at the congress on the constant violation of the rights of the Albanian people in Kosovo, the inhumanity of the use of force against demonstrators fighting for freedom, and so forth.

Reportage on Demonstrations, Violence in Kosovo

Streets Barricaded; Cars Stoned

PM3101143590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov: "Yet More Shooting in Kosovo"]

[Text] Belgrade—Alarming news continues to come in from Kosovo Autonomous Province. After the large meeting of Albanian separatists in Pristina on 24 January reported in IZVESTIYA, a wave of demonstrations by the separatists swept many cities and settlements. The development of events is very reminiscent of the situation early last year when nationalists shifted from meetings and demonstrations to overt acts of terrorism with the use of firearms.

It looks as though the slogan for the demonstrations—"in defense of the Albanian population's rights and freedom"—is being written by a single hand. Before lunch it is calm in the province, but in the afternoon demonstrators go out onto the streets at one and the same time with slogans hostile to the SFRY and Serbia. Last Saturday when darkness fell in the cities of Orahovac, Podujevo, and Urosevac, the extremists launched armed attacks against representatives of the public security forces. The militiamen were obliged to open fire in retaliation. As a result of these provoked clashes six terrorists died. Several militiamen were wounded.

In subsequent days the afternoon onslaughts by the "demonstrators" were repeated in many settlements. The nationalists are setting up street barricades, tearing up apartment buldings, and throwing stones at automobiles and buses. Some bus passengers have been seriously wounded. The Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosovo are not leaving their apartments and are afraid to go out into the street. Many of them have urgently sent their children and grandchildren out of the province.

The events in Kosovo have again rocked the entire federation. The actions of the separatists and chauvinists have been denounced by the Serbian Presidency, that republic's League of Communists Central Committee Presidium, and the Federal Executive Council (the country's government). On Monday the government urgently passed on to the SFRY Federal Assembly for approval a draft law on the allocation of funds for the construction of 2,000 apartments for those Serbs and Montenegrins who were obliged to flee their homes in Kosovo under threats from the separatists but would now like to return home.

The majority of Yugoslavs denounce the Albanian separatists' provocative actions and support the special measures of the SFRY Presidency introduced in the province in February last year in response to the extremists' terror. United detachments of militia made up of representatives of all the federal republics are now in Kosovo. But at the 14th Extraordinary League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress, the Slovenian delegation said: This province's national problems cannot be resolved by force, a political solution for all problems is needed, as is the observance of human rights and freedoms. Many people here believe that it is no accident that the Albanian extremists' demonstrations have come immediately after their support from the Slovenes. But commentators are asking how it is possible to reach agreement with people who have gambled not on dialogue but on open armed struggle.

But after the congress had completed its work, the Slovenes were supported by the Croatian Communists: At a recent plenum of the republic's Central Committee they adopted a statement on the situation in Kosovo. It says: "The policy pursued so far with regard to Kosovo has been unable to stop people dying, the province's indigenous inhabitants from being expelled, and interethnic relations from deteriorating. The failure of the present policy with regard to the defense of human rights and man's freedom and life requires immediate changes.... We suggest that the SFRY Presidency and other federal organs, like all Serbian organizations, immediately take political measures to eliminate the causes of the clashes and we voice the conviction that the demands of the Kosovo citizens for national equality, a multiparty system, free elections, the ending of political trials, and the release of political prisoners will no longer be called counterrevolutionary...." So the League of Communists of Croatia has also now poured fuel on the Kosovo conflagration.

Attacks Become 'Frequent'

PM0102153190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov dispatch: "On Events in Kosovo"]

[Text] Belgrade—The situation in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo is becoming more dramatic by the hour. Further casualties among demonstrators have been reported. "According to some official bodies," the newspaper VECERNJE NOVOSTI wrote, "It cannot be ruled out that in the next few days demonstrations by Albanian separatists will increase in scale and that they will try to organize an armed uprising in the territory of the autonomous province."

This is evidenced by the scale of the hostile demonstrations staged in the last two days. They are being held in many cities and settlements in Kosovo. More than 10,000 people have taken part in them. Attacks by militants on representatives of public safety bodies,

civilian installations, and party committee buildings have become more frequent.

Not far from Suva-Reka, clashes between demonstrators and the militia continued for more than five hours. People were injured. There has been serious unrest near the city of Prizren. The militia has been forced to use tear gas. Demonstrators have responded by hurling stones at the militia and firing on them with rifles and automatic weapons.

Powerful demonstrations have been held in the cities of Pec, Lipljan, and Kosovka-Kamenica. What is more, the separatists are using provocative slogans in their demonstrations, saying "Kosovo is a republic" and so forth. Many of the demonstrators are carrying portraits of Josip Broz Tito. A number of enterprises in the province are on strike.

The SFRY Presidency intends to use every available means to defend its territorial integrity, immutable borders, and the federal Constitution in connection with the new demonstrations by Kosovo separatists. The Presidency has demanded protection for the rights, freedom, and equality of all people living in Kosovo, regardless of their nationality, and the creation of conditions that will stop Serbs and Montenegrins leaving the province under pressure from the nationalists.

There are increasingly broad protests throughout the country against the divisive actions of the Kosovo separatists. They are being decisively condemned by the public of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. At 2130 hours on 30 January, traffic was interrupted in the center of Belgrade. Tens of thousands of students from Belgrade University marched on the square in front of the Federal Assembly. The young people staged a massive rally protesting the actions of the Albanian separatists and in defense of the territorial integrity of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the whole of the SFRY. Students and lecturers from this major higher education establishment who addressed the rally denounced attempts by Albanian chauvinists to tear this autonomous province away from Serbia.

The rally, which continued until 0300 hours on 31 January, unanimously adopted a resolution. Condemning the terrorism in Kosovo, the participants demanded more decisive action from federal organs of power against the organizers of the armed clashes and protection for the civilian population against extremists. If this is not done, the resolution says, those who took part in the rally will demand the resignation of the SFRY Presidency.

'Separatists' Fight Militia

PM0202091590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov dispatch: "Alarming Situation in Kosovo"]

[Text] Belgrade—For days and nights now there has been no letup in the shooting in Kosovo Autonomous Province. It seems as if the Albanian separatists have embarked on the fulfillment of a final action, which had been secretly planned a long time ago but failed last year—a mass armed uprising against the authorities whose aim is the disintegration of the SFRY and Kosovo's separation from the federation.

Fierce clashes and stubborn battles are taking place between nationalists and public security forces in many of the province's cities and villages. The separatists have erected barricades in some cities, blocking routes in and out of the cities. Militiamen come under fire from all types of weapons, including automatic arms. The public security forces are forced to use helicopters against the extremists, dropping tear gas over where they are concentrated. The helicopters are shot at in response.

Barricades have been erected not only in streets but also on the highways linking Kosovo with the neighboring republics. The extremists open fire and hurl rocks at all vehicles not carrying Kosovo registration plates. Several vehicles have been set on fire. The armed clashes continue at night too. There is a growing number of Serbian and Montenegrin refugees, with people abandoning their homes to save their lives and rushing to get out of the province, while those who stay behind persistently demand weapons from the authorities to defend their families.

There is also a swelling wave of protest against the splitting of Serbia and against the chauvinists' gangster-like actions. Mass rallies attended by representatives of all strata of the population were held in Serbia and Montenegro 31 January. Participants in a rally attended by 100,000 in Titograd vehemently demanded that the federal authorities should act to prove that Yugoslavia is truly a rule-of-law state capable of defending the life and dignity of all citizens regardless of nationality, no matter where they live. It was declared that the republic's inhabitants would not abandon their Serbian brothers and sisters in their misfortune and, if necessary, would immediately send volunteers to join the armed struggle.

Sittings of the Serbian Presidency, the Central Committee of the republican League of Communists, and the republican National Defense Council were held in Belgrade. The general sense of their decisions is this: Serbia will never cede Kosovo and will not allow the SFRY's borders to be destroyed. It was also noted that the adjournment of the 14th League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress was a blow against Yugoslavia's unity which was exploited by separatists in their own interests. An urgently convened sitting of the SFRY Presidency on 31 January decided to convene a session of the country's Federal Assembly to discuss the situation in Kosovo.

PRAVDA on Demonstrations

PM0202120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev: "Trouble In Kosovo"]

[Text] Belgrade, 1 Feb—A large demonstration in the main city of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo—Pristina—was started by students of Albanian nationality from the local university.

They were later joined by workers from several enterprises, 40,000 in all. The demonstrators assembled outside the building of the League of Communists provincial committee, demanding its resignation en bloc and the introduction of a multiparty system in the province.

Later, when the crowd began to chant the local Albanian nationalists' traditional slogan—"Kosovo: a republic at any price"—demands were also made for the lifting of the state of emergency, which was introduced here last March in connection with the mass disorders, and the halting of the trial of former provincial party leader A. Vlasi and a group of 14 people accused of organizing and encouraging last year's Kosovo miners' strike.

Despite being addressed by League of Communist of Kosovo Provincial Committee Chairman R. Morina, the demonstrators issued an ultimatum: If their conditions—above all, the resignation of the entire provincial leadership—were not met before Friday, there would be a general strike in Kosovo.

The strike did not take place, but the fierce clashes continue. The casualty figure in the province now stands at 12, and the events are beginning to take a dramatic turn, local observers write.

In some cities and population centers Albanian separatists are building barricades and are launching attacks on militia officers and League of Communists local committee offices. In some places, the papers write, it has even gotten to the point where local ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins have been recommended not to go to work and children not to go to school.

In general it remains unclear what form the actions of the Albanian nationalists, who have periodically disturbed the peace in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo for several years now, will take in the future.

Late last night in Belgrade, there was a demonstration by 10,000 students outside the SFRY Federal Assembly (parliament), protesting the separatist actions in Kosovo.

Pancevski Decries 'Nationalists'

LD0202160590 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade February 2 TASS—By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ovcharenko:

The situation in Yugoslavia has become extremely tense due to recent developments in Kosovo Province, Yugoslavian Communist leader Milan Pancevski told the TANJUG news agency. His interview was published in national newspapers today.

"The actions by Albanian nationalists are threatening the rights, freedoms and creative labor of citizens and the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Yugoslavia," he said.

Pancevsky called for an immediate end to demonstrations, strikes and any manifestations of violence and terror in respect to people in Kosovo.

"The federation's state bodies should use all available means to resist attempts ito change the country's constitutional and political set-up by force," he said.

"The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, jointly with all democratic forces of the country, regards it as its task to help normalise the situation in Kosovo.

"Major importance should be attached to the exposure of the goals of Albanian chauvinists and separatists."

Kosovo on 'Brink of Civil War'

PM0502151390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unnamed IZVESTIYA own correspondent dispatch: "Kosovo: Troops Brought In"]

[Text] Belgrade—From the morning deep into the night 1 February convoys of military hardware moved along the highways of Kosovo Autonomous Province raising up clouds of dust. By midday tanks and armored personnel carriers had reached the capital of the province—Pristina. Convoys of combat vehicles then proceeded to the cities of Podujevo, Pec, Titova-Mitrovica, and other population centers where bloody clashes between armed separatists and public security forces have been under way for the last few days.

Having won the support of the Slovenian delegation at the 14th League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress, Albanian chauvinists wasted no time in embarking on implementing their age-old plans. First they held a rally of 40,000 people in Pristina in front of the provincial party committee building and issued Kosovo's leadership with an ultimatum—either their political demands were met immediately, or there would be demonstrations and a general strike. The extremists kept quiet at the rally about the sinister plan for an armed uprising. But literally a few days later all Yugoslavia saw that a wave of banditry was rising rapidly in the province.

The serious threat of disintegration loomed over the federation once again, for the umpteenth time in the last few months. Attempts to somehow appeal to the reason of people blinded by chauvinist propaganda and to halt the violence and lawlessness have not been successful.

Thus, only a week after the "initial rally" in Pristina, Kosovo has found itself, so the local press believes, "on the brink of civil war."

The number of people killed and wounded in the street battles rises every day. It was announced 1 February at a press conference in Pristina that 18 people had died and 54 (43 of them militiamen) had been wounded. In the last two days terrorists have changed their "tactics": They are now mainly expelling children, women, and old people from their homes and using all methods, including weapons and smoke bombs, in the fight for an "ethnically pure Kosovo." It is not only Serbs and Montenegrins' families who are being subjected to violence and mockery but also those Albanians who do not support the separatists.

All Serbia has risen up to defend the rights and dignity of Kosovo's citizens. Working people have issued the SFRY Government and Presidency with an ultimatum at rallies in many cities of the federation—Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Titograd: Either stop the terror in Kosovo or resign very shortly.

Of course, the tanks on the streets are not firing on the demonstrators. But they are already having a psychological effect, a Belgrade Television commentator stressed. An armed mob in Podujevo dispersed just on seeing the slow-moving armored vehicles.

On the morning of 2 February alarming reports once again came from various parts of the province: Extremists' attacks on representatives of the public security forces and the peaceful population are continuing. There have been further casualties.

Emergency Situations Described

PM0502161590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

["On-the-spot report" by own correspondent Ye. Fadeyev: "Emergencies After the Emergency Congress. Can Yugoslavia Manage Without a Communist Party?"]

[Text] Belgrade—Yugoslavia's Communists who assembled for their 14th Congress, their first emergency congress since the war, had to decide their party's future. That was the unanimous opinion of local observers. Unfortunately, this did not materialize. The walkout by Slovenia's Communists, who left the hall late at night on the third day of the congress' work, resulted in a break in the party forum's work and nobody knows how long it will last.

Initially, people thought: Plenums of republican and provincial leagues of communists will be held, a way out of the deadlock will be found, but—as many actually imagined—this proved to be a by no means easy job. The SFRY has eight republics and provinces and just as many opinions and positions. Some are in favor of the congress resuming its work, others declare that Yugoslavia today can manage without the party, yet others believe that the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] should remain united and indivisible like before, while yet others still, as PRAVDA already reported, shrug their shoulders without expressing an opinion.

There are numerous forecasts about the future of the League of Communists. There are countless such forecasts in the Yugoslav mass media. "The SFRY is now reminiscent of a ship which is having difficulty keeping afloat. The engine—the LCY—has failed in a ship which urgently needs major repairs." This is TANJUG's opinion.

"There is no doubt at all that, with or without the party, Yugoslavia will remain in existence." This was the firm declaration by Ante Markovic, head of the Federal Executive Council (government).

Yes, the situation in the country is complex and unsettled after the LCY forum. The LCY is really reminiscent of a ship sailing stormy seas. The waves generated from Belgrade's Sava Center, where the 14th Congress failed to come to an end, are now reaching all republics and provinces, generating additional waves of all hues, and even bringing sundry scum to the surface.

What I have in mind is an anticommunist and nationalist gathering, only recently held outside the Serbian Republic Assembly and organized by the illegal "Sava" grouping from the city of Nova Pazova. Slogans echoed in the center of Belgrade; there were clearly provocative, nationalist, and anticommunist shouts. Open attacks on J. Broz Tito, calls to overthrow the Communists ("The Serbian people have had enough of Communist dictatorship")—this is what that gathering produced. The nationalists demanded the creation of detachments of thugs to march on Kosovo.

Kosovo... Events in the autonomous province are once more at the top of the agenda. Some commentators believe that the clashes with Albanian separatists—large-scale, cruel, involving barricades, with dead and wounded, and going on for more than 10 days now—were apparently provoked by speeches by delegates from Slovenia at the 14th Congress, where they spoke of violations of the Albanian people's rights in Kosovo and the inhumanity of security forces. Indeed, Slovenes disagree with the appraisal of the situation in the province and bluntly said so at the party forum. But I personally think that this was hardly the cause of the latest outbursts in Kosovo.

Much was said at the congress' sittings about interethnic relations in multinational Yugoslavia by delegates from other republics too. One of the reasons why the Kosovo problem seems totally beyond solution is that dozens of programs, resolutions, and directives concerning the province have not been implemented for years on end. As if this were not enough, a whole series of causes which regularly produce nationalist outbursts have not been eliminated to this day: Bureaucratism, voluntarism, and differences of opinions as regards ways to solve the Kosovo drama.

Ongoing feuds between Serbia and Slovenia generate growing concern in Yugoslav society. Serbia even announced an economic blockade of Slovenia. The main reason? The Slovenes supposedly support the Albanian separatists.

But what about the League of Communists? What is it doing nowadays? How is it preparing to continue the congress which was so dramatically interrupted? Another emergency, which was only just reported by BORBA on its first page: Many of its leaders have gone... on leave!

I would like to end with the following quotation from the weekly LCY organ KOMUNIST: "Relying on cosmetic repairs to the party is a tactic which has hitherto produced nothing but failures. Now that the political volcano of passions of every kind is behaving wildly, any indecisiveness by the League of Communists could produce fresh difficulties. There can be only one of two possible options in today's situation, when the fate of society and the country is being decided. Either the LCY will simply get off the political stage as the main culprit of everything that was done wrong in the last decades, or it will nonetheless attempt to find inner strength to prolong its life in the prevailing emergency."

Army To Prevent Civil War

PM0502173590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Yugoslavia: The Army Defends Constitutional Order"]

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Feb—In keeping with the tasks entrusted to it by the SFRY Constitution, the Yugoslav People's Army is capable and ready to defend territorial inviolability and constitutional order both in Kosovo and throughout Yugoslavia. Admiral Stane Brovet, SFRY deputy secretary for national defense, told Federative Executive Council delegates this from the parliament rostrum.

The situation in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, which is part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, remains extremely tense. The ultimate goal of the Albanian nationalists and separatists is to wrest Kosovo from Yugoslavia and to join it with a so-called "Great Albania." They have repeatedly displayed determination to realize their goal by illegal means, having, in point of fact, embarked on the path of the violent overthrow of the order established by the SFRY Constitution. All means must be used to rule out the possibility of a civil war arising. This is what all rule-of-law states do when they defend legality, public order and calm, equality of rights, security, and the life of their citizens.

It must be clear to everyone, Stane Brovet pointed out, that the Yugoslav People's Army will undoubtedly fulfill this task. We will permit neither the splitting of the SFRY, nor a violent seizure of power, nor a civil war in Yugoslavia.

Conditions should be created for the holding of pan-Yugoslav actions and for the political activity of socialist forces in Kosovo, since there is no other way to establish peace and to ensure the security, freedom, and equal rights of SFRY citizens, the report points out.

The full political mobilization of the organizations of the League of Communists of Kosovo and all the socialist forces of the province, as well as of Serbia and all of Yugoslavia, is needed. Without this both the political activity of public organizations and the successful fulfillment of the measures being taken by state organs are impossible.

The League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium has urged all the country's Communists and citizens to support measures to normalize the situation in Kosovo. A decision has been made that the president and several members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee Presidium will visit the province with a view to promoting this.

Serbian President Milosevic Interviewed

PM0502111590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, by APN special correspondent S. Gryzunov; date and place of interview not given; first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction: "Slobodan Milosevic: 'Our Future is a Federation'"]

[Text] Modern Yugoslavia is a voluntary alliance of six socialist republics and two autonomous provinces which form part of Serbia and today is in an unprecedentedly grave sociopolitical crisis. The split in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] and the enforced pause in the work of the 14th Extraordinary LCY Congress has been proof of this.

At SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's request, APN special correspondent S. Gryzunov met with Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the largest republic in the SFRY in terms of size and population, and asked him a few questions. This is the first exclusive interview the Serbian leader has given to a Soviet journalist.

[Gryzunov] On the basis of what principles were the Yugoslav federation and the multinational alliance of republics and provinces built? What problems has the country encountered on this path and what problems is it resolving today?

[Milosevic] Back during the people's liberation war, in 1943 to be precise, Yugoslavia chose the federative form of state structure. This principle, despite the ordeals which our society has encountered, particularly in recent years, remains undisputed even today.

The main reason for the Yugoslav problems lies not in the federative system but in the constitutional principles

which prevent its successful functioning. We have a discrepancy between the declared federative organization of society and a number of constitutional decisions and also instances from practice which accord with relations of a confederative nature. The decentralization introduced in our country has led not to the democratization of social relations but to a dangerous disintegration of the country. In addition it has promoted the emergence of alienated centers of political power and the dominance of the local interests of republics and provinces over common interests.

Yugoslavia has thus found itself divided into six (and until the recent changes in the Serbian constitution even into eight) "political systems," as well as the same number of "national economies."

This process has had a particularly adverse effect on Serbia. According to the constitutions of the two autonomous provinces belonging to the republic in practice they had the rights of republics in a federation. These constitutional decisions led essentially to Serbia's division into three almost autonomous parts. The problem was resolved by constitutional changes in 1989.

Yugoslav practice shows unambiguously not only that authoritarian centralism is an antidemocratic principle for a social structure. A confederation in which narrow national interests dominate over all the rest is also undemocratic.

[Gryzunov] How do you assess the work of the SFRY Skupstina (parliament) and its vece (chambers) and of the government from the viewpoint of their effectiveness at federation level and also their consideration of the interests of the republics and provinces?

[Milosevic] The complexities in the work of the union organs have been to a considerable extent generated by the above-mentioned confederative structure of Yugoslavia. In turn, this is the result of pressure from the most diverse interests, of the republics' varying economic positions and their specific features, and even of open obstruction to the federation and its policy from separatist forces.

The system of making decisions on all important questions in the SFRY Skupstina is based on the principle of the coincidence of opinions of the Skupstinas of all republics and provinces. This deprives the federation and its organs of the opportunity to successfully pursue a policy of economic development and take effective decisions reflecting common interest.

[Gryzunov] What do you think of the principle of rotating leading cadres which exists in Yugoslavia? How successfully does this mechanism function?

[Milosevic] If you have in mind the principle of the temporal restriction of the functionary's mandate and the possibility of extending it, it is clearly recorded in the Constitution and is being consistently implemented. For instance, the mandate of the government's chairman is restricted to four years and cannot be extended for two successive terms. But a practice has long existed in our country whereby the same people have moved from state to political posts. Great harm was thus caused to the democratic purpose of the principle of rotating cadres.

[Gryzunov] I witnessed the demonstrations of many thousands of people in Belgrade recently in supports of the Serbs and Montenegrins who are being forcibly driven out of Kosovo and I saw a meeting of 100,000 people in the Montenegrin capital—Titograd. What is the position of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia with regard to these popular demonstrations?

[Milosevic] The Presidency's position is identical to the expressed will of the people. We can introduce order in Kosovo by the means at the state's disposal. And we have sufficient forces for that.

What you saw in Belgrade and Titograd proves that Kosovo will never be in the hands of the Albanian nationalists and separatists.

In Kosovo it is not only Serbs and Montenegrins but also the national integrity and sovereignty of the entire country which are being jeopardized. Calls are being heard there initially to create a second Albanian power in the Balkans and then to join the existing Albanian power. But this land is Serbian and has never been Albanian and never will be.

[Gryzunov] What do you think of Yugoslavia's future in the light of the aggravation of interethnic and interrepublican relations? I have in mind your considerations on the subject in the book "Years of Disentanglement" ["Gody Razvyazki] which, unfortunately, is still unknown to the broad Soviet readership.

[Milosevic] In the consciousness of the enormous majority of our citizens Yugoslavia is a progressive historical gain for its peoples. Despite the fact that today it is in a profound economic and political crisis. I am sure that this awareness of joint interests will strengthen in the future and drive out separatist trends.

The future of Yugoslavia and all its citizens, peoples, and ethnic groups lies in the consolidation of unity on the basis of their numerous joint interests and in the building of a modern and effective federation and democratic socialist society.

Serbian Communists Opt for New Party Status

PM0602153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Independent Party?"]

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Feb—The League of Communists of Slovenia [LCS] has become an independent political organization with its own program and statute. In the future it will be called the League of Communists-Party of Democratic Renewal.

This decision was adopted by delegates to the First LCS Conference in Ljubljana following a discussion of a report on the work of the 14th (extraordinary) League of Communists of Yugoslavia Congress.

The decisions adopted by the forum in Ljubljana record that the LCS is prepared to meet with representatives of other republic and army party organizations without preliminary conditions with a view to creating new foundations of cooperation. Slovenian Communists will cooperate with all democratic organizations in Yugoslavia, foreign parties, and the Socialist International. The conference proposed that the SFRY Federal Assembly (parliament) organize a "roundtable" involving all the country's democratic forces.

The conference delegates ratified the program and the list of candidates from their organizations for the coming parliamentary elections. M. Kucan, former leader of the republic's party organization, was nominated as a candidate for the post of Slovenian president.

Changes in East Europe Discussed, Analyzed

LD0102223690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Discussion between All-Union radio commentator Viktor Levin and political observer Nikolay Shishlin from the "Viewpoint" program]

[Excerpts] [Levin] Hello, esteemed comrades. In today's program—and political observer Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin is participating in it—we want to discuss a matter which probably does not only simply interest all of you now, but also worries you: specifically, the matter of how to explain the fall in the authority and prestige, and sometimes even the breakdown, of the Communist Parties in the Eastern European countries. These are the countries we always used to, and even quite recently, called socialist and still do, through inertia, although they themselves—Czechoslovakia and Romania, in particular—are rejecting those definitions. We should not deal with definitions. We will talk about the communist parties' situation. [passage omitted] I will now ask Nikolay Vladimirovich to express his view on how, all the same, to explain such a situation.

[Shishlin] I will begin, all the same, with the point that many assume the changes in Eastern Europe mean the failure of the socialist idea, the end of the communist ideology, and the transition of events into some sort of completely new sphere. I would not be in a hurry to bury socialism, to bury the socialist idea. I feel the drastic collapse which has happened in the Eastern European countries is the defeat of the administrative and command form of a social structure, the failure of the Stalinist model in its essence.

Does this failure affect the situation in what were quite recently the ruling parties? Undoubtedly, it does. I am absolutely in agreement with you here, when you remind the listeners of the facts which everybody can see today. The situation is, indeed, complex. Yet, this is how it looks to me: 1990 will turn out to be a year of very turbulent shocks, which are far from having ended with the changes we have already witnessed.

[Levin] What do you mean, Nikolay Vladimirovich?

[Shishlin] You see, if you look at any country, it is like a boiling kettle. You mentioned the situation in the GDR. Besides the fact that we are dealing with a struggle for power among various social forces, besides that, another question is being raised there: How does all this fit into the context of the German problem and how does it fit into the context of European politics genrally? There, of course, any turn of events is possible, even the very strangest.

The second circumstance is the fact that, whether we like it or not, these changes are accompanied by a feeling of revenge regarding those who were in power for many decades. I cannot speak of this without regrets, the most sincere regrets, because I know many young men, splendid patriots, who are intelligent, active, and educated, but who, because they were party members, are today becoming the object of pressure and a witch hunt. That is happening even in such civilized countries as the GDR and Czechoslovakia. I am not even speaking of Romania. [passage omitted]

Viktor Nikolayevich, it must be seen that the changes in Eastern Europe, in themselves, were prepared not only, and maybe not even so much, by the opposition forces—well, to be sure, each country has its own answer—but the obvious fact is that these changes also were prepared with the participation of realistically thinking forces among members of the ruling communist and workers' parties. Criticism of stagnation and corruption was growing in some of the parties themselves, and the previous position at the top of those parties was undermined by movement within the parties. [passage omitted]

Why do I say the future awaiting the countries of Eastern Europe seems fairly complex in 1990? It is because all these changes are occurring against the backdrop of a rather complicated and serious economic situation which is, in esseence, a crisis in nearly every one of those countries. This is connected not only to the existence of the administrative and command system; it is also connected to some of the initial sins of economic organization. You know, in essence, when you take a look at those countries, you see what serious, tragic mistakes were committed in forming the structure of the economy. [passage omitted]

Another thing is that if the structural changes and the recovery of the economy take place under the slogan of rejecting rejection—meaning rejection of everything that has been—that will, of course, lengthen the road and make it even harder and more difficult because every revolution is worth something when it does not only

destroy, but also creates. I would like to believe that these revolutionary changes will be marked, all the same, by a creative process.

[Levin] The transition to a market economy?

[Shishlin] Yes, undoubtedly. The creation of mixed forms of ownership and the appearance of new forms of ownership—that, of course, is also a good process, a healthy process, which can yield results. An increase in ties with the West—undoubtedly, yes—but definitely while maintaining ties with the East, because we are certainly organically linked. When the session—a dramatic session, as you recall—of the CEMA took place in Sofia at the beginning of the year, I believe, all the same, it was perfectly correct that the question of the CEMA's definite need for fundamental, radical reform was raised. It clearly does not have the right to exist in its present form, but it is also indisputable that the actual need to organize economic cooperation in the socialist states remains. It is necessary to transfer that cooperation to a completely different level. [passage omitted]

[Levin] How do you see the role of the Communist Parties, or the parties which are taking over from them, in these processes? [passage omitted]

[Shishlin] I think the key words here are "life" and "realities." Why? I think one of the flaws in the Stalinist social structure model and the Stalinist organization of the party is that a model was constructed, and life was forced to fit that model. As a result, of course, the working people, the society, and the countries suffered, quite simply, terrible damage. So, when the subject today is the formation of a new model of social structure, a progressive model of social structure, it is perfectly understandable why, in almost all the countries of Eastern Europe, we can already speak of a multiparty system, of alternative versions, of the formation of a real political opposition. What's more, it is unknown who will end up in the political opposition; most likely, it will be the former ruling Communist or workers' parties. [passage omitted]

Although it is more likely that the forces which used to be in opposition, which were crushed under the old system, will come up to the surface, I believe that the bearers of socialist ideas, bearers of ideas which reflect the interests of the working people, nevertheless, will not leave the political stage. I also think that, in spite of the fact that stern tests await the countries of Eastern Europe and tests also await the representatives of the former ruling Communist and workers' parties, they do, nevertheless, have a future. However, how optimistic that future will be depends on how fully, honestly, and clearly Communists are indeed able to assess where they have ended up, why they have ended up in such a state and what has to be done to get out of that deep political crisis.

It seems to me that if we in our society are endeavoring to conduct a dialogue with various social forces, it is now just as essential for us to maintain a dialogue with the left-wing forces in the countries of Eastern Europe as well, and not only with those left-wing forces, but also with those who are now setting the tone of political life in Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and so on. This is why I believe the cooperation between us and our near neighbors, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis, should increase, become richer and, to use your expression, cleanse itself, of course, of all all the unhealthy elements that were introduced into its previous development. In this connection I think it is highly important that the conversations now taking place in Moscow with the leaders of our neighbors, of our socialist friends... even though those countries are now often represented by people who, well, have nothing to do with the Communist Parties, of course, and, as is known, it is already becoming common there for people to address one another not as "comrade" but as "mister." Yet, there is no need to be afraid of this.

[Levin] No, I have learned, for example, that the party organization in the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow has been disbanded because the official policy is now that civil servants should not be party members. Actually, this is a practice followed by many states, and I think it is also something that one has to get used to, that one has to be realistic about.

I totally agree with you, Nikolay Vladimirovich, that our friends in the Communist Parties definitely do have a future, particularly when, in fact, it has to be said bluntly, that the Stalinist course, political course, did not have a great deal in common with the socialist idea. To put it mildly, or to be more precise, they are totally different things. This really is a very difficult period now because many many people have been spattered with mud and this emotional intensity is making itself felt.

[Shishlin] Numerous allegations are now being tossed out against the former Communist and workers' parties, very many justified allegations. Still, the most serious thing now is probably the fact that a multiparty model of social organization is actually emerging. It seems to me that in itself this multiparty model of social organization could restore considerably the health of the left-wing movement in those countries. You see, a monopoly of power in itself, an absolute monopoly, is, of course, a sure path to decay. This has been demonstrated by the entire experience of social development throughout the postwar decades.

It is this respect... I realize there are going to be side effects here, and very serious side effects, given this tumultuous upswing of social activity. Yes, side by side with the healthy emotions, healthy attitudes, and healthy arguments there are extreme points of view or even downright extremist views. Yet I believe in this new social atmosphere an opportunity will, of course, take shape for consolidating the truly healthy forces, patriotic forces, forces capable of broad thinking, of thinking correctly and honestly, relying not only on knowledge drawn from books, but also on knowledge obtained through familiarity with real life.

So a realistic assessment of the state of affairs in the socialist countries—or if you like, the countries of Eastern Europe, though not all are abandoning the word "socialism"—at any rate I think it would be unreasonable of us to abandon it. I think this realistic view of the whole thing prompts me to say that yes, the changes that have come to that part of the world are, of course, wholesome ones. The path from those changes to positive results is not an easy one; it is a difficult path. Those who belonged to the ruling Communist and workers' parties and those who represent the left wing of the political spectrum in those countries are dutybound; they can and must make a contribution to bringing about these positive results. [passage omitted]

[Levin] If I may take the liberty of asking you one more question: What do you see happening with the long-term relationships with our European neighbors?

[Shishlin] I think in the immediate future they will develop in a slightly nervous way, although everywhere the new political forces realize the need to maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union. One has to be honest, however, and see that a mass of anti-Sovietism has been tossed up on this wave of renewal. This is taking an acute form in Poland, in particular; it is also evident in the GDR and some absolutely extreme points of view are being voiced. It is also present in a number of other countries, even in Bulgaria, a country which is traditionally friendly toward us.

[Levin] Are they attempting to accuse us of the sins committed by their former leaders? Although, to a certain extent, the CPSU had a dominant influence over those parties for many years and we probably ought to accept a certain degree of responsibility. What do you think?

[Shishlin] Yes, it goes without saying. Of course, but the main thing is that in recognizing our degree of responsibility for social development in the countries of Eastern Europe, we must, at the same time, realize that we remain responsible for the present situation in our country, for how things develop among our neighbors, for how things develop in Europe and for how things develop in the world. In this enormous home, as it were, that we call the earth, one must, of course, behave sensibly, responsibly, and amicably. One must learn to cooperate in a new way, in new conditions, closer cooperation of a higher quality that is truly mutually beneficial.

[Levin] Thank you, Nikolay Vladimirovich.

West Europe

Developing Links With EC Discussed

LD0502154290 Moscow TASS in English 1521 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 5 TASS - By TASS news analyst Andreiy Orlov:

New thinking, which has become the guiding star of Soviet foreign policy for years ahead, is already yielding fruit.

In addition to the current elimination of nuclear-tipped missiles on both sides of the Atlantic, the intensifying process of the drawing of the Soviet Union and the European Economic Community (EC) closer together can be cited as an example.

An EC ministerial session opens in Brussels today to focus on EC relations with East European countries.

The Soviet Union is known to have been the last among European Members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) to reach bilateral accords with the EC. This is accounted for in many respects by the Soviet Union's desire to use to the maximum the potential of CEMA-EC multilateral cooperation.

However, following a series of "separate" deals between Brussels and the Soviet Union's CEMA partners, Moscow hurried to make up for lost time, and not without success.

The treaty, signed at the end of last year which was notable for major changes, is opening the way for the industrialisation of Soviet exports to Western Europe (this is promoted by the EC lifting of 600 out of 1,200 non-tariff restrictions, including those on paper, rubber, tractors, ships, and plastics) and is creating equal opportunities for Soviet and competitors' commodities in EC countries.

Moreover, trust, which is taking the place of former suspiciousness, has made it possible to approach in a new manner such a painful matter as dumping accusations that used to complicate trade relations in the past.

From now on, sanctions will be preceded by consultations and by readiness to resolve differences at the negotiating table.

Naturally, the Soviet Union promised to take steps in response: to ensure preferential access for West European commodities, to improve West European businessmen's working and living conditions in the Soviet Union, and to regularise the system of the issuance of export and import licences, and some other steps.

"The Soviet Union has been given political credit which must be utilised so as to achieve the compatibility of economic structures with the EC, to effect domestic economic reforms and accelerate integration into the world economy," Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ernest Obminskiy said.

"Perestroyka should be regarded as a dual process which combines a profound economic reform inside the country and the establishment of favourable external conditions for its implementation. The agreement with the EC accords with such understanding," maintained Ivan Ivanov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Foreign Economic Commission.

There is growing awareness in the Soviet Union now—both in the business community and in the country's parliament where prospects for the Soviet Union's cooperation with the EC and CEMA were discussed recently—that the agreement will pay back most effectively only provided the Soviet economy is actually integrated into the world one.

The radicalisation of the economic reform and the application of new thinking to the country's domestic life are needed for this.

Embassy Comments on Treaty With Finland

LD0502155890 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1400 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet Embassy in Helsinki has taken a stand on the debate that has been going on in Finland on the future of the YYA Treaty [of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance]. In a statement to the radio news, the embassy says that it has nothing to add to President Mikhail Gorbachev's statement on the treaty at the Finlandia Hall in October. Gorbachev said then that he was of the same opinion as President Mauno Koivisto: Not one word of the treaty should be changed.

In a statement signed today, Counsellor to the Embassy Press Attache (G. Isakovskiy) said the embassy has been closely following the debate going on in Finland, especially in recent days, concerning the YYA Treaty. The counsellor states that the embassy has no better comment than Mikhail Gorbachev's statement at Finlandia Hall.

The debate on the renewal of the YYA Treaty was given new stimulus when Doctor of Philosophy Risto Penttilae proposed changing it as a result of the upheavals in Europe. President Gorbachev said in his October statement that the YYA Treaty corresponds to the realities of our time; it allows for full-scale and equal activities now and in the future in accordance with our own, Europe's, and the world's interests.

Yazov Asks Belgian Defense Minister To Visit

PM0502151590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Official Visit"]

[Text] Belgian National Defense Minister Guy Coeme will pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of February at the invitation of Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister.

Kryuchkov-led Delegation Returns From Italy

PM0602153590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[TASS report: "Delegation's Return"]

[Text] A CPSU delegation headed by Comrade G.K. Kryuchkov, first secretary of Odessa Ukrainian Communist Party Obkom [Oblast Committee], which was in Italy at the invitation of the Italian Communist Party Central Committee, returned to Moscow from Rome 4 February.

General Demands Apology From FRG Newspaper

LD0602131690 Moscow TASS in English 1305 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Lieutenant-General Gherman Starodubov, has demanded that the West German BONNER RUNDSCHAU newspaper apologise for printing a fabricated "interview" with him.

In its January 30 issue the newspaper carried the "interview" on the situation in Azerbaijan, allegedly granted by General Starodubov to a newspaper correspondent.

"I have not met the West German correspondent and the content of the 'interview' is sheer fabrication," Starodubov said.

"Since my name is known in West German military and political circles, I believe that BONNER RUNDSCHAU should print a denial," the Soviet general said.

Latin American & Caribbean

U.S. Policy on Latin America, Drugs Viewed

LD0202150790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1145 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Moscow, 1 Feb (TASS)—TASS observer Gennadiy Petrov writes: The Latin American mass media regard the bombardment of the Cuban mercantile vessel by a ship of the U.S. Coast Guard as a dangerous incident which assists the charging of tensions in Central America. [passage omitted]

Assumptions by the Americans that there were supposedly drugs on board the vessel and not a cargo of chromium ore dispatched for the Mexican port of Tampico served as a pretext for this bellicose action which has flouted the elementary norms of international law. However, whatever suspicions they may have harbored, the use of artillery, especially in international waters, against a mercantile vessel can hardly be justified, even for such a noble aim as the fight against drug smuggling, which has become one of the most critical problems of modern civilization.

However, judging by news agencies' reports, officials in Washington so far do not even intend to apologize to the Cubans. Having declared war on the international drug mafia, G. Bush's administration is attempting to solve this problem with the aid of extremely dubious and

dangerous methods and means, leading to consequences which can only be compared with the intrusion by a bull into a china shop.

The intervention of U.S. soldiers in tiny Panama, the attempt by the Pentagon to dispatch the gigantic "John F. Kennedy" aircraft carrier to the shores of Colombia and, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES newspaper, the planned creation of radar stations in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, allegedly for tracking suspicious aircraft, but in fact providing the U.S. Defense Department with a check [kontrol] on the aerial and maritime transport of the countries of South America, give rise to alarm in Latin American public opinion. Similar actions and plans, in essence, signify blatant interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

One would think the following question legitimate: Is it possible to eradicate drug addiction in the United States—a major consumer of the deadly poison—with the aid of U.S. marines, aircraft carriers, and other attributes of strength in foreign countries? Is it not simpler to attempt to solve this problem above all at home, having deprived the smugglers of a sellers' market, including means of international cooperation, which has proven its effectiveness, and which uses exclusively civilized methods of struggle?

New Brazilian Envoy Presents Credentials

PM0502120690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Credentials Presented"]

[Text] On 26 January Sebastiao do Rego Barros Netto, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Federative Republic of Brazil, presented his credentials at the Kremlin to A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

The ambassador noted that in recent years a firm foundation has been laid for further strengthening friendly ties between Brazil and the USSR, and for developing bilateral contacts in all spheres on the basis of mutual benefit and the balance of interests. He pointed with satisfaction to the two countries' coinciding positions on fundamental contemporary problems and on the matter of maintaining peace and strengthening international security. It was emphasized that the forthcoming arrival in the USSR of Brazilian President-elect F. Collor is evidence of the desire of the country's new leadership to ensure the continuity of fruitful political dialogue with the Soviet Union.

Accepting the credentials on behalf of the Presidium and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, A.I. Lukyanov noted that the Soviet Union values highly Brazil's active line in international affairs and its active participation in UN work. Our countries have much in common in their approaches to the questions of disarmament and the nonmilitarization of space, the ending of nuclear tests, and the banning of chemical weapons, and to the problems of settling regional conflicts and establishing a fair international economic order.

We have grounds for looking optimistically at the prospects for Soviet-Brazilian relations, considering the high degree of trust and the presence in both countries of the desire to continue a constructive political dialogue and develop relations on the principles of sovereign equality and mutual benefit, A.I. Lukyanov stressed. We are in favor of introducing new forms of cooperation with Brazil in all spheres and broadening collaboration between our countries in the international arena.

After the presentation of credentials, a friendly discussion took place between A.I. Lukyanov and S. do Rego Barros, in which V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and E.L. Kuzmin, chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Secretariat International Relations Department, took part.

Supreme Soviet

Statistics on USSR Supreme Soviet Composition

90UN0780A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4 27 Jan 90, 2 Feb 90 p 8

[Untitled USSR Supreme Soviet reference-information service statistical report in response to reader inquiry]

[Text] **I constantly follow the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions. I am curious to find out how many leaders of various ranks there are there, how many workers, or, for example, clergymen, cooperative members, and what their ages and levels of education are. R. Kats, Kishinev.**

We are publishing the data on the composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet received from its reference-information service.

Numerical Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Persons, 1989 Elections

	USSR Supreme Soviet	Soviet of the Union	Soviet of Nationalities
Total	542	271	271
Men	442	227	215
Women	100	44	56
Workers	134	66	68
Kolkhoz workers	17	10	7
Employees	374	187	187
Military servicemen	8	4	4
Religious figures	0	0	0
Pensioners	7	4	3
Cooperative members	1	0	1
Others	1	0	1
Having higher education	384	191	193
Having secondary or incomplete secondary education	158	80	78
Under 24 years of age	3	2	1
25-29 years	25	15	10
30-39 years	104	48	56
40-49 years	167	84	83
Over 50 years of age	243	122	121
CPSU members	474	239	235
CPSU candidate members	2	2	0
Non-party members	62	26	36
Komsomol members	4	4	0
Leaders of USSR and republic administrative organs (members of the Government, members of the Supreme Soviet organs, ministry and department leaders	7		
Enterprise personnel manager	41		
Agricultural personnel manager	52		
Leaders of state and soviet organs	30		
Leaders of scientific organizations	24		
Leaders of party organizations	44		
Leaders of trade union organizations	5		
Komsomol leaders	6		
Leaders of public organizations	9		
Leaders of cultural organizations	3		
Leaders of health maintenance organizations	5		
Leaders of literary and artistic organs	23		
Total	249 persons		

Supreme Soviet, Congress Ethnic Make-Up

90UN0672A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 pp 3-4

[Article by Valeriy Tishkov, director of the Ethnographic Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and doctor of historical sciences: "Assembly of Nations or Union Parliament?"]

[Text] Philosophers, historians, and legal experts have been engaged for many decades in studying the phenomena of power and the state. Only in recent years has political science been established as an independent discipline of the Soviet social sciences. Ethnologic studies have only now become possible in this sphere. Their need is dictated both by the new sociopolitical situation marked by the explosion of ethnic movements and the crisis in interethnic relations in the country, and by the qualitatively different state of the objective of ethnologic research. This article is an attempt to show the possibilities afforded by an ethno-political analysis of the structures of power. Our subject is the Congress of People's Deputies and the newly elected USSR Supreme Soviet.

The body of USSR people's deputies is comprised of citizens of 65 different nationalities. Thus, in spite of the fact that we have national-territorial districts existing right alongside territorial electoral districts, as if providing an additional ethnic representation, several dozen of the peoples of the USSR smallest in number have gained no representation in our parliament. Although the congress is first and foremost an all-union organ of authority and not some "ethno-parliament," all the same it is worth considering measures that would effect a fuller representation of peoples, at least in the Soviet of Nationalities. This is especially true under the competitive conditions which have become established for those who aspire to attain the credentials of deputy, conditions prompted by the energy and interest of the voters. In this context, the system of national okrugs will lose its meaning, approximating more and more closely in its

effect the regular system of territorial representation. For the time being, however, in March 1989 this system helped to diversify the mosaic of the highest organ of power. The difference in quantitative representation of the nationalities of territorial and national okrugs is evident—41 nationalities are represented in the first section of the body of deputies, 59 in the second. There are practically no representatives of the minor peoples from the territorial okrugs. The national-territorial okrugs turn out to be the only ones in which their representation is secured and the representation of the major peoples which have union republic-level statehood is supplemented as well. Specifically, elected on that basis are all five Karakalpak deputies, all six Kalmyks, seven of eight Abkhazes, seven of nine Buryats, 25 of 41 Estonians, 26 of 44 Latvians, and 42 of 71 Georgians.

In elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the representation of seven of 65 peoples was "lost" (Karachay, Greek, Tat, Abazin, Lak, Tabasaran, Hungarian), and in the Soviet of Nationalities, the final total now shows representation of 55 peoples, i.e., less than 50 percent of the total number of ethnic groups in the USSR. The representational level of peoples in the body of deputies differs from their proportional representation in the population of the country. This pertains to the three largest groups of peoples. There are 1,026 Russian deputies (45.6 percent of the total number of deputies). For comparison purposes, we see that Russians comprise 52.4 percent of the country's population (1986 data), Ukrainians—258 deputies (11.5 and 16.1 percent, respectively), Uzbeks—87 deputies (3.9 and 4.7 percent, respectively). Several peoples not having their own ethnic state formations are heavily "under-represented": Germans—10 deputies (0.4 and 0.73 percent), Greeks—one deputy (0.04 and 0.13 percent). Some of these peoples, however, are represented in just about the proper proportion: Jews—15 deputies (0.66 and 0.69 percent), Poles—seven deputies (0.31 and 0.43 percent).

The "shortage" in representation of certain peoples has indisputably shifted to the advantage of those peoples with statehood at union-republic level (except for the Russians, Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Belorussians, whose representation is almost adequate in view of their share of the population). Peoples with more than twice the number of deputies their population percentages would dictate are Georgians—71 deputies (3.2 and 1.3 percent), Lithuanians—52 (2.3 and 1.0 percent), Latvians—44 (1.9 and 0.5 percent), Estonians—41 (1.8 and 0.38 percent), Turkmen—40 (1.8 and 0.77 percent), Kirghiz—35 (1.6 and 0.72 percent). The representation of peoples of certain autonomous regions is less than half their population share (Ossetians, Yakuts, Buryats, Kabardins, Balkar, and others). There are examples of striking contrast—1 million Estonians have 41 deputies while 6.3 million Tatars have 24; 1.9 million Germans have 10; 1.1 million Poles have seven; 91,000 Abkhaz have eight; and 173,000 Gagauz have two deputies.

Let us try to analyze the reasons for these discrepancies. The most significant of these, in my view, is the hierarchy of national formations which has been preserved, which the peoples of our country either have or do not have. The higher the status of the formation, the greater is the quota for electing representatives by national okrug. These are the unique "odds" certain peoples have, especially those having a higher status with relatively low numbers and a more mono-ethnic nature for their formation, where they are not actually threatened with a loss of some national-district spaces in favor of "nonindigenous peoples" representation.

In addition to this overall cause, other no less important reasons exist, but only in certain republics or regions. Among these is the undemocratic establishment of the size of national electoral districts. In certain union republics, Latvia for example, the size of electoral districts in rural areas, where predominantly Latvians reside, can encompass 28,000 voters; in the urban areas, where the population is more multiethnic and comprises significant numbers of Russians, districts were delineated on the basis of 150,000 voters.

Still another reason is the presence within a union republic (Georgia, for example) of autonomous regions, including those for a people that do not exist. Thus, 11 additional national-okrug spaces for the Adzhar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] went to the benefit of Georgians. In this manner, the fifth largest ethnic group of people's deputies was formed (71 individuals), although Georgians occupy ninth place with respect to numerical strength of peoples in the country.

It would be incorrect, however, to limit explanation of the phenomenon of ethnic "over-representation" to the above-mentioned reasons alone. A certain role—and quite a significant one in fact—was played by the political effect of ethnic movements in a number of republics. In the Baltic region, the Transcaucasus, and Moldavia, where people's fronts and other national movements have become a powerful political force, their influence on the course of elections has been very great and has unquestionably facilitated the election of representatives of the "indigenous nations."

The trend towards narrowed representation of the most numerous peoples has been preserved in elections to the Supreme Soviet—here the proportion of Russian members has decreased (from 45.6 to 38 percent), as has that of Ukrainians (from 11.5 to 11.1 percent), Uzbeks (from 3.9 to 3.3 percent), and Belorussians (4.2 to 3.7 percent). Approximately the same proportions have been maintained for Kazakhs, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, and Mari. In general, the total percentage of all remaining peoples, outside of the 15 "union-republic nations," shows an increase as compared to the congress, from 11 to 16 percent, approximately doubling the percentage these peoples have in the total population in the country.

Elections to the Supreme Soviet have been especially successful for certain nationalities—the Komi and

Khanty; each have two people's deputies, all of whom were elected to the Supreme Soviet.

As we know, the Supreme Soviet will be renewed over the course of its full term. A question arises in this regard which has not yet been fully acknowledged—how, in the event of observing the promised principle of deputy rotation, will we maintain maximum possible representation in the Supreme Soviet?

The reservoir from which ethnic diversity can be derived or maintained is entirely limited. In the ensuing rotations, the Komi and Khanty will have to lose seats in the Supreme Soviet. Those who "got too much" in the excitement and under the understandable influence of desiring to get parliamentary experience will be the first to "get too little" in the elections that follow. This means the representation of Russians, Ukrainians, and Uzbeks for the second or fifth year of the parliament's functioning should exceed their share by approximately the same amount as they yielded to representatives of other peoples during the first round of Supreme Soviet formation. Whereas the first composition of the soviet included eight percent fewer Russians, subsequent compositions will compensate for this loss with a corresponding increase in the average figure—38 percent Russians in 1989 should mean 54 percent Russians in the Supreme Soviet after the first rotation.

Such is the elementary logic of the rotation principle. In this regard, we can predict with complete certainty the increase in mono-ethnicity (both in numbers by nationality and in their percentages) of the composition of the Supreme Soviet, and this not so much at the expense of the "union-republic nations" whose "reservoir" allows participation in four rotations, but at that of representatives of the minor peoples. Although it is entirely possible that the "reservoir" of deputy positions freed from the minor peoples will be clearly inadequate for the Russian and Ukrainian deputies to be able to fully realize their right of election to the Supreme Soviet. It will also be necessary to do this at the expense of the other "union-republic nations."

We still must take into account the fact that the majority of individuals elected to leadership posts in the soviet (committee and commission chairmen and their deputies) are Russians and they, as it is proposed, are not subject to rotation. This means they will not yield their positions to those awaiting their turn in the status of regular people's deputy—the latter will more likely be able to enter the Supreme Soviet from the reservoir of deputies of other nationalities. All of this promises to lead to dramatic collisions and still greater sensitivity, even "inflammation" of the ethnic boundaries within the body of deputies itself.

Disintegrative trends in the sociopolitical life of the country in recent years, most clearly expressed in the positions of a number of union republics, are immediately and quite sharply manifest in the work of the congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. The all-union nature of the parliament and its two-chamber organization have given way, it turns out, to a more powerful factor and principle—that of the republic. In many respects the congress has comprised a meeting of delegations and not the highest all-union legislative organ, although reminders have many times been issued from the podium telling congress participants that they are people's deputies of the USSR. The concept "people's" has been understood by the overwhelming majority of deputies delivering addresses to be the deputy's "own" people, and not the Soviet people in general.

Frankly speaking, however, when we analyze the deputy membership, we would prefer to "weigh" not the nationality of the deputy in evaluating election results, but rather his personal qualities, civil position, and political platform, i.e., those factors which should play a determining role in a normal civil society with democratic electoral processes. In the final analysis after all, we have not chosen a kind of "assembly of Soviet nations"; neither our Constitution nor law on elections makes any kind of provision for special ethnic rights. These rights are extended to national-state formations which have in fact a multi-ethnic nature—and this is the way the deputy composition of republic delegations should have been. But the realities of our social life have dictated another kind of logic for the electoral conduct of our citizens.

It should be noted that there actually was competition during the elections based on the qualities of candidates to the position of deputy, especially when there were alternate candidates in ethnically homogeneous regions, and in major cities with stronger interethnic traditions and ethnic tolerance. We cannot cite the entire list of deputies victorious in the elections from a "different ethnic" (for them) field of voters, "native" for their opponents. But we can say with certainty that this list is not great. Nonetheless, we recall instances we know so well: The victors following competition in Moscow (where about 90 percent of the voters are Russian) included the Armenian Gdlyan, Ukrainians Stankevich and Belyayev, and the Jew Zaslavskiy; in the Far East national-territorial okrug (where 95 percent of voters are Russian), a Nanay woman, Gayer, was victorious; the Russian Starovoytova won in Yerevan (95 percent Armenian).

However, it would be a mistake to think that in these instances the ethnic factor yielded priority entirely to other factors by the will of the electorate. In particular, we are referring here to the phenomenon in which one people or another—especially one having strong political movements and an ethnic "super-concept"—entirely consciously delegate their candidacy to a different ethnic representative who shares their ethnic demands in order to obtain additional opportunities for realizing their goals, and at the same time reduce their chances of being accused of nationalism.

It appears that the phenomenon of "extra-ethnic delegating"—but with clearly defined national interest—may become still more widespread in the future when certain peoples, especially those who do not yet have a sufficiently strong and well-prepared national political elite, will prefer to have in the parliament more experienced, more qualified politicians from another, primarily dominant ethnic field, but these politicians will share their national interests and concerns, and be capable of arguing their position and resolving issues more effectively. Presently in our first parliament, like in the past, the price of being a deputy is calculated to a great extent in seats, and not in people, and this inevitably renders absolute a national representation "by blood."

During the course of further democratization of our social life, every kind of "absoluteness" and primary priority given to ethnic principles (even if these are embodied using national-state form) in the all-union parliament will have to yield to the founding principles of political organization of a civil society on the basis of common democratic values, norms, and concepts. This does not mean, however, that in order to establish the face of an all-union parliament it is necessary to do away with its face as an assembly of nations. This is an uneasy coexistence to a certain degree—the imperative of our multi-ethnic state. All the same, a promising and most harmonious formula for the highest organ of authority in the USSR, it seems to us, is the formula of all-union principles and all-citizen representation in combination with an additional (but not the principal) mechanism for safeguarding the interests and representation of all the peoples who populate our country.

Phone Numbers of Supreme Soviet Committees

90UN0784A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 4 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Where Is This Commission, Where Is That Committee?"]

[Text]

Tell me please how I can phone chamber commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I have suggestions with respect to their functioning and need to meet with the members of one committee. But how do I get there? Could VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA publish the phone numbers?
[Signed]O. Sobolev, engineer, voter. Moscow.

Here is a telephone listing of permanent commissions of the chambers and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

Planning, Budgeting, and Finance Commission of the Soviet of the Union: 203-80-52, 203-79-74.

Commission of the Soviet of the Union on the Development of Industry, Power Engineering, Equipment and Technology: 203-58-98.

Commission of the Soviet of the Union on Transportation, Communications and Data Processing: 203-84-17, 203-75-12.

Commission of the Soviet of the Union on Labor, Pricing, and Social Policy: 203-89-47, 290-07-05.

Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities on National Policies and Interethnic Relations: 203-82-58.

Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities on Social and Economic Development of the Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Oblasts and Okrugs: 203-92-54, 203-92-58, 203-92-70.

Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities on Consumer Goods, Trade, Municipal, and Other Social Services to the Population: 203-61-58, 203-54-56.

Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities on the Development of Culture, Language, National and Interethnic Relations, and Preservation of Historical Legacy: 203-96-12, 203-96-14.

Committee on International Affairs: 224-15-24.

Committee on Defense and State Security: 292-73-04.

Committee on Legislation, Compliance With the Law, and Legal Order: 292-91-45, 292-73-96.

Committee on Safeguarding Health: 203-18-56, 203-85-17.

Committee on Glasnost, Citizens' Rights and Appeals: 291-00- 87, 291-24-70, 202-92-52.

Committee on Agrarian Matters and Foodstuffs: 203-96-36, 203- 61-14, 203-60-45.

Committee on the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies, the Development of Government and Self-Government: 291-02-07.

Committee on Science, Public Education, Culture and Indoctrination: 203-63-54, 203-58-78, 203-58-76.

Committee on Women's Affairs, Safeguarding the Family, Motherhood, and Childhood: 203-86-96, 203-87-43, 203-87-34.

Committee on Youth Affairs: 203-78-89, 203-77-07.

Committee on Construction and Architecture: 203-46-32, 203- 64-41, 203-48-63.

Committee on Matters of Economic Reform: 203-64-56, 203-64-34.

Committee on the Ecology and Efficient Use of Natural Resources: 203-59-39, 203-59-40.

Committee on the Affairs of Veterans and the Disabled: 203- 53-45, 203-52-07, 203-52-40.

Reference and Information Service of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 203-91-90.

Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet are located in buildings No 4 and No 27, on Kalinin Avenue.

CPSU Central Committee Plenum

Participants' Debate Speeches 5 Feb

Moscow's Prokofyev

PM0602144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 3-4

[Debate speech by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] The very fact that the draft political platform of the party's Central Committee exists merits approval. The desire of the platform's authors to emphasize the socialist nature of our society and the need to democratize the party and to restore its aspect as a truly political organization should be noted.

At the same time the draft document which we have received can hardly be submitted for discussion by the party in this form. It will create disappointment, to say the least.

We are not just discussing the question of preparing for the next party congress today; the party's political destiny is being decided. The time for palliatives in politics is past. What is needed is a concrete stance on the aims and the means of achieving them. If we do not define our position today, tomorrow will be too late. The party is already disastrously behind in the processes of democratization and is lagging behind the pace of society's renewal.

Life today has brought about an unprecedented movement of party members and prompted communists to independently seek the party's way out of the crisis state. The debate in the Moscow City party organization on the role and place of the CPSU in the contemporary political system produced a quite adequate sum both of principled approaches to party perestroyka and of specific proposals with regard to the contents of its program documents. We know that rich material has also been accumulated in the country's other party organizations.

All this is known to the Central Committee's leadership, but the distributed document fails in many ways to take account of the existing developments [narabotki] and essentially takes us back two years, to the 19th party conference.

This applies, above all, to the section on the party. It is necessary to expound more clearly the attitude toward Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. The program political document must state unequivocally that the CPSU advocates its revision.

Communist deputies should be entrusted with submitting corresponding proposals to the legislative organ on the plenum's behalf. Further delay over this will merely strengthen the negative attitude to the party.

We could discuss for as long as we like whether a multiparty system is a "panacea." But in our platform we must proceed, above all, from the political realities. And these are that society is already living under conditions of what is virtually a multiparty system, of acute political confrontation, and of a tough power struggle. Forces have rallied in the country to oppose socialism and they are waging a struggle without rules, whose outcome many people will not undertake to define. We should not close our eyes to this but formulate in our program document a party strategy adequate to the moment. It is no coincidence that the thought is already being expressed that "if we suffer defeat with perestroyka, that will prove just one thing: that we, the communists of the nineties, are talentless people who have been unable to find the right ways out of the crisis, who have been unable to rise above our own narrowness and egoism and curb our own ambitions."

We must not delay until the congress the practical resolution of the questions of extending the rights of primary party organizations, which have already been discussed repeatedly by primary party organizations and which are in many cases being realized without prior arrangement. This concerns admission to and withdrawal from the party, the procedure for electing secretaries and members of party committees and bureaus, and the concession to primary party organizations of up to 50 percent of the party members' dues. But the most important point is that what is needed is not a declaration of the principle of "power of the party masses" but the consolidation of the mechanism guaranteeing every communist's real participation in the elaboration and adoption of party decisions.

The elections of congress delegates is a paramount question. The appeal to the party Central Committee by the participants in the conference of secretaries of Moscow's primary party organizations, which summed up the long discussion of this question in the city, contains clear proposals for holding direct, secret, multicandidate elections of congress delegates. We favor giving local party organs the right themselves to determine the mechanism for holding the elections.

On the threshold of the Central Committee plenum a whole series of rayon and primary party organizations, including those of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the defense complex, and higher educational establishments, insistently reaffirmed this position. I know that these proposals are consonant with the mood of communists in many parts of the country. As well as the strengthening conviction in the party of the need to bring the 28th congress nearer and to hold it no later than June of this year. I believe that Central Committee members must unequivocally support this proposal of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's.

As for Comrade Arkhipov's proposal, I believe that it would be more expedient to conclude the elections of congress delegates in good time, so that it would be possible to form them into commissions even before the congress opens, so that the delegates themselves are able to prepare the corresponding congress documents.

I must also speak of the indeterminate positions of the authors of the draft platform under discussion with regard to the question of the party apparatus. It is necessary, finally, to take account of communists' urgent demands for the apparatus to be reduced and, primarily, to eliminate all its subdivisions which involve us in resolving questions not peculiar to a political organization. It needs qualitative renewal and shaping anew on a competitive basis following the completion of elections of party organs.

Already today party committees at all levels must be given the full right to independently determine the structure and size of their apparatus and its wages. A more concrete section on the party's budget is also needed. Again, what is needed is not a declaration of efficient and open control over the correct and careful expenditure of funds but an indication of classes of income and expenditure. It is necessary to enshrine in this section the right of party committees to engage in independent production and commercial activity. This will make it possible to strengthen the material base of ideological and propaganda work and will not put our party in the situation in which a whole series of communist parties in East European countries now find themselves.

As regards the proposals for forming the party's central organs, they contain obvious contradictions. If it is proposed to hold all-party conferences in the intervals between congresses, then why the coopting mechanism, which is not democratic in itself?

No one can explain why the top leading organ for communists of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is elected by comrades from other union republics, while Russian communists themselves are not involved in this.

There are many such questions relating to the document—all sections of it, moreover—and there is hardly any need to continue them. Everything points to the fact that it was created, as used to happen, in the offices of the apparatus. I am not a member of the party's Central Committee, but I see from the press that this draft platform was not discussed beforehand even at sessions of the party Central Committee commissions. Instead of taking account of many thousands of proposals from the mass of the party and taking clear stands, general tasks are being set for the umpteenth time, to be resolved in the indeterminate future.

This applies to the introductory part of the document, to its first section, the critical and detailed analysis of the current moment, and the political assessments and conclusions relating to the errors and mistakes made in the course of perestroyka itself. People await our stand on the priorities of socioeconomic development and a definition of the specific stages for resolving the current problems. But, instead of this, we are offering them the section "For an Efficient Planned Market Economy," containing slogans. How far forward will the promise to "support efforts aimed at accelerating scientific and technical progress" move us? This is hardly clear to anyone.

What lies behind the category of "labor private and group property" and the arguments concerning the need to find "an organic combination of planned and market methods of regulating economic activity"? Is it so harmless to mechanically transfer borrowings from foreign practice to our social and national soil? The people are concerned about where we are going. Man's exploitation of man is impermissible in a socialist society, and there must be no poverty or unemployed, old people, or invalids deprived of their home and abandoned to the mercy of fate. We must not make concessions in the matter of the working population's social protection. I believe that the exclusion of man's exploitation of man must be reflected more definitely in our political platform.

In our view, the document does not properly reflect the interests of the working class, which constitutes almost half the party. And workers are now leaving the party. What is more, according to polls conducted in Moscow, one worker in every four will not support candidates who come out from the CPSU position in the soviet elections. And it must be honestly stated that there are grounds for such sentiments. The economic reform has put precisely the working person in the most vulnerable position and given him little.

Ideological positions are important. It is impossible to ignore the existence of many currents in the party today, social democratic trends have become apparent, and statements are being made about the creation of a faction, and even about separation from the CPSU with a share-out of all party property. Therefore the chief question is to define the ideological basis of the renewed party. Political pluralism is not ideological omnivorousness. The time for flirtations is past. If it loses its ideological unity, the party loses its future.

All sociopolitical problems and the consequences of interethnic upheavals are focused in Moscow. The events of recent months, yesterday's rally in the city on the eve of the Central Committee plenum, the activities of numerous politicized associations, the emergence of horizontal structures and separate platforms in the party itself—everything demands dynamism of us. We must be not a party of words but a party of vigorous action. We must not wish for changes but implement them.

And back to the question of glasnost, Comrades. Everyone awaits open coverage of our plenum. It is good that a decision has been adopted to publish the speeches, but, Mikhail Sergeyevich, you probably should have

consulted the plenum members in advance and, perhaps, provided a television relay. The people expect that.

Yeltsin on 'Crisis Point'

PM0602133590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Debate speech by B.N. Yeltsin, member of CPSU Central Committee and chairman of USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Construction and Architecture Questions, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades! Today the party is at a crisis point to which it has been brought by, among other things, the present Central Committee, through its frequent adherence to dogma, its sloth and irresoluteness in democratizing the party, and its reluctance to restructure itself. The party's long monopoly on power has turned it into a bureaucratic structure which has reduced the country to a desperate condition and the people, tens of millions of them, to poverty. Someone has to answer for that. The party Central Committee must answer for it, of course, as must members of the Politburo, and not only its leader [pervoye litso], as is customary, but each member of the Politburo who is responsible for an area of work must be answerable.

The party, as has been said today, is increasingly losing influence and authority among the people. Clearly, the party has one last chance left at the plenum and at the congress. There must be a truly radical renewal of the party on a new democratic basis. It cannot be said that the draft new platform (admittedly submitted late) has been drawn up solely in the old spirit and contains nothing new. It does contain elements of the new, some areas are even progressive, too. But on the whole the impression that is formed is that it was written by two hands, a right hand and a left hand, and that there has been a constant attempt to reconcile them somehow by making concessions now to one, now to the other, in other words, by compromise again.

Many provisions lack clarity, definition, they erode positions or contain slogans and appeals once more. On the basis of my personal standpoint and of the declaration of the All-Union conference of party clubs and party organizations held in January, I am going to express a number of ideas.

First, that the principle of democratic centralism be abandoned and replaced by generai democratic principles ensuring true pluralism within the party, guarantees of the right of the minority, freedom of opinions and the defense of the position of the party member and the citizen of the country and the political rights and freedoms of the individual.

Second, the apparatus as an instrument of power must be abolished and there must be a switch to democratic principles of self-management in the party through the efforts of elective organs and councils of primary party organization secretaries.

Third, there must be a switch from a party defending the one-party system to a party which permits a multiparty system and is ready to act with others on the basis of a law on parties and social organizations. The supreme organ is the Congress of People's Deputies and the CPSU, like other parties, shall be legally accountable to it.

Fourth, it is necessary to abandon the principle of formal unanimity and acknowledge the diversity of positions, tendencies, platforms, and the autonomy of factions, which shall be represented in proportion to their numerical size at congresses and in the elective organs of the party.

Fifth, it must be clearly formulated as a legislative initiative that the CPSU Central Committee itself repudiates Article 6 of the USSR Constitution.

Sixth, there must be a gradual transition, in addition to the creation of organs of local self-management, to a horizontal structure within the party, that is, an association of communists based on the principles of purpose, function, and territory.

Seventh, elections to the congress, to conferences, local and central organs, and elections of their leaders, including the supreme party organs, must be direct, secret, equal, and on a contested basis from primary organizations in party territorial okrugs with their own platforms. This will give rise to objectivity, glasnost, and control [kontrol]. Whereas what happens with us is that we have no information on each party Central Committee plenum—for example, all seven plenums last year—nor as to how their decisions are being implemented.

Eighth, the subordination of the party mass media exclusively to the congress or party conference. It is intolerable that the decision to retain or dismiss the chief editor of a newspaper, journal, or television editorial office depends on the mood of party committee secretaries. The nomenklatura system and elitism must be abolished, there must be no interference in questions of the appointment or election of leaders of those ranks which are the prerogative of local soviets or the Congress of People's Deputies. All privileges within the party must be abolished without further ado. [bez vsyakikh komissiy]

Ninth, the party budget must be formed and spent exclusively in accordance with decisions from the grass roots upward and there must be rigorous monitoring by primary party organizations of all spending without exception. As for channeling a proportion of the rights and resources of primary organizations toward the top, it is my opinion that it is probably necessary to reduce the scale of dues and leave a large proportion of them with primary party organizations.

Tenth, from the unitary principle of building the state and, accordingly, the CPSU, there must be a transition to a voluntary alliance of the peoples and a voluntary alliance of the republics' communist parties, including the Russian Communist Party, and the abolition of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau. I think that the present composition of the Central Committee will probably not be able to conduct a truly democratic and radical renewal within the party albeit four-five years late, to revise its platform, or hold elections and a congress. The process of impatience and of crisis of confidence has already occurred and can hardly be contained until the fall. And I support the proposal that the party congress be brought forward to May or June; that an organizing committee to prepare for the 28th congress be created for that purpose, based on the representation of primary organizations and representatives of various platforms; and that the congress be held at that time to discuss the crisis situation in the party, policy, ideology, and society, and that an amended platform of party renewal be adopted.

Latvia's Vagris

PM0602153790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 4-5

[Debate speech by Ya.Ya. Vagris, member of CPSU Central Auditing Commission and first secretary of Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Perestroyka is masterfully introducing new features into all spheres of society's life. But at the same time it can be heard said, quite legitimately, including today at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, that dissatisfaction with its progress is emerging among people. The working people of Soviet Latvia are no exception in this. The republic's communists endorse the fact that it is necessary to act more resolutely and, what is most important, to switch from the correct sort of general discussions to specific actions. Admittedly, it should be acknowledged self-critically that until now we ourselves have not put these problems sufficiently vigorously and specifically before the supreme organs of the party and state leadership.

But today one is bound to talk about what Comrade Prokofyev has already talked about: We are not satisfied with the continuing practice of preparing the most important partywide documents in Moscow's offices, without involving in this the representatives of the union republics' communist parties. In particular, during registration we saw for the first time the draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress which is being discussed today. It requires time for deeper analysis and comprehension. I think that Latvia's Communists will read with satisfaction in the CPSU Central Committee platform many of those proposals which they were putting forward a year, or 18 months ago. Such ideas as the republics' economic autonomy and sovereignty, the development, on a par with modern conditions, of the treaty principle for the structure of the union, and the definition of the best mechanism of ties between the union republics and the union as their common entity, and also questions of the new status of the union republics' communist parties had not, at that time, met with support.

Indeed, time confirms the well known conclusion that there is no alternative to perestroyka and that we have the same strategic aims. The most important of them is the cardinal perestroyka of the USSR, ensuring republics' autonomy on a stable treaty basis and democratization and perestroyka in the party itself.

I would like to dwell in more detail on these two interrelated questions.

On our Union. The real situation in a number of the country's regions as it were suggests that a law defining the procedure for republics to leave the Union is needed. This is mentioned in the platform. Such a law, obviously, is needed. But is that the way to go about solving the problem. Shouldn't we begin from the legislative definition of how we should live together and live fairly and honestly for the good of one and all. Only then define, so to speak, the procedure for separation, for the division of property, and so forth. While unfailingly recognizing nations' right to full self-determination, of course, the party's duty is to take a stance of realism and expediency and to combat separatist tendencies. But how and with what methods and arguments? It is impossible to build a democratic rule-of-law society and state without a stable internal incentive for unity. Appeals and exhortation will not help here.

I have already said from this rostrum, but I repeat once again that we will be able to create a free union of free peoples if we have a commitment to each other, rather than being doomed by someone to a joint existence. Unfortunately, in the draft CPSU Central Committee platform the new contours of our union are defined very indistinctly. So I believe that it is necessary to work out and adopt a law on union or a new treaty on union. Here it is specialists who must define the form of this legal act. This, in my view, should be done before the 28th CPSU Congress.

A few words about radical economic reform. This is not the first year that we have been hearing from all rostrums that direct contracts, and contractual ties between enterprises, and between republics and regions, and the formation of a union-wide market must be the economic basis for the integration processes, and for the renewal and consolidation of our federation. This is correct. But just as frequently people talk about the nonequivalence of economic arrangements between the republics and the center, which contradicts USSR laws and, particularly, the Law on Economic Independence of the Baltic Republics.

Just one example. It is common knowledge that Soviet Latvia specializes in the production of meat and milk mainly using concentrated feed brought in from outside, and paying for it with output produced. Mutual economic commitment in this must be built on a stable and long-term contract ooncerning the volume of reciprocal deliveries. But the USSR Government still avoids making such a contract and, what is more, is adopting its own kind of penalty sanctions, unilaterally continuing to reduce sharply the amount of feed grain allocated to the republic. As a result in the first six months of this year the shortage of concentrated feed amounts to more than 40 percent of what is needed, which will inevitably entail getting rid of pigs and meat poultry.

It follows from this that the republic will not be able to fulfill union deliveries for meat and milk in full, which will affect Leningrad first and foremost. This causes unnecessary opposition between the republic and the Union. The question takes on a political tinge, because once again the Baltic Republics "are reluctant" to fulfill their obligations.

I am talking about this so that the union government and all those present will understand that the Baltic Republics, including Latvia, are interested in union deliveries. But the rules of the game must be strict and honest.

We ask just one thing—that the state order for meat and milk is backed up with deliveries of concentrated feed. That the reduction or increase in the allocation of it is only in proportion to the output delivered. This, comrades, is not petty haggling on account of a few carloads of meat. This is the fundamental problem of restructuring economic relations in the new economic management conditions. At the same time we are proceeding from the thesis of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform that the center does not have interests of its own which are distinct from the fundamental interests of the peoples of the republics which constitute the federation.

About the party. I fully support the idea that delay in carrying out profound transformations in the party itself is fraught with the risk of its being squeezed onto the sidelines of political life. I am sure that the party will be able to assert itself in this stormy torrent of political processes not so much by fixing on political phenomena which have already taken place, so much as by the ability to boldly look ahead and prepare for the future.

A number of new long-term proposals in this connection are contained in the appropriate section of the draft platform. But are we looking sufficiently far ahead into the future? To say, for instance, that a multiparty system is not a panacea says almost nothing. It is time to call a spade a spade. It is quite possible that in many of the country's regions such problems as the attitude to democratic centralism as it is understood today, or the attitude to territorial-production structuring of the party, to the forms and methods of work in conditions of real political pluralism and a multiparty system, have still not fully emerged. But let us not deceive ourselves. Given the normal and consistent development of perestroyka in the country—all this is just a question of time, and it is not so far off.

In Soviet Latvia these problems are no longer theoretical but exceptionally practical. The Latvian Communist Party is already operating in the conditions of a multiparty system. The elections of the local organs of power, and of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, in particular, are taking place amid fierce rivalry between the various political forces. If we want to build a democratic rule-of-law state where the law prevails and where the principle of people's power is really being implemented, then the party should master as quickly as possible the rudiments of parliamentary activity, which is based, among other things, also on political partnership, on social and national reconciliation, and on the art of constructive and reasonable compromise.

Proposals about raising the status of the union republics' communist parties and giving them guaranteed representation in the supreme organs of the CPSU leadership and full autonomy in solving all the questions of their internal life deserve full support. The renewal of the Soviet federation and strengthening republics' sovereignty, on the one hand, and the renewal of the party and strengthening the autonomy of the union republics' communist parties—on the other—is a dual process which must proceed harmoniously, but resolutely and consistently.

The CPSU Central Committee draft correctly says that the party's perestroyka must increase primary party organizations' autonomy. I believe that the CPSU Central Committee platform should more fully and clearly elucidate guarantees of minority rights. The party's democratization, and its transformation into an organization capable of following the principles of humanism and democratic socialism places paramount emphasis on precisely this range of problems.

It is obvious that with time the existence of several platforms on the one and the same problem within the framework of one party will become a normal phenomenon. Of course, in this case the party's political leadership will comprise efforts to draw together different opinions, to coordinate them and work out a new, compromise viewpoint.

It is precisely the search for and implementation of consensus in these conditions that is becoming the source of movement from a confrontation of views to socially significant conclusions. But the diversity of views, and freedom to express and defend them must not supplant conscious party discipline and unity of actions at the stage when democratically adopted decisions are being implemented.

Comrades! Today we are facing a most crucial, fateful decision. Broad, free and principled discussion in the party is needed. On the whole, in my view, the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress by

and large reveals the essence of perestroyka and, with the remarks made at this plenum duly taken into account, can be put forward for party-wide discussion. The final words rest with communists, and also with nonparty people and all those who are sincerely rooting for our country's and party's future, and for the destiny of each republic.

Kiev Obkom Head

PM0602141190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Debate speech by G.I. Revenko, first secretary of Kiev Ukrainian Communist Party Oblast Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! The turbulent changes of recent years have highlighted a great deal. It is becoming increasingly obvious that defeat for the ideas of perestroyka would be the heaviest of blows to our society and world development. There are grounds for serious concern. The acute interethnic conflicts against the backdrop of the ever-deepening economic crisis, fundamental disagreements between the republics and the center, the decline in trust in institutions of power, the lack of respect for the law, and the deformation of ideological and moral guidelines essentially raise the question of the fate of our multinational state and our constitutional system.

The party's ideological and organizational unity is clearly being eroded in the broadening pluralism of opinions and currents, its forces are splintering, and there are increasingly loud voices proclaiming that the CPSU has compromised itself once and for all and can no longer recover, and by this means they are squeezing out the party. The time has come to say: The CPSU, as the leading party, has reached a point where any further delay or inadequate measures are impermissible and may lead to the loss of its political leadership and then to the destruction of the existing institutions of power.

This Central Committee plenum, in my opinion, must initiate a new political period in the life of the CPSU and offer an action program that would be conducive to rallying the party, give it confidence in its ability to head perestroyka, and be accepted and supported by communists and the people.

The draft defines new democratic principles for the building of society, society's ideology, and the functioning and structure of a renewed party and contains radical proposals that take into account the processes taking place both in our country and in other countries.

Within the context of the debate taking place at the plenum, I would like to make the following points.

First. In conditions where an intensive quest on how to realize the socialist idea is under way throughout the world and where pan-human values are coming to the fore, it is clearly not enough merely to say that we stand for humane democratic socialism. A fundamental substantiation is needed, the essential features of socialism's new look must be revealed, and this must be done on a really scientific basis. Without this communists and nonparty people lose their political bearings. Unless we do this, we will lose the positions that our party and country have held in the development of the revolutionary idea.

Nor can we close our eyes to the fact that processes in the East European countries are meeting with a mixed reaction among our people. Therefore, it seems advisable to have in the congress program document a special section or subsection that should set out and assess the modern socialist concepts prevalent in the world.

Second. The party's place in the conditions of the deepening of the reform of the political system. The party and power, the party and the economy. I think, and in this I am basing myself on many people's opinion, that the political platform ought to clearly express our attitude toward Article 6 of the Constitution, which today continues to remain a subject for the fueling of passions around the party and for political speculation. My opinion is that the party cannot declare its power via the Fundamental Law.

I think it is extremely necessary when elaborating the congress political documents to directly link their theses with the drafts of new laws. Above all those on ownership in the USSR and on land, and also with the future law on federation. The Central Committee too must express its attitude toward them in the conceptual context.

I think that, while diligently implementing the thesis of working people's political power, we are dangerously lagging behind in ensuring constitutional guarantees of the foundations of our socialist system and strengthening state structures. This is increasingly sharply felt and requires action in response. The formation of strong soviets must be singled out as a most important direction in the work of the whole party; given sovereignty of the soviets, I am convinced, it will also be easier for the party to work.

Meanwhile today in the party there is a very marked lack of new forms of work, a commitment to obsolete approaches, and a tactical inflexibility. It ought long since to have been decided what the party's tactics should be in soviets at all levels given the differing representation of communists in them, and what attitude to take toward social organizations and unsponsored formations, including those espousing frankly reactionary positions. I think everyone will agree that there is a need for profound political analysis of the essence and orientation of the sundry people's fronts and movements, which are attempting in a number of places to become an alternative power.

The renewal of the party's internal life. Today this is impossible without the elaboration of new statutes. In my opinion, the statutes should be democratic and free

from dogma and declarations. Most important of all, they should attract people to the party, not repel them. They should permit every communist to realize his potential within the framework of the new party relations and should fully ensure party unity—ideological and organizational.

I support the new structure of the party's top organs proposed in the draft platform. At the same time I believe that we should also change the procedure for their formation. Direct proportional delegation from the republic communist parties of their representatives to the CPSU Central Committee would accord with the new vision of the theses regarding those parties.

The proposed changes in the CPSU's organizational structure certainly constitute a qualitatively new degree of independence for the union republic communist parties. Of course, it is not easy to choose among the many opinions the optimum option for the structure of party organs below the Central Committee. But the fact that the management of the national economy has three tiers yet the party is led according to a five-tier system cannot be left unchanged.

We must take a particularly radical approach toward reinterpreting the role of primary party organizations. The kind of primary organizations we need today are not a submissive foundation programmed to perform the will of superior organs, but a living, self-developing party organism. Clearly they should be given not cut-down but broad autonomy and the right of final admission to and expulsion from the CPSU, and we should eliminate the paradox whereby a person joins the party voluntarily but cannot quit it freely. At the same time we cannot leave the loopholes that enable certain party members today to keep one foot in the CPSU and the other in other politicized organizations.

The raising of the question of a strictly regulated procedure for reports by all elected organs and their members, from Central Committee secretaries to primary party organization secretaries, seems logical and correct. We are clearly faced with the need to introduce resignation into party practice as a democratic form of party life, and also the recall of Central Committee members. But I am categorically opposed to this providing cover for personnel who have made a mess of things, and not only party personnel.

The elections of party leaders must be made direct, secret, and multiple-candidate for all, with the involvement of all Communists. At the same time I propose that the draft clearly state what kind of cadre policy the CPSU renounces and what kind of cadre policy it favors.

Taking into account the experience of elections to the soviets and the nature of our party, we should make provision for a regulated norm for the representation of workers and peasants in all elected party organs, right up to the top leading organs.

Life itself rejects today the Central Committee's monopoly right to control the party's money. The party budget must be revealed in full, it must be formed in a fundamentally different way, from below, and must be subject to mandatory approval at congresses, conferences, and party committee plenums, and reports must be made to communists on the expenditure of party funds.

Today the situation is complex, and it is a matter of honor for us, for communists, and for Central Committee members to take a clear stand without delay on privileges and benefits within the party not through the efforts of the Supreme Soviet but ourselves, by our own party decision.

Comrades! We will certainly be preparing and holding an unusual congress and one that is crucial in every respect. It is also easy to foresee the sharpness of the debates in prospect, taking into account the fact that today various clubs and groups with their own platforms and collective positions have begun to emerge in the CPSU and regional interests are being manifested increasingly markedly. In this connection it seems necessary to give special thought to the mechanism for the adoption of fundamental documents by the congress and for emerging from possible situations in which positions do not coincide.

The unprecedented speed with which the situation in the country is changing and growth of processes destroying party unity demand that we come out unequivocally in favor of bringing forward the date of the congress and the entire report and election campaign in the party on a broad democratic basis.

Those are the points I wanted to make.

Moldavia's Luchinskiy

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[Debate speech by P.K. Luchinskiy, member of CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Of course, everyone understands what Vladimir Ignatyevich [Brovikov, ambassador to Poland] said here. Probably each of us experiences roughly the same feelings. We all feel miserable. But, nevertheless, I wish to return to the appeal with which our plenum began—just think: What is to be done?

I do not know how successful I will be, but I will try to get closer to answering the question of just what we should do together to make things go better. People really expect of our plenum—perhaps more than ever—political decisions which will provide answers to the questions set with regard to today's realities.

Yes, the CPSU undoubtedly deserves credit as the initiator of perestroyka. However, we must no longer take comfort in this. We need breakthroughs to new ideas and work to get ahead of the situation. We have too little political foresight and good prognosis, too little rapid and decisive action and assertiveness in implementing what has been planned.

It is clear to almost everyone today that indecision, tardiness, and laggardness in resolving any questions are precisely the sources of many of our misfortunes. The situation in Moldavia could serve as a graphic illustration. Many people in the country know that Moldavia occupied a record place in terms of preserving stagnation under the conditions of perestroyka. Questions of giving statehood to the Moldavian language and switching to Latin script were were taking a long and agonizing time to tackle. On that basis a confrontation and a demarcation along ethnic lines began. As a result, the republic entered a very real sociopolitical crisis, and ethnic confrontation was still further exacerbated. Worst of all, a section of people, particularly young people, were strengthened in the conviction that they could ensure their interests only in a confrontational way, only by exerting pressure, issuing ultimatums, or even provoking disturbances.

In that situation, all that was done in the republic was to reshuffle cadres. As the saying goes: Until the storm breaks...[people don't worry]. Unfortunately, this had already become the norm with us, as can be seen recently not only in the example of our republic.

As a rule, a new leadership inherits such a grave legacy and such a neglected situation that there is no simple and easy way out of the crisis. Questions of employment, ecology, migration, and rural development had become acute in the republic, and distortion had occurred in the development of livestock raising.

In addition, many party cadres accustomed to using the old command methods in their work have now lost their heads. Rayon committee secretaries are leaving one after another, and many communists are surrendering their party cards.

The events in Romania, which neighbors on us and with which we have a common history, language, and culture and numerous kinship ties, have been a new factor in the political life of Moldavia. For long years official relations with that country were frozen. We now intend to take the path of developing very diverse contacts, particularly in the cultural sphere. This work is already being carried out.

It is against this complex political background that the Moldavian Communist Party is operating today. I am profoundly convinced that these processes are very closely linked with the overal political situation both in the country and in Europe.

The draft CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress submitted today is undoubtedly a serious step forward in analyzing the situation and in formulating the party's further strategy and tactics. But I would not say that the platform clearly expresses positions on the very acute aspects which our society is now experiencing and which are being so heatedly debated.

We must admit that we have become too dogmatic and cling too tightly to customary truths which have already ceased to be so for the rest of mankind. Unfortunately, most frequently we only belatedly assess the true significance of what is happening to ourselves. Look, surely we could have discussed a multiparty system at our plenum a year ago? But that was considered dreadful sedition, even though people were talking about it absolutely everywhere. History attests that at turning points in the life of society major political trends inevitably split apart. Why? Because in every large party there are those who are ahead of the time and those who lag behind it. There are innovators and conformists, conservatives and radicals. A multiparty system is already essentially developing today within the CPSU and in society. Why have we been forced to integrate under the party's command not only heterogeneous, but sometimes also opposite opinions and ideological aspirations and different tactical approaches? It seems to me that Lenin's credo—first demarcate and then unite—remains just as objective a methodological strategy as ever.

And again. Whose interests do we, as a party, express? When the party was formed, it expressed the interests of the workers. Then, running ahead, we hastened to declare that the party expressed the interests of the whole people. During that period the party merged with the state apparatus. Thus we as party workers, in attempting to unite everyone, sometimes abandon some of our own positions. It seems to me that in this situation we ought at least to discuss this question. In general, comrades, we are today discussing very acute questions, but no way do we say what among them is a natural development and what is the result of our bad work or our errors.

I have already said that we admit many things at our plenums and adopt decisions on them only after the event. It seems to me that when the words "Who is to blame? are heard in the hall today, they once again reflect the same situation. This is roughly the same as happens at rallies. Because there are some natural laws in the development of society. Can we now stop what is happening in the country? If not, in what way must our party act, restructuring itself, so as not to end up ultimately on the sidelines of history, as our draft platform states?

Why should we not, let us say, study in depth the experience of those countries which operate a two-party system? An advantage of that system, it seems to me, is that it preserves political stability in the country. Both parties have to be created on the basis of the socialist option but differ in their work methods and approaches—which ensures a definite dynamism in society. If we are not ready to discuss this question today—and probably we are not ready—then let us,

perhaps, set up some kind of commission to study the question and, as proposed, discuss it specially in three weeks' time. The chief point is that something must be decided, that it is necessary to act.

The question of the president. I do not agree that this is only a formal matter. The laws are not operating—that is true. But understand: It is only with regard to deputies that people in the country do not, in my opinion, make any demands or complain that they were elected illegally, and they are recognized even if only 50-something percent of the votes were cast for the candidate. Therefore, I would now support the question of the president. It seems to me that this would make it possible to strengthen legality and, in the long term, to think about having the president elected by the whole people.

It seems to me that a clearer entry could be made in the draft in respect of Article 6 of the Constitution. It does communists a disservice, because it imposes the party's supremacy on people in society, and this inevitably gives rise to protest. This is why it is not the Congress of Soviets [as published] but precisely the Central Committee Plenum, in our view, that must come out unequivocally for its exclusion from the fundamental law, because the party's fate must be decided, above all, by the party itself. We are late in this regard, too. At the second congress there was one situation. It has changed now. For the situation is changing every day.

The question of the union republic communist parties' independence. The report proposes much that is positive on this score. Many people today seem to be frightened by the point about the union republic parties' independence. But the reality is such that we must proceed more boldly to form a union of union republic communist parties on a unified ideological basis.

Another cardinal question: The future of our federation. I believe that, from saying that we have yet to live under conditions of a real federation, we must resolutely proceed to action and give new, perestroyka substance to the concept of a federation not later than the end of 1990 (Comrade Vagris proposed perhaps earlier). There is one way out—a union of sovereign states on the basis of a new union treaty. This requires a clear definition of the range of problems which the republics will delegate to the center the right to resolve. These could be questions of the country's defense, the functioning of transport and communications, the development of the power industry, and some others.

In addition to a union treaty, each republic will have to sign corresponding protocols with the center. Their contents will reflect the republic's specific features. And precisely this will strengthen both communication with the center and trust in each other. The report also talks about this—about various forms of federative ties. I believe that our proposal fits precisely within this concept.

Literally just a few words about the economy. Of course, I agree that it would be a good thing to define something more concretely in the platform. But the chief point is that we must take account of the fact that, unless we resolve in the very near future at least some substantial questions connected with supplying the population, the situation will certainly exacerbate even further. I do not understand why we are not resolving those questions that have already arisen repeatedly. Comrade Belousov has just said that holding elections for [enterprise] leaders is not the right approach." So let us resolve this question.

We are also lagging behind, I believe, in resolving the questions of ownership, land, and many other things. There is talk of extending the operating principles of cooperatives to socialist enterprises. If this makes sense, and I believe that there is much here that is substantiated and principled, then let us decide these questions more quickly.

Take a question like material and technical supplies for national economic plans. Our republic is supplied to the tune of 70 percent. Why is this done? I do not know, but I personally consider it simply an act of sabotage, because once again we arrive at a discrepancy between word and action. We write about this and publish it, but what will we have achieved at the end of the year? I believe that it may well be precisely extraordinary measures with regard to the economy that make the greatest sense.

Two other proposals. In the very near future, it seems to me, we are obliged to resolve one fundamental question—the question of ensuring elementary public order in the country. People are living in fear, and confidence in the future has receded into the past. That always used to be our advantage. What is to be done? I propose creating a public parliament in the country, i.e. forming a kind of "roundtable," to which representatives of all movements, fronts, and unions would be invited and where a joint discussion of ways to establish tranquillity in society, ruling out violence and mass disturbances, would be started together with representatives of the country's leadership. Comrades, we must hold a dialogue with all forces so as to ensure order in society.

Finally, about party comradeship. We have begun to forget this concept, comrades. We are getting unnecessary suspicions about each other in connection with the expression of some opinions. Yet it is precisely by relying on party comradeship that we could work better in this stormy, difficult, and complex time, trusting each other more and understanding each other more, and on this basis achieve greater results.

Moscow University's Melnikov

PM0702125490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Debate speech by I.I. Melnikov, secretary of Moscow State University Party Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Representatives of several primary organizations have spoken at the present Central Committee plenum. It is a good thing that the Central Committee has begun to listen to the voice of the primary organizations. Although it seems to me that this should be the norm.

Horizontal ties within the party are no less important. All-union conferences of secretaries of higher educational establishment [VUZ] party committees were held recently. Representatives of 200,000 of the country's communists gathered there. These are, of course, elements in the democratization process that is developing in the party.

Today it appears naive, to put it mildly, to try to persuade people of the value of democracy, since the majority shares the common democratic theses. The differences begin when it comes to concrete actions. For instance, how should delegates to the congress be elected, when should elections take place in the party organizations, how and when should the congress itself be held?

Or take this question: When will we finally learn the viewpoint of members of the Central Committee, the Central Committee Secretariat, and the Politburo, not as set forth by Foreign Ministry spokesmen, but from their own mouths?

Esteemed Central Committee members! What's the matter, are you afraid that we will not be able to grasp which of you wants to say what, and what you are calling for? What are you trying to do, protect us from being upset unnecessarily? Or are we not mature enough, in your opinion, to understand our own problems? What we want to see in the Central Committee is not a portrait gallery, but an assembly of real people who suffer, argue, and perhaps make mistakes along with us, but who seek to resolve the most difficult, fundamental questions.

You could put it like this: Is the Central Committee fulfilling the 19th Party Conference resolution "On Glasnost"? And the congress should be given an answer to that question.

Back in June, at the university party conference, we proposed that the 28th CPSU Congress be held in the first half of 1990. And now there are far too many very serious reasons to hold the congress no later than June. But will we be able to hold the elections of congress delegates in a new way? Back in October we proposed a concrete formula for holding these elections, based on direct, secret, contested elections by party okrugs. Many primary organizations share this approach.

Why do the primary organizations talk so persistently of the need for direct elections? Because, of course, in this way those whose positions are closest to those of ordinary communists will be elected. But I think there is another reason too. We want to have confidence in the people who will determine the party's fate and the country's future.

Their reputations should be beyond all doubt. The question of confidence is now a question of the party's life. Unfortunately too many things have already accumulated that make us ponder the subject of confidence. Conclusions are drawn too slowly from the grave lessons of life. You do not have to look far back to see how many party workers in the upper echelons we provided with honorable pensions and personal cars without assessing their actions.

Does this not mean that all you have to do is make your way to a certain level of power, and after that—whatever you do—you will get away with anything? Is not that why ministers are starting to haggle over tanks? We cannot avoid analyzing and assessing everyone. That is the way to clean up the party. That is where every one of us can find lessons and warnings: For the rank and file—to elect worthy people, and for the leaders—not to forget their responsibilities.

Direct elections will give every communist the opportunity to put forward people with whom you work hand in hand, with whom you discuss common problems at party meetings in the primary organization.

Incidentally, at the university, proposals to this effect have been put forward, by, among others, the veterans: Every party leader should be registered not with the apparatus party organization, but with one of the large primary organizations. I think the Politburo members could heed this proposal.

In essence the process of forming the body of delegates has already begun. Various kinds of associations and clubs are springing up, and will continue to do so. All this is a reality. True, one does not want to come up against the claims of some associations of a monopoly of democracy, or attempts to claim the right to divide candidates into "democrats" and "antidemocrats," "progressives" and "nonprogressives." The candidates' platforms will be generated chiefly in the primary organizations and in the process of discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee platform. The communists will give their assessment by voting.

As we approach the congress we have an opportunity to renew and strengthen leadership components at every level and to hold reports and elections in the party committees—from the primary committees to oblast and republican committees. People say it is better to do this after the congress. At the conference of VUZ party committee secretaries, opinions were also divided on this question.

But I would like to cite the arguments in favor of holding reports and elections in the party before the congress. First, elections of people's deputies to republican and local soviets will provide much food for analysis and, let us be frank, will call into question the authority of a number of leaders and members of party committees. This question cannot be kept on ice. Furthermore, the sooner communists who have won the voters' confidence

appear on the elected party organs, the quicker perestroyka processes will begin in the party.

Second, we see that the people's initiative and the voices of the primary organizations are already resolving this question in practice in a number of oblasts in favor of holding the reports and elections now, not in the distant future. Must we be left behind by events here too?

Furthermore the idea of not holding elections before the congress comes not only from people whose intentions are good, but also from those who want to sit it out, as the saying goes, while times are tough, and who have nothing much to report back. But the main thing is that elections in a party organization are not only a time to report back, but a time to formulate a position, a line of progress. And it is important for this choice to be made in the eyes of the entire labor collective.

Elections must be held, but this must be done in a new way. The elections of delegates to party conferences at all levels should be direct, secret, and contested. Esteemed Comrades! You could radically change the system of elections now, at the present Central Committee session. That would be a concrete contribution to perestroyka in the party.

The CPSU Central Committee platform is being discussed today. That is we are discussing the fundamental principles of the life of the party and society. First, about the document's title. If we all believe that socialism is a society of humanity and democracy, if there can be no socialist society without democracy and humanism, then to call for a humane, democratic socialism is, in my view, to contradict ourselves on the most important point. Perhaps that is the reason why the draft is full of phrases like "renewal of socialism," "truly socialist society," and such. And what is meant by terms like "earned private property" or "bureaucratic property"? This is, after all, a platform, and we have a right to expect accuracy, brevity, and clarity from it. It is these qualities that it lacks, if it is to become the basis of the communists' work until the formulation of the new CPSU Program.

Take just one question as an illustration—that of the Russian Communist Party. This question is already pressing, and the platform should answer it. The creation of a Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] is nothing more than a temporary measure. The CPSU is the party of the working people, and it expresses their interests, not those of all strata of society, as the platform says. After all, there are strata in our country whose interests no honest person would want to express.

In the proposed platform, science, education, and culture are not given the place and significance that they should have in society. In this connection I must tell you about one of the main conclusions of the conference of secretaries of party committees of the country's VUZ's. This conclusion is unfortunately not optimistic. We are dealing with an undervaluation of the role of science, education, and culture on the party of leading bodies in the party and state.

It is not enough to state that without the support of scientific and technical progress and without the priority development of science, education, and culture, the successful development of society is impossible. Resolute steps are needed to rectify the situation. Until there is due respect in the state for the labor of the scientist, teacher, and cultural worker, our society is doomed to continue marking time. The example of Moscow University demonstrates that collectives understand the grave situation in our economy. The mood is not one of dependence. We see the solution to many problems in our being given a free hand and autonomy.

Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, in your speeches you often talk about self-management and democratic principles. We ask the Central Committee—help Moscow University to obtain autonomy. Our proposals are with the government, but there has been no decision.

To conclude my speech, I would like you to listen to a very serious complaint that is made against the Central Committee. Communists believe that the Central Committee's reaction to events in the country is often belated and is not appropriate to the importance of these events. The lack of political assessments is particularly perplexing. For instance, was an assessment given of the distribution of political forces and their actions in Azerbaijan and Armenia? Or let us recall that the analysis of the situation in Lithuania was at least a year late. In the difficult days of the miners' strikes we on the party committees were waiting not only for general assessments, but for detailed information, but the Central Committee was silent.

Naturally, it is not so easy to propose a formula for emerging from a difficult situation. But it is incumbent on the party leadership to give a timely assessment.

Esteemed Comrades! All of us, ordinary communists and Central Committee members, are now tormented by the same questions. And we cannot postpone their resolution until later, we must resolve them today.

Explosives Expert Fesenko

PM0602121590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Debate speech by K.G. Fesenko, explosives expert at "Artemugol" production association "Kochegarka" mine, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades! Here we are, a miners' delegation. There are not many of us—just five people. In general this is probably a rather unusual event. But we shall not touch on the question of how we got here and why this has happened. Probably because we are nonetheless advancing along the path of democratization.

Talk now is about what we are to do within the party so that it can remain the vanguard. We say "vanguard" but in fact what do we have? Perestroyka was essential—it seems everyone understands that. Anyone who did not understand it has now assessed it at its worth. The party was the vanguard.

Where did perestroyka begin, who suggested it? It came from above, the communists suggested it—perestroyka began. It seemed that everything would have been all right if everyone had grasped this, and there would be no talk now about how the party is in some incomprehensible state, in a state of public dishonor or god knows what else.

So why has this not happened? In my opinion without such an analysis we will probably make no headway, whatever platform we prepare now.

I want to talk specifically about this document. We have familiarized ourselves with it but some clauses written there make us dubious. At the very beginning—about how radicalism in the economy is essential. In general our opinion as workers is that radicalism in the democratic movement of all society should be primarily in democracy. Radicalism in glasnost, radicalism in democracy—that is what there should be. But in my opinion perestroyka has advanced along the path of radicalism in the economy. Without having a legal basis under all this, without having elaborated laws, we began to dash from side to side: Now we would have one thing as a panacea, now another, economic accountability at one moment, then the lease, or something else. But ultimately without laws like laws on property and price formation, without the mechanisms, all this is economically unacceptable. That is, you cannot put these innovations on the rails of an economy which has been monopolized to the limit.

It was monopolization which led to the decline of the economy but instead of using the mechanism which still operated to some extent we began to approach the market without having any laws or any normal grounds for implementing market relations. This market has in general turned into outright robbery. Those sectors which give goods to the people have lagged behind.

We say there are no goods. That is right, there are no goods. That means we will make goods for the people. But at the same time where are we going in the base sectors on which the entire economy rests, where have we taken heavy industry, and why? We miners say that all these innovations by our academicians have brought the coal industry, for instance, to the end of its tether.

To say now that the miners are strikers and self-seekers is intolerable. You have to look into everything, comrades, you cannot simply state now that the only thing strikes have done is to undermine our economy.

But who talks about what the miners have done on this plane to ensure that perestroyka rises from below, from the very root, from where, if that root becomes secure, the entire process of perestroyka will proceed? That is what we must think about. We cannot say of strikes that they are merely a negative phenomenon and immediately sweep them aside as a negative phenomenon.

What kind of an approach do we have? Five years of perestroyka and again some utterly obsolete approach. Probably we should ascertain why and how this has happened. Where and in what did we slip up? I have already said frequently that perhaps all these strikes took place in some atmosphere of local connivance? It was precisely there that much could have been prevented.

At the start of his activity Mikhail Sergeyevich used to travel around the country a lot and he also visited the mining regions. The local apparatchiks did not allow the truth from the people to reach him, they did not allow it. They did everything once again to organize meetings unofficially, to select and train people who would give our typical "yes sir," saying that all was well, that perestroyka was advancing and we would work. The truth should have been spoken and measures should have been taken when it was not too late. Perhaps we would not have gotten to this state.

There is much talk in society now about how the party is losing out because Article 6 of the Constitution secures some special rights for it. This must be understood in one way—special rights are secured now in our society not for the party but for the party apparatus.

I am simply a rank and file communist. I have no post through CPSU channels, I am simply a worker, not even in the party bureau of the mine sector. But what is my leading role? Anyone can tell someone that he is doing something wrong. So we should not speak of any leading role of the party as a whole. That thesis has been overturned. We must speak of what position the party apparatus has now taken. Basically because of its conservative position perestroyka is making no headway.

Now that it has also arisen from below and, backed up by decisions from above, there will possibly be some new wave which will nonetheless enable it to proceed at a smarter pace, so to speak [sentence without main clause as published]. But the leading role of the apparatus probably tells in the fact that the apparatus has seen a threat to itself beneath all these democratic phenomena. To itself as an individual. Everyone was thinking primarily about his own place. He thought: But what will happen to me personally?

We are saying now that the party has lost trust, yet it had the greatest trust five years ago. It was the party which began the processes of democratization. But why is it losing its positions now? Let's say frankly: We must dot all the i's. Who is discrediting the party? The apparatus is discrediting the party.

Elections to the local soviets are under way right now. I can cite examples directly from my own city. A worker is nominated for the local soviet, for the city soviet, for instance. A representative of the party rayon committee

[raykom] has been nominated alongside him as a candidate deputy in the same okrug. As soon as they saw the workers' alternative, which is now strong, they switched the apparatchik to another okrug.

We tried to play at these stupid apparat games, we took this worker (he is chairman of the strike committee) and he also rewrote his application. But how does everything happen here? The party apparatus has prepared the okrug commissions, the party apparatus performs and controls this work, so to speak. We are more concerned with our work, we have nothing like that.

We switched our candidate, but with what difficulty! Moving from one okrug to another—you have to almost submit a new nomination: There is carping about documents and all that kind of thing.

That is how it happens and that is where it leads. We see all these methods as a kind of unpleasant struggle. Or intrigue rather than struggle.

In some okrugs only representatives of the apparatus are nominated and in others only workers. These are all utterly wrong methods. I shall say frankly that they will never find support among the ordinary people.

Hence the discrediting. We have heard Comrade Mesyats' speech. What does he say? He talks of the dishonor of the party apparatus. Well, talking of dishonor, you were the one to deal with agriculture, Comrade Mesyats. Do we have full shelves in our country now? Now someone is dishonoring you. I do not know how you can say that.

Now about information. As we remember, as we have been told since childhood, there have been all kinds of revolutions—the mail, telegraph, communications, the telephone, and so forth. That is, information. Perhaps there are computer information centers now. All information is in the hands of the party apparatus. It has learned to make very precise use of this mechanism.

In principle we do not receive information locally. For instance, a conference is being prepared—a meeting of workers and peasants with the General Secretary. What happens? Literally a few days before the start of this conference let us say we have learned by change that the conference is being convened. The apparatus has tried to prepare people, this has been discussed somewhere unofficially for a long time. Why? Why place the General Secretary in a position where he will receive information that has been filtered and selected so that later he will be accused of taking the wrong decisions? Why should party leaders be guided by information suggesting that all is well locally?

Of course, it is convenient for the apparatus to say that all is well locally and that perestroyka is in full swing. But against this background decisions are made which are not implemented because they are divorced from real life.

What else did I want to say? Glasnost in the work of the Politburo. We have frequently raised this question. As long as the Politburo and Central Committee do not discuss publicly [glasnost] the problems which are being resolved in the country, nothing will come of it. There is a lot of talk about glasnost but we have glasnost in a truncated form. We read in the newspapers that a Politburo session has taken place. A brief note is given of the questions raised and just as brief a note of the decisions made. Who took what position and how the question was discussed—we do not know.

I think this problem will be easily resolved if the party accepts once and for all that if the party was the first to make the demand for democratization it should be the first to restructure its ranks. What it has not managed to do, that is the minus point, the path on which trust in it has been lost.

Appointment by election in the party should be absolutely direct and Politburo members should be elected directly for party okrugs. We must not now make this election mechanism even a two-stage one (even though it is has very many stages right now). We do not need a system whereby the electors, which means us, elect congress delegates whom we trust but the congress delegates are then elected by leading organs. In my opinion this should be done from start to finish, right up to the election of the General Secretary, in the party okrugs. Ultimately it must not be thought that rank and file communists are unable to assess their leaders. Under conditions of glasnost they will probably understand who is who.

I should like to mention the mechanism of power. Here in general it is said that we have the holding of more than one post and so forth. Yes, indeed, but who will say now that our president, as we call him, has some real power? Where is this power?

For instance, there are the two congresses of people's deputies which we have seen. We seem to have elected the deputies ourselves, everything looks as though it should have been normal. But, forgive me, we have seen nothing there but a talking shop. The laws which are made are not reflected in real life. The adoption of these laws evidently follows a different sequence.

Thus, forgive me, if, for instance, he instruct Mikhail Sergeyevich to engage only in presidential activity, what can be achieved in this field, in this presidential activity, if there is as yet no mechanism for implementing the decisions which have been taken?

I should like to say a little more about the party's structure. This structure has obviously become obsolete. It should not be said that we will have completed perestroyka in the party when we have remade its structure. We should probably reduce the apparatus. But it is through the structure that it must be reduced. Why do we need raykoms in cities? That is the first point. Why do we need city committees in oblast cities? That is the second point. Here is the last thing I want to say. We

have reached the conclusion that the workers' movement is in general constructive. But even this movement is having difficulties. We have now talked directly with Comrade Gorbachev in earnest, explained our positions and taken a common decision to consolidate our efforts. We should not be afraid of the new workers' unions which are emerging, we should not be afraid. We must simply assess which way which unions are inclined. But the workers' movement is constructive. I tell you frankly. Only the apparatus can fear it. And why does the apparatus fear it? It is afraid of losing its personal seat, that is all.

RSFSR's Ivanova

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[Debate speech by T.G. Ivanova, candidate member of CPSU Central Committee and deputy chairman of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! Today we are continuing the difficult discussion on the party's place and role in the new political conditions. This discussion began at the previous plenum under the extraordinary circumstances caused by the Lithuanian Communist Party Congress decision. During the past month the situation has not been eased but has even become worse, and there are more extraordinary circumstances now than there were before.

Who could now answer these questions, for example: How many members does the Azerbaijan Communist Party have, or how will the party's future be affected by platforms like the one recently adopted by the Estonian People's Front? It is no secret that CPSU members are coming under increasing pressure even in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and that people are surrendering their party membership cards in a number of places for this very reason. It cannot be denied that panic is creeping into party ranks in some places.

Questions about the party are being discussed everywhere, but, in addition to the multiplicity of opinions as to what kind of party it should be, another problem is forcing itself upon society with increasing persistency and seriousness: Should the CPSU exist at all? Forces trying to replace restructuring in the party with restructuring of the party—meaning, of course, the ideological foundations of its activity—are becoming increasingly active. In this sense we are virtually at the last limit of our defense. For all the different views on specific issues connected with the preparation of the congress, the election of delegates, and the formation of leading bodies, communists must take a common stand. This common stand does exist, of this I am very sure: The party will retain and strengthen its authority only as a **party of real action** one which reflects the people's needs, protects their interests, and responds promptly and adequately to turbulent changes in the situation in society. For this reason the CPSU political platform cannot only be a program setting out long-term or strategic objectives, which is basically how it it formulated now.

Today, now, this platform must be a mobilizing factor for immediate action. People expect this, particularly as public interest in this plenum has not just warmed up but reached maximum intensity.

I do not know whether we need to draw up some other document which would reflect the party's current concerns. I think that all this could be done in the proposed platform. But one thing is certain: It must be done. I believe that at the present moment the most important, most urgent task is to get out of this phase of extraordinary circumstances, gain political and economic stability—on a new, restructuring basis, of course—and guarantee people's social protection. It is obvious to anyone with common sense that, without this, there will be no progress.

It goes without saying that the proposed CPSU draft platform is oriented toward consolidation and constructive action. It reflects people's vital aspirations to a considerable extent. I would put my signature to almost any of the individual theories contained in it, although the document as a whole is clearly swamped with the usual, essentially economic-state formulas. I think it is no accident that Mikhail Sergeyevich has appealed to us today to express our opinions on this section of the document.

My dissatisfaction is caused by something else. All the provisions of this document are to be found in one degree or another in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speeches, party documents, and the government program. I think this is correct, but the platform is clearly lacking something which millions of communists and the entire nation are particularly looking for: How is the party going to put its program guidelines into practice? How must the party act in the new conditions? This is the direction in which we must make serious efforts to enrich the proposed document before it is submitted for broad discussion. How is this to be done?

First, set out the basic principles of our work, particularly party work among the masses, on the basis of present-day political realities. It is also necessary, I feel, to supplement the rather abstract statement of readiness for dialogue with all sociopolitical organizations with a specific appeal to party organizations—perhaps even an instruction to communists—to find their place in the work of independent formations playing a constructive role in restructuring and, at the same time, oppose extremists, separatist forces, and destructive trends.

Second, while stating our commitment to developing and strengthening the democratic process in society and in the party, we must not overlook the task of strengthening communists' ideological cohesion. Discussion within the party must become a normal phenomenon.

We sometimes regard this prospect with panic. But the aim of this discussion is not to set different platforms within the party in opposition to one another but to evolve a common communist stance on the key problems of our development.

Why not make it the practice to have primary party organizations discuss the drafts of fundamental laws determining our path for years to come? The draft laws on land and ownership, for example. Surely, as the situation now stands, we are going to have to explain some concepts, such as "working private ownership," to primary party organizations—concepts which are new to many? The role of these discussions in the shaping of public opinion would be greatly enhanced if party leaders were to participate in them, and also leading scientists, cultural figures, and publicists—members of the CPSU and our party press. We must make it clear that the party itself is going to have to learn to live in a rule-of-law state.

Third, 100 deputies delegated from the CPSU have been working for almost a year in the country's highest bodies of state authority, but we certainly do not exercise our right of legislative initiative, our constitutional right. I think there is some point in formulating the appropriate mandates for our people's deputies in the platform. One of them could be an instruction to submit their own version of the first section of the country's Basic Law—"The Political System"—to the commission working on the new USSR Constitution, basing this version on the principles set out in our platform.

The draft platform will certainly be finalized on the basis of the discussion at the plenum. Finally, it would be good to involve CPSU Central Committee commissions in this work, as we are quite unable to do this during the preliminary preparation of documents for a plenum.

One more difficult question. The rapidly developing, positive process of growth in national consciousness is beginning to be swamped by nationalist outpourings. I think that the concept of "internationalism" is fading out of our lexicon under their influence. A crucial role is played by the party in preserving and reviving this concept—as a way of life and not just as a concept. For all the disjointed opinions, we can see that there is simply no one to do this other than the party. Resolving this task would be simpler if the party remained a united, all-union organization. But for this, of course, the agreement and sincere desire of all the union republic communist parties are needed. There is no such agreement at present. Proposals for a new organizational structure for the CPSU and its leading bodies and new principles of collaboration between the union republic communist parties consonant with Comintern principles are probably right in these conditions.

But there is one serious contraction in this, without explaining which we will hardly be able to explain our stand to the millions of communists in RSFSR party organizations. How can they realize the democratic principles which have been proclaimed and are becoming a real part of party life if they do not have a common, uniting principle?

The formation of the Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee does not solve the problem. It must, unfortunately, be admitted that the very procedure of its election has not enhanced the Central Committee's authority. But the main point is that it is hard to count on the bureau being able to become a body equal in significance to the union republic communist parties' central committees in terms of its impact on party life.

I am aware of the complexity of this problem. I feel it is necessary to consult with communists in detail. I propose that we hold a Russian CPSU conference at which this question could be discussed among other urgent problems, before we hold the congress—regardless of when that may be. The Russian Bureau of the Central Committee could be instructed to prepare this conference.

In general, it would be right for the platform to reflect the limits of power of the party's leading bodies at various levels and the mechanism for holding party referendums on fundamental strategic issues. This, comrades, would remove the question of how many rights to give to primary party organizations and rayon party committees. At the moment these rights are not considered in full. I am convinced that defining the limits of power of leading elected bodies has fundamental significance for the democratization of all internal party life. That is how we can really embody the theory of "the power of the party masses" in the CPSU.

North Osetian Official

PM0602143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Debate speech by A.S. Dzasokhov, first secretary of CPSU North Osetian Oblast Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] I have the impression that the extent of our responsibility has increased rapidly from one plenum to the next. The idea of ways of implementing the perestroyka program and methods and ways of overcoming existing difficulties is becoming more pressing.

Today's plenum is special. Our comrades in the party are expecting a very great deal from it. I maintain that the plenum has been called on to define well regulated measures capable of bringing the whole system and the forms of the party's activity into line with the tasks of perestroyka.

To reach this goal, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's report opens up democratic scope for discussion and persuasivly leads us to the idea of becoming involved in the urgent qualitative renewal of the party itself. In essence, we, the participants in the plenum, now find ourselves in a reality in which there really are grounds for putting the question in the mobilizing, very honest form

that was used in the draft platform submitted for our attention: What will become of the party? This problem is made up of many components. It is important to show them correctly. Here I would like to stress the need to determine our political aims and phases of fighting for them in a sober way, without extreme actions or emotions, and particularly without elements of confusion and despair. In this context, I support the idea, formulated in the draft platform, of viewing it as transitional period; I mean that we are faced with a task of great strategic importance, that is, the drawing up of a new CPSU platform. Therefore the draft platform must affect the current situation today, immediately.

This aim would meet with great success if we preserved a sharply critical and demanding atmosphere in our ranks, but at the same time promoted the formation of a moral climate in all echelons and links of the party free of unhealthy suspicions about who is underestimating and who is overestimating the CPSU's role. It is only in this way that we can examine the objective bases of the trends which really exist toward the lowering of the authority of the party and party committees in the localities.

Basing myself on analysis and on the frame of mind, opinion, and judgment of people in the North Osetian Oblast Party Organization, I would like to express several ideas in a condensed form.

The renewed interpretation of democratic centralism as a necessary form of regulator of intraparty life will of course provoke great interest within the party and among the public. After Lenin—and it is very important to state this today, in connection with existing critical publications—this principle was grossly distorted and essentially turned into its exact antithesis. Unfortunately, it became synonymous with administrative pressure, which correctly gave rise to the idea of its incompatibility with the plurality of opinions or, for instance, with a respectful attitude toward the rights of the minority.

In my opinion, the draft platform under examination leaves no doubt on that score, because it returns us to the political experience of the time in our party's history when there were fine examples of dialogue and tolerance toward dissent and dissidents and toward cooperation with the opposition as essential features of any democratically organized party.

In the light of political realities being formed in our day and on condition, of course, that they are dialectically interpreted on our part, it is important that this frontier be noted and understood by our opponents and that science and current affairs writing be more active in joining in its elaboration. In our own milieu it is important to protect renewed democratic principles from exaggeration and superfluous organizational armor. In the final analysis, after all, it is a case of the origins and nature of the political power in whose name democratic principles are proclaimed.

I hope that my comrades in the party committees will support me in my view that a significant decline and even devaluation of communist ideas can be observed. That perturbs us. There is an explanation for this because on each occasion all programs before the full and decisive victory of socialism were carried out in the name of Marxism-Leninism and its founders. It is therefore very topical to mobilize the party's intellect to the elaboration of modern concepts of social progress and the study of our own and the worldwide workers' and communist movement, its contradictory past, and its potential in the present and future. The country's social scientists are waiting for this study. For this very reason, communists' assimilation of the Marxist heritage is no less significant today than it was, for instance, at the turn of the century or straight after October. But we are not returning to our ideological sources to canonize them once again.

I believe that perestroyka in the party is not just a purely organizational and structural measure, but also a process of modernizing our store of knowledge. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the fact that it is now time to reject the narrow departmental, and I would say, corporative system and model for training leading cadres. This means party schools on the one hand and on the other trade union schools, All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League schools, and an endless network of various types of political courses. The time has come to look attentively at their training programs and make them more up-to-date.

In conditions when human values are being affirmed and there is a need for a sharp increase in our readiness for political competition, we perhaps also need to introduce in educational establishments a new type of study of non-Marxist humanist heritage and current sociopolitical ideological trends.

From the independent section in the draft platform on the power of the people and the prospects of state building, I would like to single out the question of the powers of the head of the supreme organ of power. A theme on which attention is now riveted. It is being discussed in the press extensively, with interest, and on when whole proficiently, in my opinion. The main thing is that life itself is today persistently posing the question of how to extend the constitutional prerogatives of the head of the state power in the interests of guaranteeing a democratic process in conjunction with stability in our socialist society. I think that we must take worldwide experience into account here, but mainly seek our own optimum paths.

A brief word about nationalities policy and the section on this question in the draft platform: I am with those who believe that perestroyka's future indeed depends to a great extent on the will and unified work of the party in this most important sphere. To be honest, the bitter dramatic events of recent months are not conducive to extensive reflections. It is clear that we all have to learn our lessons, which we are doing in the localities where we

are based. Yes, the people are lamenting, the losses are irreplaceable But this means that we must make a principled evaluation of the forces which, on the wave of glasnost and democracy, are stoking an atmosphere of interethnic hostility and speculating on past and present difficulties.

As life has shown, the harmonization of interethnic building is not one-sided. Therefore we are actively supporting the provision in the draft platform regarding self-determination. I note, however, that some of its provisions, including the one on autonomous formations, are unfortunately very general and are made just for effect.

I cannot help expressing sorrow and alarm about the fact that we are resolving inexplicably slowly a whole number of acute questions stemming from the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum. The exacerbation of interethnic relations, for example, urgently requires the now urgent introduction into practical operation of a special state organ, which we agreed on at the September plenum. Eliminating serious tension in interethnic relations is a question of enormous international significance. Comrades, recent talks with foreign delegations show that true international problems are being displaced by interethnic problems, since questions in the sphere of interethnic relations provoke huge and understandable interest.

I would like to conclude my speech, comrades, with a proposal which may not be original but which, it seems to me, is very necessary and important. What I propose is that this time all of us who took part in the plenum should without exception agree to go to the localities, to the party organizations. And it is important that the minister, the academician, the chief editor, and the military leader do this—all those who are here in this hall. This is the path toward the direct unification of the atmosphere of our anxious discussion of topical questions and the atmosphere in the broad people's auditoriums.

Leningrad Worker Arkhipov

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[Debate speech by Yu.P. Arkhipov, party committee secretary at Leningrad's "Izhorskiy Zavod" Production Association, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades, time is so precious that I don't want to squander it describing the situation the country and party are in at the moment. Much has been said about this in the media, at congresses of soviets of people's deputies, at conferences at the Central Committee, at rallies, and, indeed, here, at the plenum.

The distrust of organs of power and the party leadership has not yet reached its peak, but that fateful point is not far off. The people expect resolute, constructive actions by the government and people's deputies, and communists expect the same of the party leadership.

Obviously, there is no point in explaining in detail here at the plenum who exactly is to blame for such a profound crisis in the country's Communist Party. There is no point either in the political leadership's gratifying its pride with the notion that the people support perestroyka, and since perestroyka was started by the party, the people support the party too. Rather the reverse. In the past year, there has been a sharp drop in admissions to the party in our organization and, indeed, in the majority of Leningrad organizations. In the past few months, applications to join the CPSU have simply not been coming in at all. For example, last year 109 people left the "Izhorskiy Zavod" Association party organization, but 70 left in January this year alone. Although people generally cite personal reasons for leaving, an anonymous poll of people who have already left the party shows that the majority left because of distrust of the CPSU and its leadership.

We believe that today's plenum should be the first step toward eliminating or at least reducing this distrust. It must come out unequivocally in favor of recognizing a multiparty system, revoking Article 6 of the Constitution, and radically reforming the party.

Moreover, I propose that today's plenum adopt at least two documents. The first, which we are discussing at the moment, is a document of purely political significance aimed at democratizing the CPSU during the period of preparation for and holding of the 28th congress. I believe that it is premature to adopt in this document everything designed for the long term, for the period after the 28th congress. We must prepare a document for the precongress period, define the main, conceptual principles, and be guided by them in our actions.

The second document is an organizational one—standing orders for the preparation and holding of the 28th CPSU Congress. I repeat, why do I see the 28th congress as the end point of this period? Because the fate of the party and the fate of perestroyka depend on this period, on how we shape up by then.

Aside from noting the crisis in the party, the platform must basically contain the conceptual principles of the CPSU's activity in the precongress period, and the democratic platform adopted on 21 January at the conference of party clubs and organizations in Moscow could well serve as a foundation. Incidentally, its decisions are based on primary party organizations' laborious quest for a way out of the present situation. The decisions of party conferences of the major collectives of Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities were also reflected. We made these decisions in November and December, but no one listened to us, everyone began to talk about the decisions in Moscow. Mikhail Sergeyevich, must we join the opposition for the voice of communists to be heard?

As a standing order measure I propose the formation here, at the plenum, of an electoral commission made up of Central Committee members and invited people to elect an organizing committee to prepare for and hold the congress. The committee should have 50-60 members, a representation norm should be set, and the organizing committee members should be elected by the most democratic means, by direct, multiple-candidate elections in party districts.

The elections should be completed before March. Then the organizing committee should be instructed to prepare for the congress, with part of the CPSU Central Committee apparatus being placed at its disposal for day-to-day work. CPSU Central Committee Secretary Comrade Razumovskiy should be instructed to give the committee the requisite assistance in its work.

The committee would have three months to hold direct elections of congress delegates in party districts, finalize proposals on the preparation of the agenda, and also prepare the draft documents—CPSU Program and Statutes.

This proposal should not be regarded as a vote of no confidence in the CPSU Central Committee, which, according to the statutes, is supposed to prepare the congress. The proposal is aimed at finding a new form of alternative, rather than monopoly preparation of the main documents for the congress. There is nothing to prevent the Central Committee from continuing the work it has already started and submitting to the congress its versions of these documents.

I propose that the congress be held in two stages: that it start work at the end of May, discuss the submitted alternative documents, adopt the drafts at first reading and present them for partywide discussion, and then adjourn the congress. A month later, at the end of June, the congress would resume, finally adopt the program and the statutes, taking the discussion into account, and elect the leading party organs.

Now for the dates of reports and elections to the party. A referendum on this question in our association showed that a little over one-half of the communists were in favor of reports after the congress. Obviously, this basically depends on the decisions made here at the plenum.

Communists are impatiently and optimistically awaiting our decisions. Unless we make radical decisions, the processes of a split in the CPSU will probably intensify. There is still hope, there is a chance that the party can be preserved, and we must not miss this chance.

There may be other proposals, of course. They have already been made from this podium. Therefore I propose that after the exchange of opinions at today's plenary session we continue tomorrow with work in sections, where the majority of plenum participants, including invited guests, and not only those who got onto the list of speakers, will be able to express their views. How much time to allocate to work in sections—one day or two—will depend on the work; it is necessary to prepare draft decisions, or, rather, give the platform greater depth and adopt it on the final day of the plenum, at a plenary session.

Leningrad's Gidaspov

PM0702100290 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Debate speech by B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Today, in the age of glasnost and democracy, paradoxical as it may sound, what people lack most is the truth. This is indeed so. The truth about the real situation in the country, where we are going, who is leading us, and what lies in store for us in the next few months.

Being a prophet is a thankless task, as I have already found. But he who has eyes must see. Here at the plenum a debate has flared up over the party's present and future, and this concerns us all. It is a problem of the utmost importance. But now people are concerned about another matter too—the fate of the country and its citizens. Let us ask ourselves: Did we really not know, could we not see, where the turn of events in Transcaucasia would lead? And today, with hindsight, we keep lamenting that if radical measures had been adopted just a little sooner, there would have been no bloodshed. Meanwhile equally dramatic events are taking place in other regions of the country. How many more times must we repeat the well-worn truth that any ailment, including a social ailment, if its course is irreversible, must be stopped as early as possible and by radical methods?

The destabilization of the situation in the political and economic sphere is increasing every day. And the draft platform we are examining today does not offer any glowing predictions, either. On the contrary, it says that some time will pass, and perhaps everything will change. There are many reasons for this, but the most important is that the mechanism of executive power has broken down virtually completely. The governability of the state is rapidly declining. The ministries are in a state of utter paralysis. The present local soviets do not yet possess the necessary competence or authoritative powers, either legally or in practice. At the same time a systematic process of distancing the party from the leadership is taking place. No political assessment is given of laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Yet we are about to adopt very important laws—on land, on ownership, and others, I will not enumerate them. Yet we have to live by these laws, and we should and must give a political assessment of them.

A reorganization of the party apparatus has taken place. The size of the apparatus under the Central Committee and the oblast, city, and rayon party committees has been reduced. Perhaps that is right. The sector principle

of party leadership has been rejected. But what has replaced it? Amorphous, essentially faceless structures where everyone is responsible for "political backup," or in other words, responsible for nothing. As for the role of the primary party organizations to which we want to hand over authority and powers—that role is proclaimed, and nothing more. Further reductions and shifts in the apparatus, if this information is correct, will exacerbate the situation.

In conditions where leaders are appointed by election, the party's most important lever—the cadre lever—is weakened, and these are the new realities: Last year in Leningrad, for the first time, industry only just met its planned target, and we messed up January, too. We have never done this before.

We can see a growing tangle of problems in agriculture. There have been plenty of discussions and decisions on ways to overcome them, but these remain no more than good intentions, while exactly the opposite is being done—economic accountability is being introduced in the countryside with increased prices for machinery, fuel, mixed feed, fertilizers—that is the snare that our Nonchernozem is now being driven into. The shortage of capital investments is felt acutely.

The formulas based on half-measures that they are offering us in order to bring about economic recovery and normalize the state of affairs in agriculture and industry are not producing results, and will not do so in the foreseeable future. Given the gross imperfections of the Law on the State Enterprise, it is not so easy to change the position of labor collectives with regard to the countryside and create conditions such that the peasant will return to the land.

As has already been said from this platform, the lack of a scientifically substantiated conversion program is leading to underutilization of production and scientific collectives and the loss of skilled cadres. As a consequence of the cuts in the financing of long-term scientific work, laggardness in the technical level of industry and production is inevitable, which will affect the national economic complex as a whole.

Comrades! Look at the clock, we still have time, though not very much. A recognition of the need to avert national disaster is prompting us to take nontraditional, unorthodox actions. The party has no more important goal at present. In this context, let me say this: At this exceptionally difficult, indeed explosive moment for the country, unless we think about how to boost the CPSU's prestige and its mobilizing role in our society, unless we set the communists this task, we will, at the minimum, lead our society into utter chaos—I do not want to use the word "collapse."

Our party's Central Committee should state clearly and specifically in its platform—and not in the way that it has now been done—that only the CPSU can be the constructive, consolidating basis of our society, the guarantor of the socialist path of development. We have no other acceptable choice, no alternative. Only energetic, constructive activity by the party, from the Politburo to the primary party organizations, can stabilize the situation.

One characteristic feature. Today we are discussing a very important, fateful document. But we did not even have the opportunity to study it thoroughly beforehand; basically we were presented with a fait accompli. Of course, the Leningraders will do their job, and there will be proposals with regard to the draft platform. But that will take time, consultations are needed, everything must be pondered and considered.

We are, of course, aware that we bear full responsibility, in the first instance, for the state of affairs in the localities. But the party as a whole is also losing the initiative. It is quite obvious that the Central Committee and the oblast committees [obkoms], including Leningrad Obkom, are losing ground. Are losing, I say, although you could say have lost. We are faced with the urgent need for renewal in all the leading components, in all the hierarchical structures of the CPSU, complete renewal, radical and immediate. And here I agree wholly and entirely with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's theses.

It seems to us that it is extremely important to adopt one of the scenarios that the Leningrad Communists put forward. Its essence is this: We hold the 28th CPSU Congress in March-April, giving paramount importance to intraparty, cadre questions, and then we develop the report and election campaign. But in general, we do not object to the second option. But we think that in Leningrad it is now virtually impossible to postpone the report and election party conference any later than March-April 1990. Either the party obkom will hold this conference, or else other structures will act. Many thousands of communists and many dozens of primary party organizations are calling for this conference to be convened. And this is not only because they are dissatisfied with the actions of the party obkom, although that is true; it is because of the objective need for profound changes and the bringing in of new people elected by democratic means.

Speaking at the last CPSU Central Committee Plenum, I said that it is expedient to create a Russian party organization, but I called into question the creation of an Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party. In the situation we are in today, only two months later, it seems to me that a congress of Russia's communists is simply essential, even before the 28th Party Congress. We must consolidate our ranks. We must resolve the question of leadership of the Communist Party of Russia. Harsh necessity leaves us no other choice, and we have no right to drag out this process.

The decline in governability and the fall in state discipline are acutely affecting the working people's situation. Whatever heated intraparty debates may develop, we must above all do everything necessary to ensure normal

life. The lack of a radical program for emerging from the grave economic crisis makes it incumbent on us, perhaps at today's plenum, to define our position on the implementation of priority measures in the economic sphere. In our view it is necessary firmly to close all channels for the unjustified economic emission of rubles, which means repealing many articles of the laws on the state enterprise and the cooperative system.

We must carry out monetary reform, introduce economically justified prices, monitor strictly the fulfillment of production plans, and probably introduce a state rationing system for the main industrial goods for the whole of the Soviet Union. Without strict accounting and control of our more than modest resources, they simply will not suffice. Where traditional state measures are powerless, measures of party and political accountability must be applied. And it must be said frankly that political methods cannot be based solely on conviction, they have always contained and always will contain elements of coercion via the state mechanism. And if we adopt such decisions, their implementation must rest entirely on the shoulders of the party's deputies on the Supreme Soviet.

We talk about the party's leading role not just for the sake of the leading role. And we will fight for it, not for the sake of our own ambitions. Only the correctly interpreted objective interest of the working people, as reflected in our ideology, will enable communists to look people honestly in the eye.

Today, as we discuss the need for resolute actions, we realize that unless we take the steps that the working person expects of us, he will do it himself. The people are tired of confusion. If we are really a party that defends the people's interests, we must roll up our sleeves and work, rid ourselves of time-servers and the unscrupulous, and at last cast off our inferiority complex, and only then will people follow us. The time has come to choose. We have reached the limit, and our actions must be appropriate to the critical situation that is taking shape.

Education Chief Yagodin

PM0602133990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Debate speech by G.A. Yagodin, member of CPSU Central Committee and chairman of USSR State Committee for Public Education, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] I think that Anatoliy Ivanovich Korniyenko posed one of the most sensitive and important questions in his speech. We are losing authority among the people as a party mostly because we are not indicating where we are going. He put it this way: Not everything ahead is clear. But we have created the opinion about ourselves that the party is omniscient and omnipotent. And if the party does not indicate where it is heading and how, it seems like a plot against the people—they themselves know but don't tell us. And it doesn't enter people's mind that perhaps the party is searching for and determining these ways now as our society develops.

If you look back and examine Marx' brilliant analysis of capitalism, which eventually led to revolutionary transformations not only in our country but across the world, and at the mistakes which we made during the transition to a socialist society, doesn't the same cause arise here? It is good to analyze what already is, but if you plan something from purely theoretical notions and then make life fit those principles and cut away everything that is not congruent with the theoretical framework, you can cause great misfortune.

I therefore think that the wisdom of the platform resides in its not setting goals now save for common human goals, only those goals with which one cannot but agree—people and their happiness and well-being.

This is the most important achievement of the concept. I think that departure from Marxism, subjectivism, and perhaps subjective idealism too were the mistakes of the leadership of the twenties and later years. At that time theory became more important than practice. And I very much fear that now, when we are trying through our laws to make good the flaws and omissions in our very grave budget situation, we may be making the same subjective mistakes. And instead of talking about people in the sphere of production and determining the opportunities for improving production, we are concentrating on questions of distribution which, although very important, necessary, and glaring, will nevertheless always be secondary, particularly in conditions of scarcity.

I think it essential to give very vigorous support to the platform's idea on the post of president. Collegial leadership is first-rate so long as it does not lead to collective irresponsibility. The post and the person who assumes full responsibility for the country's present and future should be designated. Here I fully endorse the presidency provision. Of course we would like him to be elected by nationwide direct, secret ballot, but we probably do not have the time for that now, so perhaps it should be done at the Congress of People's Deputies prior to the adoption of the new constitution, and the constitution must precisely delimit the term for which he should be elected and the mechanism which will enable the president's activity to be monitored, because our history, for all its brevity, already abounds in major errors in this regard.

I am absolutely convinced that the provision on the state should be delineated more precisely in the concept. Of course the USSR is a voluntary formation. No one can be made to join by force, admittance can only be on the terms of a union treaty. We in Latvia have seen this very clearly, broadly, and fully in our encounters with ordinary, everyday folk. But what does that mean? It means that we are united in the Soviet Union because it is beneficial to us. It is beneficial in tackling such questions as defense, foreign affairs, and transport, the integrated energy system and the like. But that is not enough! When

we unite in the union, we should assume certain obligations. We do not just join the union but are admitted into the union, and here too the conditions should be clearly designated.

What main condition should be designated? Human rights in a socialist state on the territory of the whole state—absolutely identical for everyone, without any exceptions!

I think that the second condition should be an official state language, because our state has few opportunities for consolidation and those which it does have must be utilized. One more condition—equivalent education throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. And, of course, the obligatory exclusion of segregation on grounds of nationality in every sphere. I think that mandatory state programs on problems which demand the special concern of the whole country are needed. For example, the small peoples of the North—they require protection for their health, culture, and so forth. Concern for the victims of the Chernobyl accident—that should also be a state program. And many such programs that will actually cement society can be put forward.

I think that people are correctly designated as the goal of the platform. That means that we will not take a step forward if peoples' living standards are determined by extraeconomic distribution rather than by their competence, professional work, responsibility, and discipline. Extraeconomic distribution, no matter what ingenuity we apply, always suits some and not others. Just look: Our level of culture and competence very much constrains us today. We have bought masses of technology from developed countries. I am a chemist and I don't know a single plant which has attained its design capacity. Why? Our workers lack skills, our engineers lack skills. We always think: Let us buy computers; our education will do. And no, Nikolay Ivanovich [?Ryzhkov], I am not withdrawing my request for computers, don't get me wrong. But a teacher is more necessary than a computer. An engineer and a worker are more necessary than a plant, and so forth. Just look: Only 42 percent of leaders in our industry now have a higher education, in transport and agriculture the figure is 36 percent, and in trade 25 percent. Now compare this with where they work best and you will see how the same pattern is traceable there too.

The improvement of skills is carried out in a perfunctory way in our country. I also say this by way of self-criticism, but here there is nothing more important than self-criticism. We should create a real skills-improvement system. In the future for both life and people this will be the lifeline that enables them to leave one job and switch to another. There is an acute need for us to protect responsible posts from incompetent, dishonest, and low-grade people and low-grade leaders. This protection should be legal protection, but to an even greater degree it should be actual protection of a person's work, that is to say, the protection of society from poor workers.

The Central Committee platform notes the need to increase expenditure on developing the material base of education. Mikhail Sergeyevich has today spoken about this very graphically and clearly. I am very pleased that it was said thus. But it is not enough. We must make education autonomous. It is necessary that a rural community concern itself with the quality of education as much as or to a far greater degree than it does the quality of the herdsman whom it combines to hire. We have so accustomed the people to thinking that they will be given a teacher without fail that afterward they put this teacher in inhuman conditions just as blithely.

The situation with teachers today is as follows. There are three million teachers working in our country and we annually produce 317,000. You would think that we would have had a surplus long ago, but there is still a shortage. Even in Moscow there is a shortage of around 1,000 today. Why? The answer is very simple. The average wage in the country is 240 rubles [R], a teacher's wage is R204. And this with a 50-percent extra work load. This means that he will be constantly moving on from that sphere to another. It means that there will be no male teachers. And if there are no male teachers, there will not be a good intake into the Army either.

Esteemed Comrades, I think that we now have an historic opportunity which we have no right to forgo.

Ambassador to Poland

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[Debate speech by V.I. Brovikov, member of CPSU Central Committee and USSR ambassador to Poland, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I share the opinion of those speakers before me who said that the document we are discussing is scarcely acceptable in the form in which it has been submitted to us and needs serious additional work. Its over-the-top sloganeering and even slight shrillness, what I would describe as the inaccuracy of the assessments of the past and especially of the present which it contains, and its ideological eclecticism and lack of theoretical clarity, do not yet permit it to aspire to the role of our party's program document. You get the impression that the document is utilitarian in character and is called upon to satisfy only the immediate requirements of our policy.

Society, one discovers, sated with democracy, is not now thirsting for a better life, but is literally exhausted without a post of president "possessing the full panoply of executive-administrative power." The party, it transpires, simply cannot survive without a "chairman and two deputy chairmen," and democracy in it will subside unless there are not 500 but 200 members of the plenum [as published] in this auditorium, as the document proposes.

The document under discussion contains plenty of eulogies of perestroyka, criticism of the remote past, and generous promises for the future, but practically no assessment of the present and of errors made not once upon a time, but during the period of perestroyka. Of late we have somehow come to attach greater value not to our own assessments of our own work but to how the gentlemen in the West assess us. We have not even avoided this in the platform.

Good luck to them, Bush may be Bush, but the people are the people. We are somehow constantly endeavoring to prove that the people are in favor of perestroyka, but permit me to ask: What kind of perestroyka? Not the perestroyka that in less than five years has plunged the country into an abyss of crisis and brought it to a point where we are face to face with rampant anarchy, degradation of the economy, the leering visage of universal ruin, and a collapse in morality. To assert in this situation that the people are "in favor" and that they like all this is politically indecent, at the very least. The people are against it and are saying so increasingly loudly. Not that I need mention it, you are aware of it yourselves, Comrades.

It is clearly for this reason that our leadership finds it ever more pleasant to meet with smiling crowds in the streets of Western capitals rather than with its own sullen compatriots, who, you never know, may according to the law of glasnost say something unpleasant. Incidentally, a few words about the very term "perestroyka," which we coined so boldly though to this day we have not bothered to fill it with specific and clear meaning. As a result it is exploited equally successfully by true supporters of revolutionary changes and reactionaries, friends of the Soviet Union and its foes, those who are in favor of socialism and those who have been waging a frenzied struggle against it all their lives. All this is the result of our overwhelming arrogance and the personal errors made by the leaders of our party and state.

You will ask: What errors are these? Here is my answer.

Is it not an error to proclaim total democratization of society and to forget the other side of the coin—imposing discipline and order in the country? Anyone with the slightest familiarity with theory and politics realizes that discipline will get by without democracy, but democracy is inconceivable without discipline, for it is inevitably transformed—or, to be more accurate, degenerates—into sociopolitical chaos.

This is realized perfectly well by the Western leaders who lavish such praise on us, who act toughly and resolutely at home when even the slightest threat to their state or their class interests arises. Moreover, Bush and Thatcher couldn't care less what people think about them. Illustrations of that are Panama, the suppression of the strike movement in Britain, and a great deal more besides. How do we counter this thesis in such cases? "We cannot return to Stalinist methods..." It would be madness to push people into this, to call for this. But, excuse me, any power that respects itself and its state must compel respect for its own laws.

But we just lapse into melancholy, replace passiveness of actions with the verbal activeness that everyone is fed up with, and portray irresolution and helplessness in stopping antistate, antisocial actions and even crimes as tolerance of dissent and pluralism of opinions, and of actions too.

Surely, Comrades, it is an error to adopt hasty, slap-dash laws? Someone thinks that something would be a good idea, and a new draft is immediately given people's blessing. Then it turns out that it is not a good idea, but quite the reverse.

This happened, for instance, with the antialcohol legislation. At the time we said that this was once and for all, but today our foreign trade specialists are scouring the whole world to buy hundreds of thousands of hectoliters of vodka for overly sober Soviet customers.

It was the same story with the ill-fated Law on the Cooperative Movement. It has raised its sights from shashliks to tanks and is now producing the directly opposite effect to that promised by legislators.

And are the other laws and decisions—on the enterprise, on leasing, on individual labor activity—operating as intended? Of course not.

We abandoned the idea of acceleration as suddenly as we were bold and resolute in proclaiming it. Obviously, we were right to do so, for there is no such thing as miracles and instant transformations in the economy. But, that being so, jumping the gun and imprudence also lead to lamentable results in politics, including the legislative sphere. We know heaps of examples of that from history, so to speak. We can see this clearly today, just as we saw it yesterday, during Khrushchev's endless thoughtless reorganizations.

We are constantly rushing around, seeking a panacea against all ills, and hoping that democracy elevated to an absolute will put everything in its place in the political sphere while the market does the same in the economy. But given that as yet quite the reverse is happening, it is not the leaders at the center but the executants at local level who are to blame, you see. At best it is said: We didn't think it would all turn out this way. Let us be blunt, that is a strange position for top-rank figures. But most of all, it has become fashionable in our country to put all our troubles down to the "accursed past." But we have long been eating not the daily cabbage soup of yesterday's stagnation, but the kasha cooked today from the products of perestroyka.

No, I think that you and I, Central Committee members, and deputies have to answer for all this, each in his post. To answer for what is now being done in the country. Communists expect this of us. And the country, our mother, has been reduced to a poor condition and has

been turned from a power admired in the world into a state with a mistaken past, a joyless present, and an uncertain future. And all this is to the amusement of the West, which, while heaping praise on us, is crowing over the collapse of the "colossus with feet of clay" and the demise of communism and world socialism.

Yet we are trying to present all this as a dizzying success for perestroyka and the new thinking in international affairs.

I believe that our whole tragedy today is that we still cannot abandon one-man power in the state and the party. We often lead matters instinctively, incompetently, shortsightedly, concerned not about the good of the fatherland but about other, maybe more personal ambitions.

Comrades, I made up my mind to deliver this speech because I believe it necessary to abandon at long last yet another failing that has brought us considerable trouble in the past, whereby we have criticized our top leaders with the utmost boldness and valor only after their physical or political death.

I am almost certain that everyone touched on by my criticism today, just like those who are still toadying in the old fashion, will immediately put me down as a "dinosaur" ["beton"]. There would be nothing unusual in this. After all, in our country it is customary for those who join in the chorus to be categorized as supporters of perestroyka while those who criticize are censured as conservatives.

But I tell my opponents honestly and frankly that I am heart and soul in favor of perestroyka, in favor of reforms, in favor of the renewal of our country and party because we cannot live the way we lived before. And we cannot live the way we live today.

In conclusion, I would like to submit a proposal: That the provision regarding the president and the chairmen and deputies in the party be removed from our program document—the platform—since the crux of the matter is not these posts, not what further armchair revolutions we carry out. What counts is how the party acts and what policy it implements, what aims it pursues. Incidentally, our platform also ought to say this more clearly.

CPSU Central Committee Plenum Continues 6 Feb

Plenum Speakers Listed

LD0702001390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1925 GMT 6 Feb 90

["Information Report on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union."—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—Discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress and the report by M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on this matter continued at the CPSU Central Committee plenum today.

The following spoke in the debate: Ye.P. Velikhov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy; V.I. Vorotnikov, chairman of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Yu.A. Gankovskiy, secretary of the party committee of the "Nizhnevartovskneftegaz" production association in Tyumen Oblast; V.I. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee; Ye.K. Ligachev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.D. Kadochnikov, first secretary of the Sverdlovsk City CPSU Committee; V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee; A.P. Myasnilov, an excavator driver of the Korshunovo Ore-enriching Combine in Irkutsk Oblast; V.G. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; E.A. Shevardnadze, USSR Foreign Minister; A.A. Belyayev, chief editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA; V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on Food and Purchases; V.A. Vylegzhanin, secretary of the party committee of the Kama Association for the production of heavy vehicles of the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; V.A. Medvedev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; S.G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee;

A.I. Seleznev, first secretary of the Kursk Oblast CPSU Committee; N.N. Slyunkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; S.D. Niyetullayev, first secretary of the Karakalpak Oblast Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan; S.N. Fedorov, general director of the "Eye Microsurgery" inter-sectoral scientific-technical complex; A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; N.F. Tatarchuk, first secretary of the Kalinin Oblast CPSU Committee; S.S. Shatalin, acting academic secretary of the economics department of the USSR Academy of Sciences; G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee; and V.A. Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR Committee for State Security.

Examination of proposals and observations on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee submitted by participants in the plenum continued at sessions held today under the chairmanship of M.S. Gorbachev by the commission which is putting the finishing touches to the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum will continue work tomorrow.

Plenum Debate Summarized

LD0602225790 Moscow TASS in English 2235 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, in its second day in Moscow, continues to discuss the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th Congress. Today the plenum continued debating the report that Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet Communist Party chief, delivered on Monday.

At the morning meeting, Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, raised the question of confidence in the party.

He said there are hardly any forces or sections in Soviet society now that could really compete with the Soviet Communist Party. If the party acts promptly and effectively, it stands every chance to preserve its influence and importance, he said.

At the same time Academician Velikhov did not rule out the possibility of two communist parties emerging in the Soviet Union in future. Both of them will have the same socialist platform.

Vitaliy Vorotnikov, president of the Presidium of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet, supported the idea advanced in the draft platform, which envisages the institution of the country's president. He said this will help strengthen state power and protect democracy.

Regarding the processes in the Russian federation, Vorotnokov said that problems of economic independence, of the republic's political sovereignty within the federation and the position of separate national-territorial entities in the structure of the Russian Federation are acutely debated in Russia.

The working class steps up the struggle for its interests, wittingly or unwittingly promoting the heightening of national awareness in Russia.

Vorotnikov said that many political groups ranging from "left" extremists to conservatives, claim to express Russia's real interests. There is danger that extremist tendencies may ride the crest of national sentiments in Russia. It is important to cut them down to size.

The speaker is of the opinion that it was justifiable to form the Russian Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, even though it has been formed without really consulting party organisations in the Republic.

He suggested that a Russian party conference be convened prior to the 28th congress, to discuss the structure of party bodies in the Russian Federation.

Addressing Gorbachev, Yuriy Gankovskiy, secretary of the party committee of the oil and gas extracting amalgamation in western Siberia said, specifically, the following:

I can say without flattery that while you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, were only secretary-general we all felt that new ideas are being generated by the party, that the effort is exerted to change and disrupt what has become outdated. Now you hold four posts. One gets the impression that somebody wishes the general secretary to fail in each of them, because his effort cannot be consistent. I think these matters should be discussed and resolved."

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party Vaino Vaelaes, agreeing with the view that the proposed draft platform for the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party is in keeping with the requirements and tasks of the present, indicated at the same time that the document has the tendency of merely stating problems.

The speaker supported the proposal to elect the party's chairman and two deputy chairmen at the Congress.

He believes that profound democratisation of the party should be the unshakable principle.

Restructuring within the party is the sole natural condition guaranteeing the party's success and confidence of the people, the leader of Estonian Communists said.

Assessing the course of perestroyka in the Soviet Union, Yegor Ligachev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, said that serious miscalculations have been made by the Politburo and government in its implementation. He said that much time is spent on debating acute problems, but decisive action is lacking.

The monetary reform, the reform of prices and taxation should be made shortly, naturally without eroding living standards of the population, particularly of poorer sections, he said.

Ligachev said that strong forces of nationalist, separatist, anti-socialist kind pose the main, mortal danger for perestroyka, for the Soviet Union.

"True, some tried to distract the attention of the people and create wrong notions in society, subdividing the party's leaders into radicals and conservatives and spreading a multitude of absurd rumours," Ligachev said.

Ligachev supported the proposal to register the provision about the party's unity in the draft platform of the Central Committee.

"The essential question is ideological and organisational strengthening of party ranks, the consolidation of the Soviet Communist Party's ties with public organisations, movements, units of the working people, youth. All this should be done on a democratic basis," Ligachev said. At the same time he declared against the party being turned into an amorphous organisation, a political club.

Ligachev strongly declared in favour of holding the party Congress earlier, in favour of democratic multi-candidate election of deputies to the Congress, widening of the rights of primary party organisations and independence of communist parties of union republics.

The secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee said he is decisively against the introduction of private property into socialist society. This is apparently the case where a nationwide referendum is needed, Ligachev said.

Ligachev is of the opinion that the speeding up of the reunification of Germany, or, actually, the engulfment of the German Democratic Republic is an impending danger.

He said it would be unpardonable short-sightedness and error to fail to see that Germany with a huge economic and military potential begins to loom in the world's horizon.

There is a need for real efforts of the world community, of all the democratic forces to prevent in time the posing of the question of the revision of the post-war frontiers and to prevent a new Munich," [no opening quote as received] Ligachev said.

Vladimir Ivashko, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee, said that the platform for the 28th Congress is being discussed in an extremely acute social and political situation.

He noted that in Lenin's lifetime, in the tense period when the political situation and the alignment of forces were changing right before one's eyes, party congresses were held every year, and there were party conferences in the periods between them.

He believes that a recourse to the Leninist practice should be made in present conditions, that work should be intensified among the top, and not only the top echelons of the party.

Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said the draft platform contains the main guides for the party in conditions of a transition to democratic socialism.

At the same time he warned against haste, however attractive prompt decisions might seem.

As regards a multi-party system, Shevardnadze said that a viable party needs no monopoly on power. He unambiguously declared for the institution of presidential powers.

Shevardnadze rejected assertions that perestroyka is to blame for the destruction of Europe's political structure. "It has been destroyed by the will of peoples who wished no longer to tolerate coercion," he said.

He said that in new conditions East European countries continue to develop goodneighbourly relations with the Soviet Union, remain in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and are the Soviet Union's partners in economic cooperation.

At the same time Shevardnadze said that the spectre of revanchism is roaming in Europe hand-in-hand with the ideas of unification. The new state of things with the German question encouraged dangerous hopes for the revision of frontiers.

Europe can build a common home convenient for all European peoples if it navigates without upheavals the zone of the current crisis, the Soviet foreign minister said.

Vadim Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, declared for the revision of Article Six of the Constitution of the USSR which registered the party's leading role in society.

He holds that in order to ensure the radicalness and at the same time consistency and controllability of reforms there is a need for a firm authoritative power which is at the same time democratical and responsible to the people.

In this connection he attaches fundamental importance to the provision of the draft platform for the widening of the powers of state and introduction of the presidential form of rule. The party's leader should head the effective supreme state authority in the country.

Member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Aleksey Myasnikov, a worker from Siberia, criticised the attempts to legalise factions within the party. He believes the country is not yet ready for the transition to a multi-party system.

He believes this would sharply exacerbate social tension in society and the struggle for power.

Pointing to the need for the creation of the mechanism that would regulate relations between supreme bodies of the party and state, the speaker declared that one and the same person should hold the posts of general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee and president of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Regarding possibilities of the settlement of inter-ethnic conflict in Transcaucasia, Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, declared for a dialogue between the republics, for the quest of mutually acceptable ways of overcoming the crisis.

"The road to inter-ethnic accord will obviously be difficult and prolonged. But we are prepared to cover our part of the road," he said.

The speaker also noted the need to register the fact that a multi-party system began to shape in the Soviet Union

and to envisage for the Soviet Communist Party an opportunity of forming an alliance with the most progressive of these organisations for the sake of achieving common goals.

Most speakers at the plenum on Tuesday supported the idea of the party's renewal, declared for the revision of Article Six of the USSR Constitution and submitted proposals specifying some provisions of the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party for the Congress. The plenum continues tomorrow.

Plenum Activities, Speeches of 6 Feb Reported

Ligachev Warns of 'Danger to Socialism'

PM0702113590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate speech by Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! I believe that you would agree if I said that the Soviet people's confidence in the future is the most valuable part of our life; after all, that is what socialism is all about, or at any rate it is a characteristic feature of it.

We are currently losing a great deal of all this. After somewhat reviving in the first two years of perestroyka, the economy has fallen into a slump, interethnic strike has resulted in bloodshed and—this is perhaps the most unusual thing—our people have begun to feel afraid for themselves, their friends, and their relatives, and in some areas dual power has effectively been established.

I would like to stress once again with total clarity that perestroyka is an objective phenomenon, and there was and is no alternative to it. Obviously the Central Committee plenum is a meeting where we are obliged, so to speak, to get to the heart of any process.

I can say most sincerely that I share the opinion which you and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev have voiced here, namely that the Politburo and the government have permitted serious miscalculations and mistakes in the implementation of perestroyka projects.

What mistakes? Here are some of them, in my view.

First, the overwhelming increase in the money supply, which resulted in the disorganization of the consumer market.

I want to remind you, comrades, that over the last two years the money income of the population, particularly cooperative workers, has soared tremendously: Note, it has risen by approximately as much as in the previous seven years.

This notwithstanding, the income of a considerable proportion of the population has remained virtually the same.

The process of transferring to new economic relations proved simply not to have been prepared for. No systems of corresponding economic regulators and no legal mechanism had been set up. What is more, as Academicians Boris Yevgenyevich Paton and Yevgeniy Pavlovich Velikhov pointed out here, economic changes in our country have not been sensibly tied in with scientific and technical progress. Even without technological innovations, enterprises now have a fair amount of income from unwarrantedly high contract—let us be blunt and say it—monopoly prices.

But there is something else that I would like to stress. The point is that we have statesmen who are supposed to competently ensure the implementation of the economic policy that has been elaborated.

Next. When speaking about the reasons for the difficult situation in the country, I cannot but mention the slackening of state discipline. People are increasingly realizing that democracy is indeed inconceivable without discipline. The decline in discipline, Comrades, has entailed tremendous losses. I would say that it has resulted in an unprecedented revival of narrow-mindedness and parochialism.

Here is just one example. The population of Tyumen, Sverdlovsk, Gorkiy, Chelyabinsk, Perm, and Kemerovo Oblasts and other industrial centers in the country are experiencing serious difficulties with the supply of meat products owing to the fact that the republics refuse to supply the full amount of meat to all-union stocks, while, incidentally, increasing quite substantially meat stocks for local consumption.

The Politburo has adopted a resolution on this subject to boost communist leaders' role in providing the country's population with foodstuffs.

A gulf between words and actions is intolerable in any case, but particularly so in politics. We have said on many occasions that food is our top priority. But in practice, comrades, agriculture has begun to receive fewer material and technical resources than in previous years.

I have said this before, and I will say it again: Whether we like it or not, given this attitude to the agrarian sector there is no knowing when the country will obtain plentiful food supplies. A great deal of time in our country is spent discussing acute problems. But what we lack is resolute action. From my viewpoint we must, on the basis of the trade unions' proposal, agree to monetary reform, along with price and taxation reform, without of course permitting a reduction in living standards among the population, particularly the poorer strata.

I would note, incidentally, that we have begun to feel at ease about rejecting everything that went before,

including those things that might still do service, without having elaborated adequate transitional terms for party work methods in the economic sphere. Of course, nothing can explain the fact that it was precisely during the restructuring of party work—and I say this with anguish—that we were unable to hold the planned discussion with rayon and city party committee first secretaries and secretaries of primary party organizations. There is a great need for this. This is borne out by our comrades' speeches.

I believe on the whole that we members of the leadership must acknowledge as just the criticism from communists and party organization secretaries. We do indeed need to meet with them in a working atmosphere, and we do indeed need to discuss proposals and hold consultations as to how best to implement the adopted decisions. I fully support in this respect the speech delivered by Comrade Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gankovskiy from Nizhnevartovsk, Tyumen Oblast.

Our inability to discern the **main danger** to perestroyka is a serious blunder. Life has shown that powerful nationalist, separatist, and antisocialist forces pose the main threat—perhaps a deadly threat, I would say—to perestroyka and the Soviet Union. This is where the real danger to socialism, to the fatherland is lurking.

In fact, some people are trying to divert the people's attention and create false ideas in society. They divide many of us into radicals and conservatives and deliberately put about slander and start rumors.

I would like to tell Central Committee members one thing. In particular, recently the journal OGONEK reported significantly that a group of Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries, headed by Ligachev, had gone behind the back of the Central Committee general secretary and the Council of Ministers chairman at a CPSU Central Committee meeting 7 April last year, considered questions associated with the situation in Georgia, and adopted corresponding decisions.

But it is clear that questions of this nature are not resolved by a group. Many comrades know that on that day—I want to stress on that day—that is, 7 April, the entire Politburo with the participation of M.S. Gorbachev, N.I. Ryzhkov, and Comrades A.N. Yakovlev and E.A. Shevardnadze, who had flown in from a foreign trip, unanimously—I stress unanimously—approved and adopted political recommendations concerning the development of events in Tbilisi.

The question arises: Why are suspicions being fueled and why are hints of a conspiracy necessary? I have said and I will say once again: They have one aim—to divert society's attention from the destructive work being carried out in the country and the party by, dare I say it, political demagogues and intriguers. You have already noted probably that they are now setting about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and are trying to compromise the party and state leadership. I think that we must put this down most resolutely. Destructive forces are threatening to plunge society into chaos, ruin, and moral and physical terror. By virtue of these facts alone, I would like to support the formulation of the question submitted by many communists and record something in the draft Central Committee platform, especially with regard to **party unity**. To be frank, I see no other means now of coping with the troubles.

The ideological and organizational strengthening of party ranks and the intensification of the CPSU's links with social organizations and movements and working people's and young people's formations is the supreme question. All this must be done on a democratic basis. I believe that the following demand must be immutable: A person involved in antisocialist, nationalist organizations cannot remain within the ranks of the CPSU.

I resolutely support the proposals on bringing forward the date of the party congress, on holding democratic, multiple-candidate elections of congress delegates, on broadening the rights, competence, and material potential of our primary party organizations, and party committees, and on granting autonomy to union republic communist parties.

Comrades, one cannot help but acknowledge the criticism that party organs at central and local level sometimes lag behind in political decisions and actions on questions of concern to people. That is certainly the case. But at the same time I would like to draw your attention to another aspect of the question. I believe that people sometimes try to spur us on with accusations of laggardness to fundamental concessions and hasty steps. Take as an example the question of private ownership. I resolutely oppose the draft Central Committee congress platform's opening the slightest chink to permit the introduction of private ownership into socialist society. This is not a game of words, comrades. I am talking about the private ownership form of appropriating someone's hired labor. This question concerns our future. We have already endured enough from freebooting speculative cooperatives. If people insist, I believe that this is a case where we must hold a national referendum, since it is a question of a fundamental issue.

I also oppose our party's transformation into an amorphous organization—a political club. Without doubt, the principle of democratic centralism needs to be reconsidered and imbued with the Leninist interpretation. We must create conditions for free discussion of questions, broad consideration of communists' and nonparty members' opinions, and unfailing fulfillment of adopted decisions. Lastly, I cannot omit to mention something else, comrades—events in Europe. I believe that we must not overlook the approaching danger amid the kaleidoscope of events there. I am referring to the acceleration of German reunification and, effectively, the absorption of the GDR. It would be unforgivably shortsighted and mistaken not to see that a Germany with vast economic and military potential has begun to loom on the world horizon. Real efforts are needed on the part of the world

community and all the world's democratic forces in good time to prevent the question of revising the postwar borders from being raised and—let us be blunt and say it—prevent a prewar Munich.

I believe that the time has come to realize this new danger of our time and tell the party and the people about it at the top of our voices. It is not yet too late. I believe that this problem also deserves to be discussed in our parliament.

Finally, comrades. I want to say candidly and frankly that I am extremely eager to tackle the constructive work and the concrete tasks of perestroyka and to make sure that every family experiences its results as soon as possible. I believe that we will succeed in this because the party is restructuring, because the party is getting a second wind, and because it is moving toward its congress with a platform of democracy and creative building.

Ligachev Favors Abolishing Article 6

AU0602125090 Paris AFP in English 1123 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 6 (AFP)—The Soviet Politburo's conservative hardliner, Yegor Ligachev, backed the abolition of the Communist Party's political monopoly when he addressed a crucial Central Committee meeting here Tuesday, a participant said.

"All those who spoke today were in favour of the abolition of Article six", which enshrines the party's leading role, Venyamin Midtsev, an academician and member of a Central Committee department told an AFP reporter outside the Kremlin.

He said that Mr. Ligachev made the longest of several speeches on Tuesday morning, "and the strongest". The highly orthodox Mr. Ligachev was much applauded at the end of his speech, according to Mr. Midtsev.

Mr. Ligachev's support for the radical proposals on party renewal outlined by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on Monday was a sign that a good part of the party conservatives were rallying to the idea of taking the first step towards a multiparty system, observers said.

Mr. Midtsev added that all the speakers at the opening session of the second and last day of the plenum had demanded direct elections to a party congress which is to approve the party platform to be adopted by the policy-making body later Tuesday.

Direct elections would ensure more democratic elections to the congress, which could otherwise be hampered by the powerful party apparatus.

The plenum, normally attended by only full and non-voting Central Committee members has been enlarged to include a number of guests for the key debate on the party's future.

Ligachev Speech Applauded

LD0602192290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Feb 90

[report by D. Kiselev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kiselev] At the end of the day today those taking part in the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee postponed the date of their departure from Moscow.

[V.Ye. Gomolitskiy, secretary of the party committee of Ulyanovsk aviation-industrial complex] One thing is already sure, that the plenum has been carried over until tomorrow. In other words, a very heated discussion is under way on the draft platform which has been submitted.

[Kiselev] What was the most important thing that happened at the plenum today?

[Gomolitskiy] The main thing, both today and yesterday, probably, is the commitment of everyone, including all those invited and the members of the Central Committee, to the democratization of the party and internal party life. That is most important. On Article six, many speakers, practically all, are, as they say, in favor of its revocation—and we communists should resolve this ourselves—in favor of bringing forward the holding of the congress, and everyone is speaking on and supporting this proposal, and in favor of holding a report-back and election campaign after the congress.

[Kiselev] So, after the congress. Mikhail Sergeyevich was speaking about before the congress.

[Gomolitskiy] Yes, practically 90 percent of those who spoke agree that a report-back and election campaign has to be held after the congress.

[Kiselev] Can you tell me whether there was applause at the plenum today?

[S.N. Ponasov, secretary of the party committee of the Bryansk machine-building works] Yes, there was.

[Kiselev] How many times, and for what?

[Ponasov] Well for good, critical speeches.

[Kiselev] Whose speeches earned applause?

[Ponasov] Well, right now I can't say.

[Kiselev, to Gomolitskiy] Do you remember?

[Gomolitskiy] Ligachev's speech earned applause.

[Kiselev] It was a good critical speech?

[Gomolitskiy] Yes, it was a good critical speech.

[Kiselev] What was he criticizing?

[Gomolitskiy] It was self-critical, too. He was criticizing the insufficient work of the Central Committee and of the Politburo. He really subjected his work to criticism.

Ligachev, Shevardnadze 'Clash'

LD0602163890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 6 February broadcasts a 12-minute report, "News and Comments," presented by Benas Rupeika. The program includes a pre- recorded phone-in from Moscow. Edmundas Ganusauskas, correspondent of LIETUVOS RYTAS, the former Lithuanian Komsomol paper KOMJAUNIMO TIESA, is on the line.

Ganusauskas speaks about his conversation with Justas Palacekis, secretary for ideology at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, on the proceedings at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Ganusauskas proceeds to summarize what he learned from Paleckis.

"Probably the most interesting point at the morning sitting of the plenum was that a clash between the conservative and progressive forces became very obvious indeed." Ganusauskas says that Ligachev was on "one side of the barricades and Shevardnadze on the other." He notes that Ligachev's speech, in which he seems to address Shevardnadze, can be noted for using weapons of "separatism, nationalism, socialism.... He demanded that people who took part in, as he put it, nationalist organizations which organized anti- constitutional measures, should be given severe repulse." Ganusauskas says Ligachev blames the highest-ranking officials of the USSR for problems in East Europe.

Ganusauskas says: "It seems that the speech made by Shevardnadze has revealed the face of our state which has existed until today." As for the way Soviet policies are assessed by foreign countries today, compared with the way they were assessed previously, Ganusauskas quotes Shevardnadze as saying:"How can one fail to be afraid of such a state which treats its people in such a terrible way?"

Rupeika asks if Shevardnadze also mentioned Lithuania. Ganusauskas answers yes, and quotes Shevardnadze: "I believe that communists of Lithuania did not want to set themselves up against the CPSU. They only wanted to preserve themselves as a real power, a real force." Ganusauskas says Shevardnadze spoke against taking any strict sanctions against the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Rupeika asks if the issues concerning Lithuania have been discussed yet today. Ganusauskas answers: "At least until lunch these issued were not yet touched upon directly." The report ends with Ganusauskas saying that the plenum will not be concluded tomorrow.

Shevardnadze, Medvedev Speak

LD0702001790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1216 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The draft platform, said E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR foreign minister, contains the main guidelines the party has to follow under the conditions of the transition to democratic socialism.

The very idea of a transition period presupposes a precise succession of stages in the movement toward the goal.

With this platform the party is bringing to an end a particular stage of perestroyka and is moving on to the next one, which must undoubtedly be linked with the adoption of a new constitution for the country. Despite all the temptation of quick decisions, one must refrain from haste.

Nor does a definite time scale have to be fixed. The birth of the constitution must result from the establishment of the ground rules of democracy.

Today it is necessary to make decisions that preserve perestroyka's chance for life. If the healthy forces cannot be consolidated, then a situation of chaos and anarchy may arise tomorrow. Under these conditions, it is not hard to foresee the emergence onto the stage of great and small dictators who will think nothing of putting our country's development into reverse.

A viable party does not need a monopoly on power. It must acknowledge, and this is courageously done in the platform, the need for political pluralism and for cooperation with all other healthy sociopolitical associations. The party's ability to measure up to the new political reality must be proved. This is harder than declaring a readiness for self-renewal.

The monopoly of power destroyed political life as a sphere for the interaction of various political forces. When perestroyka called them into being, it turned out that the directive command syndrome had deprived us of the wish to communicate with them. Perestroyka abolished declarations and demanded deeds.

If we wish to preserve a community of fraternal peoples, we must reconstitute it as a treaty-bound union of genuinely sovereign states and actually help to fill the principle of the national sovereignty of each republic with real content. Complete understanding ought to be shown toward the proposals of the Communists of Russia for the formation of their own state and party structures, bearing in mind the profound changes occurring within the country. Only in this way can we count on the preservation of a viable and strong center.

It is necessary to surmount the crisis of trust as quickly as possible and to introduce the instruments of law into the

fabric of interrepublican relations, thereby improving them. It is necessary to act without delay!

Another area where emergency measures are essential is the function of power. Democracy and powerlessness are incompatible concepts. I call unequivocally for the institution of presidential rule. One cannot drag out deciding on this matter.

Perestroyka, said the minister, long ago ceased to be our internal affair. The international community is, in equal measure, not indifferent to our perestroyka. Earlier we were in a state of confrontation with the world. The consequences of this was a deeply rooted mistrust of us. It fed not only upon the country's foreign policy, but also on its attitude to its own citizens. People were asking themselves the question: Is it possible not to fear a state that builds its relations with its own people in so harsh a manner?

It is known what the world's attitude to us is now. I know, though, that foreign support for perestroyka irritates some people in our country. However, one must not reduce foreign political activity. On the contrary, it is only via broad international cooperation that one can successfully tackle the most acute internal problems.

There is talk of unilateral concessions and of giving up positions, but we have made no concessions at all anywhere or to anyone. If we did, it was to common sense alone. As for giving up positions, it happened many years ago and we are now restoring them with difficulty.

As head of the department that carries out the foreign policy course in practice, I state that the positive changes have become possible as a result of the constructive dialogue with all our partners. What is behind it is the titanic work of the country's leadership and of the general secretary of the party's Central Committee. Let them not blame perestroyka for the destruction of Europe's political structure. It was destroyed by the will of people who no longer wished to reconcile themselves with coercion. It is at the end of the forties and not in 1985 that the undermining of belief in socialism began, socialism based upon suppression and coercion. We foresaw the events in these countries, and it is precisely because of that that we cardinally restructured the nature of our interstate relations with them, renounced interference in their internal affairs, and ceased to foist decisions upon them. It is easier to change policy than people. This goes for many leaders of these countries.

Under the new conditions the Eastern European countries continue to develop good-neighborly relations with us, and remain members of the Warsaw Pact and our partners in economic cooperation. However, when large masses get going and when stability is disturbed it is difficult to forecast only a favorable development of events. The specter of revanchism is roaming around Europe in an embrace with the ideas of unity and reunification, a craving for justice diluted with a craving for political vengeance. The new condition of the German question has awakened dangerous hopes for a revision of borders.

Europe can build a common home, one that suits all European peoples, if it overcomes the zone of the current crisis without upheavals.

In our country, the speaker emphasized, we have many reasons for placing the events in the country in the context of all-European and world affairs. It is precisely from this viewpoint that I propose to take a look at the decision of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. I am not convinced that our Lithuanian friends wished somehow to put themselves in opposition to the CPSU. I understand the motives, the desire to preserve the party as a real and effective force of national life. I am resolutely opposed to any sanctions whatever. At the same time, however, I would like to say to the Lithuanian comrades: It is necessary yet again to fathom everything out well. You will find it unbelievably hard under the conditions of disorder in Europe if the indications of this disorder, which are clear now, acquire the nature of a firm negative tendency. This issue, like all the others, must not be seen in isolation from the world and the European situation.

We still live in a world of major threats and real dangers. For this reason it is extremely important that stability be preserved in our country and that the process of consolidation proceed. Stability in the republics, oblasts, towns, and enterprises is the stability of the country, and in the final analysis, a guarantee of the stability of peace in our planet. [passage omitted]

I don't think anyone doubts that we have really reached a critical moment in the development of our society and that perestroyka has entered a period of dramatic trials, V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said. Here we have a consumer market devastated by inflation and shortages, interethnic conflicts overflowing into bloody quarrels, strikes flaring up in various places, political tension, and ideological confusion in people's minds. Of late there has been a growing tendency to ascribe all ills to perestroyka and to whitewash the past. It is said that, allegedly, it is incorrect to assert that the people are in favor of perestroyka. The speaker expressed resolute disagreement with such an approach, noting that such assertions mean they are trying to push us backwards.

In the decades of deformation and stagnation such a critical mass of explosive material had accumulated that if there had been any further delay it could have caused shocks of incredible force. We can now see this even more clearly from the example of the countries of Eastern Europe. The Central Committee secretary is deeply convinced that perestroyka has provided the opportunity to remove the overburden from the strata of many problems and to begin creating new democratic mechanisms and structures, and has made it possible to

prevent the worst possible way that events could have developed and to avoid catastrophe. The opportunity has presented itself to change the approaching explosion into a controlled reaction, but the way in which this opportunity is used will depend on the decisions and actions we take today.

The way out of the position that has been created is expressed in the draft platform that has been presented, the speaker considers. It is necessary to lead society more quickly out of the state of disturbed equilibrium by means of more decisive forward movement. Both in connection with the preparation for the 28th congress and at the congress itself a decisive step forward should be made along the path of forming effective sociopolitical and economic mechanisms of democratic socialism. It is necessary to propose genuinely cardinal changes in running the economy and in politics and ideology.

It is now a question of the survival of the party as the vanguard political force. Either we will be able to lead a rapid but controllable process of transformations or else it will become an uncontrolled flood and will fall under the influence of populist demagogues or even overt pogrom makers. It can sweep away not only the party but also our still weak democracy, the hopes for a humane socialism in our country.

In the words of the CPSU Central Committee secretary, in order to ensure the radical nature of the reforms and at the same time to ensure their continuity and that they remain controlled, what is needed is firm power which is authoritative but at the same time democratic and responsible to the people. In this connection he considers the article of the draft platform on expanding the powers of the state and on introducing a presidential form of government to be of fundamental importance. The leader of the party should be at the head of the effective supreme state power in the country.

Of course resolute steps must be taken in renewing the party itself. It must be the ruling party not under any constitutional norm but by a mandate received from the people for its policy, worked out and proposed to the people, and of course for its practical activity. Article Six in the USSR Constitution undoubtedly must be revised, especially in view of the fact that its content has already begun to contradict the draft platform of the party in which the new view of the party and its place in society is set out.

The speaker touched upon the matter of ensuring freedom of opinions in the party and an attitude of respect toward holding different views, if, of course, this does not impinge upon the party's ideological and political foundations. Of course it is not just any of the new ideas that turns out to be correct, but it is precisely here that living discussion is important, the comparison of arguments, linking them with real practice, only in the course of which truth can be born.

The speaker gave his opinion on issues relating to elections and in particular to the elections of delegates to the forthcoming congress. It is important to give the road to those people who are indeed the most authoritative and qualified, sincere adherents to perestroyka. It is also important not to turn the elections into a game.

The speaker expressed agreement with the fact that all the party's ideological work needs further, deep restructuring. Basically, the changes which have taken place during the years of perestroyka in the field of information, in the sense of openness, democratization and glasnost, generally have a positive purport, despite the whole contradictory quality of this process. This is indeed one of the main results and factors of perestroyka.

At the same time the speaker noted there are very many serious problems in ideological work. The old system of leadership of this sphere, based upon tight pressure and continuous control, has fallen away without a new one having been created. This is a complex and agonizing process.

Far from everyone has withstood the test of glasnost, the CPSU Central Committee secretary believes. The desire on the part of different editorial offices to please the public not infrequently turns into political Fronde-ism, and sometimes also into incitement and the circulation of low-grade articles. A wave of criticism sweeps onto our basic values: Lenin, the October Revolution, the socialist choice. Authoritarian qualities, intolerance, and categorical opinions are characteristic of many mass information media and publications that consider themselves to be virtually the absolute embodiment of the spirit of perestroyka but which in actual fact are imposing their own unilateral and subjective interpretation of it.

Despite all of this is would be totally groundless to place upon the mass information media the main responsibility for the misfortunes that have befallen the country, just as it would be to do so for the fall in the authority of the party organizations. The mass information media do not live in a vacuum, they are a part of society, they reflect in one way or another the processes taking place in society. The days of the ideological monolith, of unanimity and well-being for purposes of ostentation, have irrevocably disappeared into the past.

What is to be done here? Some people would like to return to the old and tested power methods, to shouting but authoritarian control of the spiritual sphere, tight pressure and the diktat are simply impossible. Times are different today and it would be incorrect to try to force ideological processes into old paths. There is only one path—the path of changing over to legal foundations for regulating relations arising in the sphere of ideology and the mass information media. Of course the role of ideological influence upon the press, of dialogue, and of persuasion resting upon public opinion is growing under the new conditions. The buttress here is our party press. [passage omitted]

Estonian Premier Toome Comments on Plenum

LD0602175990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Inteview with I. Toome, chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, by correspondent Aleksandr Shashkov, during the lunch break at the 6 February session of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in Moscow; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Shashkov] What sort of questions were discussed?

[Toome] The same fundamental ones as yesterday, in other words which way to go as a country and which way as a party, and how to solve today, at a very complex turning point, the most important questions, such as political democratization, the development of the federation, and how to build the work of the party in the future in order that it really starts to move away from its, perhaps, current formal structure, and again starts to influence these very many complex processes which precisely require its influence.

[Shashkov] Was there a strong difference in the points of view of those who spoke on the CPSU platform?

[Toome] They differ fairly strongly. There may not be any clear or strong expressions, but basically there are fairly strong differences.

[Shashkov] You couldn't perhaps name those who hold these extreme views, say?

[Toome] Well, I consider myself to be a proponent of radical changes. I am alarmed by the desire of a fairly large section of people in this hall to turn things back in order to turn the screws again and go back to the old orders. That's what worries me, if we are talking generally.

[Shashkov] Are these the moods which prevail in the main?

[Toome] No, of course not, on the contrary.

[Shashkov] They are in the minority?

[Toome] Yes. As a participant in a great many plenums, I was particularly struck at this plenum by a certain turn for the better. I would say that I view with optimism the adoption of the platform by today's plenum, and I think that in the main it will satisfy all of us. [video shows people queuing in Red Square; interview outside with Toome]

Gorbunov on Calls for Russian Sovereignty

LD0702034190 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1830 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Telephone interview with Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium, by Imants Austrins; on 6 February, Gorbunov speaks from Moscow—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

[Gorbunov] Certainly tension can be felt at the CPSU plenum regarding the situation in the country, as a whole. And, it appears to me, that, moreover, it can be felt in a kind of exacerbated form. When talking about the plenum as a whole, then perhaps even many kinds of lamentations are heard. Many such speakers conclude that there is a crisis; there are lamentations about the situation in the country. Unfortunately, there are those who talk particularly sharply about those negations which at present have been revealed in the country and which, probably, are also due to some processes of restructuring, thus the negations are particularly visible. All that is being presented in a kind of heightened manner; but, well, speakers of that kind lack practically any constructive proposals about what to do in order to stop this crisis. That on the whole reveals the scene in totality, as it exists at present in the union. But, nevertheless, they, at least in my opinion—those speakers—are not the dominant ones at the plenum; although numerically there are a great many of them.

What is heard a little more constructively at the plenum, then, is spoken about a great deal: the sovereignty of Russia, about the Communist Party of Russia. This question is heard with a single meaning: that Russia needs sovereignty, the republic as such, and there must a Communist Party of Russia with its Central Committee.

Well, you probably heard about the newest topic that has appeared in the platform: about a president's administration structure. This question is also being debated; the majority expresses itself positively, although it is also being rejected.

To continue, perhaps, about kind of a political pluralism. Whereas a month ago, utterances were heard in various ways that Article 6 must be preserved, that it was not yet the right time or there were different kinds of arguments, and now this question is practically heard with just a single meaning: that in the Constitution, Article 6 must be changed. But on all these questions—if we can put it briefly—then, in fact, two kinds of blocs or two attitudes toward all of these problems are apparent, and I will put it kind of conditionally and very subjectively, of course: So then, the bloc of Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and—as much as I can judge—Gorbachev; and the bloc of the other group is Ligachev's bloc.

It is difficult to say how the voting on the platform will take place tomorrow, because we did not conclude the debate today; the debate will quite surely still continue a little tomorrow, and the party's platform for the congress will be voted on or will be adopted.

[Austrins] Janis Vagris is said to have mentioned in his speech that he had received the platform's discussion draft only on the morning of that day. So that the party organization of the republics have not participated in the formation of this particular platform. Were such thoughts heard from any other speakers?

[Gorbunov] This was condemned not only in the speech by Comrade Vagris. That is how it is, and that's why the plenum could not complete its work today. It is also doubtful whether it will complete it tomorrow, because this is a very serious question. Work must be done on this platform.

[Austrins] Are the relations proposed in the platform between a republic and the center not only in party contacts?

[Gorbunov] These relations are proposed in a kind of generalized form. Comrade Shevardnadze in his speech told the most essential: that we must strive for a union of sovereign republics as a union of states, and not for a kind of uncertain federation, a renewed or whatever federation, in which nobody could understand what it would be like. And, therefore, Shevardnadze was the only one from the Politburo who, in my opinion, very accurately expressed this opinion on the further structure and fate of the union... so then, treaties and a union of sovereign republics as a union of states.

[Austrins] Did any speaker already appear today, who also mentioned the experience of Lithuania, the significance of the decisions of the 20th Congress of their Communist Party?

[Gorbunov] Well, by all means Shevardnadze mentioned this and said that those processes should be viewed realistically and perhaps by kind of an understanding-.[Passage omitted]

Velikhov Speaks on Party Trust

PM0702120590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Debate speech by Ye.P. Velikhov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and vice president of USSR Academy of Sciences, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! I should like to begin with a question which was one of the most critical yesterday—the question of trust in the party. It seems to me that we should look at this question in a somewhat different way. After all, before perestroyka this question simply did not exist. The party and society were in different correlation.. Society was subordinated to the party while in the party all organizations were subordinate to Staraya Square [address of Politburo], so to speak. Only in the new situation—as a result of perestroyka—has the question of trust really arisen. The question of trust is the result of perestroyka, the result of the enormous creative activeness of society and party members. Trust is of course a very important political capital; it must be earned. That involves a very large amount of labor. The basis of trust is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Once again only perestroyka has enabled us to tell society and to say within the party itself that we can indeed lay this basis.

I believe that we have every grounds for believing that society will show trust in the transformed party, the new party. As a result we shall be able to implement a platform for creating an atmosphere of trust within the party, too, if we indeed accept the proposals of the party organizations discussed yesterday.

Naturally, the party also raises a second question—the question of the monopoly of power. It is known historically that monopolism always generates stagnation both in the organization which exercises monopolism and in society. This is a very serious question.

We have already discussed and adopted some measures—there is the question of the duration of office in elected posts, there is also the solution of the question. But naturally it can be resolved in various ways. It seems to me that when there was talk about who the party represents, in reality today we have no forces yet nor any strata in society which can really lay claim to compete with the party. In reality the question, after all, lies elsewhere—will the workers, peasants, and working intelligentsia really want our party, you and I, to represent them. That is the main question. But is there some other organization which can do this? It seems to me that today there is not, despite the fact that various public organizations are indeed arising. If we act dynamically and effectively then the party has every chance of preserving its influence and importance on this plane.

How will it be in the future? I think that it will be as a result of free discussion in the party and the development of various platforms. All the discussions which exist in society today, all the debates must develop freely in the party too. What will happen as a result? The difference of platforms, as Luchinskiy said yesterday, could lead to a decision whereby, if life leads us to it, there arise two communist parties. This is probably a very remote possibility, life must show where matters will proceed But to be honest I, for instance, would prefer there to be two communist parties standing on the same socialist platform rather than one other party competing with the communist party. Take the United States. After all, none of us can essentially distinguish between the platforms of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The question of monopolism could also be resolved in that way. Life will show whether we should resolve it that way or not but this question should probably be discussed.

I should now like to move on to the next question, mentioned here by Boris Yevgenyevich Paton—the question of the fundamental sciences. He spoke well of their importance. Indeed, we cannot build scientific progress without a foundation and basis in the fundamental sciences. But in the fundamental sciences the basis for their development, the basis for the fact that Soviet science does indeed occupy a serious place in world science, is the fact that it has not left the world market of ideas, has not lost its competitive abilities, so to speak. We must support primarily the competitive principles in the development of fundamental science.

Internally, in the Soviet Union, these principles have to a considerable degree been lost: We have another method of managing fundamental science.

Generally speaking, agreement was reached two years ago that we should return to the method of self-management on the basis of competition in fundamental science. Science, I have in mind fundamental science, cannot be managed either from some external organization or from the Committee for Science and Technology. Science cannot even be managed from the Academy of Sciences. Science must be self-managing. Those who really make science, those who understand it, should take part in its management. This is done in the world, there is the relevant mechanism. For instance, in the U.S. system, 50,000 scientists take part every year in assessing those projects which to a considerable degree they also submit, but independently, on a competitive basis.

We have declared this competition, but we have not implemented it. It seems to me that in our platform we should in fact have drawn attention to self-management and the competitive foundations for the development of fundamental science, including social sciences. That will provide an opportunity for science's free development unrestricted by any framework. On the basis of this development real forecasts can be built.

In general, comrades, competition is a tremendous motive mechanism. And one important task in the economy is the development of competition, enterprise, and risk. For that we must develop the market and create stable laws. History shows that those cultures which have rejected competition have degenerated even if they had very good initial conditions. I apologize for the historical digression but 500 years ago China, for instance, had considerably better conditions in science and technology, material resources, and manpower than Europe. But because of monopoly, because of the failure to support competition, China became a developing power while Europe took leading world positions.

It seems to me that today we could have on our land the first historical chance whereby we can let people develop. We must not let this chance slip. For that it is of course necessary for all our decisions, including decisions on regional questions, to set the aim of developing competition, of developing Soviet entrepreneurship in particular. For that we must develop information technology and computers and create communications as we would create a nervous system. For precisely that purpose, not as an end in itself. Where possible we must meet competition on world markets and to everything to support those who can take up competitive positions in the world market.

One of the most important figures in the economy is the production leader and economic manager—from peasant to director of a very large association. He it is who must play a special part in mobilizing our enormous resources and in their use to overcome the crisis very rapidly.

Society must overcome the negative attitude toward the economic manager and entrepreneur. You know that we have had complex interrelations between society and the director. Difficulties were always created for him: From above, from below, and sideways. Even the fact that he was very often transferred to organizational work in reality led to the loss of enterprising people. We are not zealous enough with regard to one of our most important human resources. It is essential to raise his prestige, to place him in favorable conditions, and to defend him legally. Then entrepreneurial income or the profit from an enterprise should be a measure of public assessment of his activity irrespective of who owns the enterprise. That is not my idea. This very important idea belongs to Marx.

We must immediately switch to a market where we can do this. Again, there is perhaps no need for a global discussion. Let's try it sector by sector, let's try it in individual sections. I shall even be voicing a perhaps somewhat heretical thought but take, for instance, the field of computer equipment. The market there has formed and prices have formed, not the prices of the State Committee for prices, but they have formed. Everyone knows how much a good personal computer costs on this market. This market has formed by various means, through joint ventures and by other routes. Sometimes perhaps not entirely legally, but it has formed.

So it seems to me that if we support competition on this market we can perhaps completely renounce the state order in this market and drag it up, create it, and support it as a market.

A few words about foreign policy. As a result of the new foreign and domestic policy course we have begun to earn a most invaluable capital—the trust of the entire international community. Trust is the only basis on which the nonviolent and nuclear-free world of the 21st century can be built. Trust has arisen as a result of a consistent policy backed up by real actions. From the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and the moratorium on nuclear explosions to the conclusion of international treaties. I should like to say that it is the development and building of mutual trust between peoples, states, and all people on earth which should be the most important element of the party's political platform.

Delegate Interviewed on Proceedings, Media

LD0702002190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2100 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] [announcer] Why is it, that during the Central Committee Plenum, journalists remained on the outside [words indistinct]? [video shows man being interviewed by young man reporter, standing in a corridor]

[Begin recording] [Ponasov, identified by caption as being from the Bryansk machine-works production association party committee] The question (?was asked): How will the plenum, the real plenum, be covered? It was answered by Mikhail Sergeyevich, who said that the mass media would without fail be given all materials of the plenum, all materials of the plenum in full.

[Reporter] And a vote was taken then, wasn't it?

[Ponasov] No, no vote was taken. It was noted here, too, that it was a pity that both radio and television had not been invited to the plenum, and that in future this needs to be rectified so that materials would indeed be carried by radio and television. Only there are still fears that while the plenum is being held, when a relay, a live relay, is taking place, half the country won't go to work.

[Reporter] During the years of stagnation, too, half the country did not work at full stretch, so that, I think, our country can permit itself a few days to watch a plenum, with such important decisions. What is your attitude to this?

[Ponasov] Well, one can agree with you on this because today, indeed, as some of the speakers said: We are standing on the brink. That is why in such a situation, participation by the entire people and the interest of the entire people, which has been drawn to the work of the party plenum, expresses one thing: That after all the people have not lost faith in the party, and that the people hope that the renewed party will, nevertheless, indeed be able to find the strength to see perestroyka, or the thing it has started, through to the end. [end recording]

[Announcer] Sergey Ponasov, who was invited to the plenum, has expressed his view. Well, for us it remains only to read the TASS reports, to guess about the debate which preceded the decisions.

Plenum Continues Debate; To Meet 7 Feb

LD0602192390 Moscow TASS in English 1914 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), which met here on Monday, today continued debates on the draft party platform for the 28th party congress and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's report on this issue.

Also today, a commission working on the draft platform continued to discuss proposals on the platform, set forth by participants in the party plenum. The commission sittings were chaired by Gorbachev.

The plenum will continue its work on Wednesday.

Participants Report Plenum Extended to Third Day

AU0602163690 Paris AFP in English 1628 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 6 (AFP)—A two-day plenum of the Soviet communist party's central committee has been extended for a third day, participants told reporters following Tuesday's session here. The plenum will reconvene Wednesday to vote on the proposed platform to be submitted to a party congress and discuss the decision by Lithuanian communists to split with Moscow, participants said.

Vladimir Anishchev, a central committee full member, said however he felt sure the platform proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev would be adopted, including repeal of the party's constitutional right to rule. No one had spoken against the proposal to drop the party's constitutional guarantee, he said.

CPSU Central Committee Plenum Continues 7 Feb

'Keen Debates' Resumed

LD0702080590 Moscow TASS in English 0751 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—The plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee met in the Kremlin today for the third day of keen debates on ways to restructure the party and Soviet society. The meeting is discussing the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and report by CPSU CC General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. It is expected that the plenary meeting will also examine issues connected with the decisions of the 20th Congress of the LIthuanian Communist Party in December last year and end its work by mid-day.

In two days of the plenary meeting 50 people, including members of the Politburo Vitaliy Vorotnikov, Vladimir Ivashko, Vadim Medvedev, Yegor Ligachev, Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Kryuchkov spoke in debates on Mikhail Gorbachev's report.

Originally the plenum was expected to last two days but debates on the first issue developed into such an acute discussion that it was decided yesterday to extend the plenum.

A drafting commission, set up by decision of the plenum to revise the platform for the 28th congress, held a meeting yesterday which was chaired by Mikhail Gorbachev.

CPSU Abandons Power 'Monopoly'

AU0702130890 Paris AFP in English 1259 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 7 (AFP)—The Soviet Communist Party Central Committee voted to end the party's monopoly on power Wednesday, a member of parliament told journalists.

In a show of hands, only maverick deputy Boris Yeltsin voted against the decision to drop Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the party's leading role, according to Zviatoslav Fyodorov, a deputy who attended the plenum as a guest.

The scrapping of the party's monopoly is in a platform adopted by the plenum which will be submitted to the party's 28th congress, which is expected to meet in late June or early July.

"There will no longer be an Article 6. There will be political pluralism and normal democracy," he said.

Mr. Fyodorov said the 300 or so guests attending the plenum were also allowed to vote on the proposed platform to be submitted to the party's supreme instance, the congress, which is expected to meet in late June or early July.

The Central Committee will now call on the Congress of People's deputies—the Soviet parliament—to amend the Constitution.

The vote opens the way to political pluralism in the country.

The platform was proposed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev Monday.

Party Congress Platform Finalized

LD0702130390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1250 GMT 7 Feb 90

["CPSU Central Committee Plenum Has Completed Discussion of First Issue on Its Agenda"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—A TASS correspondent reports:

Discussion of the first issue on the agenda has just ended at the CPSU Central Committee plenum which is taking place here. The final version of the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress has been worked out. This document will be published later in the press.

The participants in the plenum have now begun discussion of issues related to the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania which was held last December.

As already reported earlier, it is expected that the plenum will complete its work today.

Political & Social

TASS Updates Transcaucasus Developments

Flow of Refugees Continues

LD0602220490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2008 GMT 6 Feb 90

[TASS special correspondent's report "From the Scene of Events"]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—The situation in Baku was relatively calm today. No serious violations of public order were registered. In the course of the past 24 hours, the town mayor reports, 17 citizens were detained in the capital of Azerbaijan for violating the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on the state of emergency, and 43 for violating the curfew. As a result of operational and investigation measures, seven people suspected of carrying out the pogroms which took place in Baku 13-16 January were detained. An investigation is being carried out. According to data of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic State Statistical Committee, 66 percent of the city's industrial enterprises worked today, and transportation services ran to around 80 percent of the daily norm.

Reports from other rayons of Azerbaijan testify to a certain stabilization of the situation in the republic. In the Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], major enterprises of industry and the agrarian sector began working, as did public transport and educational institutions.

The activity of enterprises in the Gyandzha railway junction has stabilized. The services on the Kazakh section of the Gyandzha branch of the railway, from which trains set off for Armenia, have started operating. Over the last three days, 15 trains have left for the neighboring republic, and all the trains have been accepted by Armenian railwaymen.

In a report published in Baku this evening on the work of the republican organizing committee for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the positive changes in the situation in the oblast are noted, despite all its complexity. Many enterprises are operating in Mardakert. According to a report by the military commandant of Gadrutskiy rayon, contacts between the local Armenian and Azerbaijani population are being observed.

In Yerevan, a report by the military command of the Yerevan garrison has been published on the arrival of an armored train on the territory of the Armenian SSR. It was sent to render assistance to the troops in protecting the state border of the USSR, and lifting the blockade in the republic.

Eduard Aykazyan, Armenia's permanent representative in Moscow, in a conversation with a TASS correspondent, noted that the flow of refugees from Azerbaijan

arriving in the capital of the Soviet Union is not decreasing. In his opinion, this is explained by the relatively calm situation in Baku. "With the help of the Moscow authorities more than 1,000 people have been accommodated temporarily in hotels in the city, and boarding houses in the environs of Moscow, Aykazyan reported. [no closing quote as received] "The rest—approximately 3,000 people—have found refuge with relatives, friends and acquaintances."

MVD Updates Situation

LD0702112190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—The situation in Azerbaijnan over the past 24 hours has not deteriorated, reported the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD]. No criminal actions on the grounds of interethnic relations have been recorded. On Tuesday, six people were detained in the republic on suspicion of having committed pogroms. Fifty-four people were detained for curfew violations. The confiscation and voluntary surrender of weapons continues in a number of major towns in Azerbaijan.

According to figures from the USSR MVD, 56 percent of industrial enterprises in the republic, including 66 percent in Baku, 40 percent in Minchegaur, 30 percent in Sumgait, and 20 percent in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were not operating on Tuesday. The total material loss through idleness of enterprises since 18 January amounts to R369,200,000

Only vital enterprises are working in Stepanakert and Martuninskiy Rayon of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast.

The blockade of highways continues. Transport is moving only when accompanied by troop details. On the Azerbaijan railway 104 goods trains, including 69 bound for Armenia, are immobile. Over the past 24 hours, three trains were dispatched to Armenia via the Idzhevan station.

The situation in Armenia remains unchanged. Over the past 24 hours the surrender of weapons and ammunition to internal affairs bodies has continued.

Baku Radio Carries Announcements of Events

Dubinyak: Situation 'Peaceful'

NC0702090890 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0430 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku City—read by announcer]

[Text] The situation remained peaceful in Baku City last night. The employees of the internal affairs department continue their work to protect the laws and maintain a peaceful official life in the city.

In accordance with the curfew regime, 89 individuals were detained, 33 of whom were detained for violating the passport regime. Automatic fire was opened on the troops guarding a residential (?area) in [name indistinct] number 1. One soldier was injured.

Rumors are being spread to the effect that military servicemen are violating the laws. I note that the rumor that the military servicemen have robbed the Marshut market in Nasimi district has not been confirmed.

Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City.

'Task of Restoring Normal Life'

NC0702090290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Notice by the military commandant of Baku City dated 6 February—read by announcer]

[Text] No mass violations of public order were recorded in the republic's capital during the past day. Twelve persons were detained for violating the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree on the state of emergency and nine were detained for violating the curfew. Seven persons suspected of committing acts of robbery from 13 to 16 January were arrested during the continuing search operations. They are: Babayev, a worker of the construction maintenance and repairs administration; Orudzhev, a worker of the State [name indistinct] factory; Babayev, unemployed, who lives in Khotur; Nabiyev, place of residence and employment unknown; Mamedov, a worker of the housing (?survey) [word indistinct] number 64; and Mekhtiyev, a worker of shop number 93. An investigation is being carried out. At 2130, the military detained citizen Dzhafarov for trying to force his [words indistinct] in Kirov district. A criminal investigation has been initiated against him.

A store of military uniforms was discovered in the cultural house in [name indistinct] district. (?Complete) military uniforms, boots, [word indistinct], and other military equipment were confiscated.

Public transport services and industrial establishments have not been working properly. This is impeding the stabilization of the situation in the city. According to the state statistics committee, 139 industrial establishments operated in Baku today. This is 66 percent of the total. [Passage indistinct]

The task of restoring normal life in the city can only be achieved with your help. We are aware of the contribution made by a large proportion of the residents of Baku. We are grateful in that regard and believe that this contribution will increase.

Lieutenant General Dubinyak, military commandant of Baku City.

Situation in NKAO Detailed

NC0602203090 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The situation remains tense in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. A general strike continues in Stepanakert, except in essential services. The rayon centers in the NKAO have joined the strike. However, normal working rhythm is maintained in agricultural work and trains continue to be loaded and unloaded at the Stepanakert railway station.

The blockades set up along highways leading to the NKAO through Lachin and Agdam have not been removed, but all blockades have been lifted on the highways within the NKAO. Movement along these highways is controlled by military units.

The workers of the NKAO executive committee are conspicuously absent from work. They walked out of the building housing the oblast's executive committee after the state banner of Azerbaijan was raised over the building. In accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decree of 15 January, SOVYET [word indistinct] and SOVYETAKAN KARABAKH, the official organs of the NKAO party organization which are published in the Russian and Armenian languages, have been closed for failing to publish information released by the commandant's headquarters. The NKAO radio committee is under the control of the military commandant.

Vladimir Sarkisyan, who was born in 1951 and who is a member of the NKAO National Council and the director of the [word indistinct] administration in Stepanakert, was detained on 1 February for refusing to receive provisions sent to the NKAO by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Ministry of Trade. Sarkisyan participated in unauthorized nationalist meetings in the past. A total of 19 individuals have been detained since the declaration of the state of emergency in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's decision of 15 January.

Comrades (?Roshin) and (?Shanin), who are workers in the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee, and Nikolayev, who is a worker in the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Party Control Committee, have arrived in Stepanakert. They have already begun to control the party and political work that is being carried out by the party organizations.

The rumors about the restoration of the powers of the oblast's people's deputies soviet executive committee are completely baseless. The raising of this matter in the NKAO executive committee in any way is illegal. A decision on the resumption of activity by the oblast's soviet executive committee is solely within the jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and will be realized when appropriate.

Comrade Fateyev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Economy Control and Supervision Commission, has disclosed that a meeting was held with economic workers to explain the tasks set out in the decisions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet in connection with the NKAO. Viktor Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, addressed the meeting and replied to questions.

The military commandant has set up field headquarters at the Askeran and Stepanakert railway stations to accelerate the unloading of railway freight cars. Seventeen railway cars arrived at the Stepanakert railway station during the [words indistinct]. Meanwhile, 51 railway cars have been unloaded and 54 railway cars have been sent to the Agdam railway station. Buses have set out from Stepanakert to 48 residential areas carrying a total of 1,125 passengers. Passports were checked in Askeranskiy Rayon's Tashbulak town. Twenty-five individuals were detained during the operation for violating the passport regulations and the rules concerning the concealment of arms. A smoke bomb and other types of arms have been discovered and confiscated.

Yerevan Radio Carries Events in, Around Armenia

Operational Staff on Situation

NC0702112090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] An ARMENPRES correspondent reported the following on 6 February from the operational staff of the republican council on the special situation:

The situation in the republic remains tense. Kornidzor and (?Aravot) villages came under fire twice last night from Lachinskiy rayon in Azerbaijan. The shooting ceased after the Soviet Army and internal troops returned fire. There were no casualties. Negotiations to secure the release of the Armenian youths taken hostage earlier in Sadarak region again failed, the fault lying with the opposite side.

According to Health Ministry figures, 14 more refugees were brought to Yerevan clinics last night; two of the patients died. So far, 17 refugees from Baku have died in Yerevan hospitals. As of 6 February, 289 refugees are being treated in Yerevan clinics.

Serious concern has been expressed over the fact that despite the state of emergency the number of armed raiders in certain regions of Azerbaijan, including Lachinskiy, Zangelanskiy, and elsewhere, is considerable. These armed raiders are destabilizing the situation and their provocative actions are strangely not being prevented by the troops deployed in Azerbaijan. As a result of this, it has not been possible to unblockade the Goris-Lachin-Stepanakert road despite the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Regular helicopter services to Stepanakert are continuing. However, as was the case before, there were no

flights to Shaumyanovskiy rayon and Getashen subrayon. The resolution of this problem is regarded as the priority issue facing the operational staff in the days ahead.

The operational staff expressed its resolute objection to the article entitled "Tense Karabakh" which was published in the [name indistinct] supplement of the first issue of 1990 of SOVETSKAYA MILITSIA, a periodical of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry. The article claimed that the National Front of Armenia—in reality there is no such organization—has distributed leaflets setting a price of R25,000 for each soldier killed and R50,000 for an officer. This calumny, published under the title (?Staff Number) by a certain lieutenant, aims at driving a wedge between the Army and the Armenian population and destabilizing the situation. The members of the operational staff agreed that this slander must be refuted by every possible means and that the editorial board and author of the article must be called to strict account.

Officials Visit Villages in Azerbaijan

NC0702114190 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1700 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Information has been coming into the republic lately concerning attempted forcible deportations of the inhabitants of the Armenian village of Azat in the Khanlarskiy rayon of Azerbaijan.

A specially formed committee, including Major General Surkov, USSR people's deputy; Oganyan, candidate member of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Buro and chairman of the party control committee of the Armenian Communist Party; Araktsyan and Manukyan, members of the administration board of the Armenian Pannational Movement; and [name indistinct], the representative of the republic's state agro-industrial committee, left for the Khanlarskiy rayon on 5 February to meet and talk with the inhabitants of Azat, Kamo, and Getashen villages.

During the meetings it transpired that in fact the representatives of the Khanlarskiy rayon leadership and the Azerbaijan People's Front have asked the inhabitants of these villages to sell their houses and settle elsewhere. It also became obvious that there are certain shortcomings as regards the provision of foodstuffs and medical services and that other social problems exist.

In talks with Colonel General (Shirinkin), the special representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and Colonel [name indistinct], (?commandant) of the Internal Affairs Ministry's internal troops in Khanlarskiy rayon, it was concluded that no one has the right to force citizens of another ethnic group to leave their place of residence. It was pointed out that it is the duty of the army units deployed under the state of emergency to ensure the security of the citizens in the region and protect law and order.

Taking the wishes of the population of Getashen subrayon into consideration, the committee considered it expedient to speed up the reestablishment of the air link with Armenia and the road link with Shaumyanovskiy rayon.

The USSR Council of Ministers is taking measures to improve the social and economic conditions of these villages.

The committee's explanations and [word indistinct] were received with understanding.

At present the situation in Azat, Kamo, and Getashen villages is under the full control of the internal troops.

Newsman Finds No Evidence of Army Atrocities

PM0602160990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 Single Edition p 4

[Special correspondent Captain Second Class S. Turchenko report: "Aid Mission"]

[Text] Baku—I chatted for around two hours with Ya. Rustamov, a diesel engine engineer and leader of the People's Front at the Lieutenant Shmidt Machine Building Plant. Rather, it was mostly him speaking. His words reflected sincere pain for the Azerbaijani people and it was hard to disagree with much of what he said. However, when talk turned to the state of emergency, Rustamov's started to lose his sense of realism, in my view. "The plant will not start work until the military leave Baku," he stated categorically and started talking heatedly about "atrocities" by officers and men.

A similar reaction to the "military" question was demonstrated by N. Nadzhafov, one of the NFA [Azerbaijan People's Front] leaders, in conversation with journalists during an interval at the news conference held the other day at the "Inturist" Hotel. Moreover, in Baku and certain other cities and population centers in Azerbaijan a clearly contrived video recording of "atrocities" committed by the military during the state of emergency is being distributed. There has also been considerable evidence that an attempt is being made to ideologically brainwash the population as well as journalists to switch the blame for the bloodshed from the NFA's extremist wing to people in uniform.

As much as I tried, I was unable to find any confirmation of cases of "atrocities" by servicemen. On the other hand, there is a lot of evidence of just the opposite. Here is what an Azerbaijani—Senior Lieutenant I. Ibadov—said:

"Our unit was ordered by the command to march to Narimanovskiy Rayon to make ourselves available to the party rayon committee. One of the streets was barricaded. Home-made grenades were being thrown from behind the blockade. There were four firing positions in the windows of the neighboring building. We suffered casualties and injuries. Only then did our soldiers return fire. I cannot consider those who fired on

Soviet soldiers, putting at risk the lives of citizens who were in the street and in nearby houses at the time, to be representatives of the Azerbaijani people. These guerrillas are not people."

It is hard to add anything to that. As far as the soldiers' behavior during the state of emergency is concerned, there are numerous examples of their selflessness in protecting the population's interests. Let me cite a few.

After the tragic events of mid-January unbelievable efforts were made—not least by the military—to normalize the situation in some way. First and foremost, it was necessary for city transport to start running. Major General V. Nadybaidze, chief of the Transcaucasus Military District motor service, went to the bus depot to try to persuade the drivers to take their vehicles out. They would have none of it. They were afraid of reprisals by the guerrillas. Then the general got into the first bus and said: I'll ride with you and share the danger, if there is any. That day 300 buses left the depot.

A snatch squad captured a guerrilla holed up in an apartment. When they approached the door, he started shouting that there was a woman and two children in the apartment and that he would kill them if anyone broke in. Then political worker Lieutenant Colonel S. Sinelnikov clambered onto the balcony from the neighboring apartment and, showing the guerrilla through the glass door that he was unarmed, started negotiating with him. Sinelnikov managed to persuade him to open the balcony door and then disarmed him in a lightning move. A woman and children were indeed in the apartment.

Somebody damaged cable communications on the Stepanakert-Goris sector. Lieutenant Colonel V. Komissarov, Soviet Army employee G. Rusadze, and 10 submachinegunners traveled by armored personnel carrier on a dangerous mission into the ravine—where any extremist actions could have been expected—located the damage, and eradicated it. It should be stressed that this was not a military communications line, the military were acting on the population's behalf. I have recorded dozens of similar examples in my book, and there has not been a single case of servicemen displaying any kind of negative attitude toward the population.

I spent the entire day with an internal troops unit, which is serving on Baku's streets. With my own eyes I saw dozens of cases of servicemen at their posts being approached by old people, teenagers, and men and women who chatted with them and offered the soldiers cigarettes, apples, and oranges. I also saw dozens of notes stating roughly the following: A guerrilla is hiding in such-and-such an apartment, there is a secret munitions dump in such-and-such a location.... People surreptitiously slip them into officers' hands or even take them to unit headquarters. Nobody signs them, people are still scared. But the fact that they are starting to realize just who is the real defender of their interests is a hopeful sign.

Of course, the state of emergency is a bitter necessity which has caused a lot of difficulties for everyone—both military and civilians. But it will not last forever. It will be lifted immediately as soon as guarantees appear that sociopolitical processes in Azerbaijan will develop safely and positively.

Rome Daily Interviews Ligachev

PM0502125490 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 2 Feb 90 p 11

[Interview with CPSU Politburo member Yegor Ligachev, by Ezio Mauro in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[Passage omitted] [Mauro] Yegor Kuzmich, there is growing alarm in the press and among the public about the ungovernability of the USSR, in the face of the crisis in the Caucasus and the Baltic, the serious condition of the economy, and the loss of authority of the party and the state. Do you share this alarm?

[Ligachev] I must say that I do. The fear of our country becoming ungovernable is increasingly widespread and is unfortunately very well founded. I do not want to claim the right to speak on the entire people's behalf, but every day I meet with and hear many people, and I realize that this unease is increasingly widespread. It is not difficult to understand why. In this country the most important thing has always been confidence in tomorrow, just as the fundamental asset has been certainty in the future—for yourself, your children, your friends, and your homeland. This is what Soviet socialism has been—precisely this. Today, however, all this is being challenged in practice. This is unacceptable; it cannot last.

[Mauro] What do you propose in order to bring the USSR's crisis back under control?

[Ligachev] For one thing, I believe that the coming plenum will have to tackle the problem, and I really do believe that it will do so and provide an answer. But one thing is already certain: It is necessary to restore ideological order, a unity around which the country and the party can find themselves again. For us unity is an inalienable asset—the unity of the USSR and of Communists. And I must also reveal that many representatives of the party, and even some of its leaders, not only follow the nationalist movements that have now become openly separatist, but are actually leading them. I believe that these people must leave the CPSU and concern themselves with other matters. Only thus can perestroyka move forward—a democratic perestroyka, but socialist, too. This is Yegor Ligachev's position.

[Mauro] But is it true that at the latest plenum you went beyond that, demanding the use of military force against the nationalist movements, especially in the Baltic?

[Ligachev] That is an utter lie, a perfect example of the lies circulating about me. I chaired that plenum together

with Mikhail Sergeyevich, and if I stood up it was only to instruct comrades due to speak to do so. I also spoke later, but only to discuss matters calmly, as I like to do and am accustomed to doing—at least with those who have arguments to defend. But I did not at all advocate force and constraint.

[Mauro] Did you or did you not support the Red Army's intervention in Baku?

[Ligachev] Yes, and I still remain convinced that it was the only way to stop the violence, the bloodshed, and the pogroms. The state—and the same applies to any state—is bound to defend itself and to defend its citizens. In fact I believe that the miliary intervention decision should have been made even sooner.

[Mauro] Following the tragic events in Baku and the separatist declaration in Lithuania, there was talk of a dramatic plenum, a reckoning, something similar to a congress stocktaking. Now it is being said that the plenum will bring forward the congress to May or June. Is this so?

[Ligachev] I really do believe so. And I would like to say that I consider this earlier date necessary. We will discuss it at the plenum. But clearly the party must regain the initiative: It cannot allow itself to be towed along. To do this we cannot permit ourselves to wait until the final months of the year. This is how I see it. However, those who were until recently calling for an earlier date at all costs are now silent; they have gone into hiding; they do not want it.

[Mauro] But is the party ready for such an early congress, brought forward twice?

[Ligachev] Yes, it must be ready, and in my opinion it is. This situation must brought under control.

[Mauro] You speak as though the party were still the center of everything. But over the past few days there has been repeated talk of the possibility of a separation of powers in the USSR's leadership, with Gorbachev as president but no longer general secretary. On Wednesday Gorbachev denied that he would be resigning at the plenum. Is the issue closed or has it simply been shelved?

[Ligachev] As Mikhail Sergeyevich said, there will be no such resignation at the plenum. For the moment the issue does not arise, because it is not helpful. I can add that it has not even been discussed within the Politburo.

[Mauro] Could the separation be decided on at the CPSU congress?

[Ligachev] In principle, it cannot be ruled out. But it is difficult to say now what will happen at the congress, which is still a long way off. For the present the issue does not arise.

[Mauro] You have always defended the single party's leading role. Do you not believe that the issue of a multi-party system will be to some extent unavoidable at the congress?

[Ligachev] Listen, my position, at present and in the specific situation that the country is experiencing, is very simple and clear. The USSR today needs a strong, united, and single party—a Communist Party.

Moscow Party Chief Interviewed

PM0702114690 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with Yuriy Prokovyev, first secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee, by Serge Leyrac in Moscow—date not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[Passage omitted]

[Leyrac] First the party. Its leadership and Mikhail Gorbachev state that it is lagging behind in perestroyka. What effect is this having on the Moscow party's organization?

[Prokovyev] The situation is clearly the same everywhere, and it seems to me that, at first, the party did not choose the right tactics, we changed the economic and political structures and it was clearly thought that something should nonetheless remain inviolable. Mikhail Gorbachev discussed it at one stage: Society had become politicized, had changed, but the party had not. Society and the party itself reacted to this phenomenon. Frankly speaking, we did not pay the necessary attention to this question and that was a political mistake.

[Leyrac] In your speech at the last session of the Moscow Party Committee, you spoke of distrust toward the Party. What did you mean by that?

[Prokovyev] You know, people spoke about some things at meetings, in their kitchens, or in the corridors, and discussed all the other questions at the party meetings. That is an inconsistency which immediately aroused discontent. The party remained isolated, and that is the reason for the distrust between the grass-roots Communists and their organizations, between the population and those same organizations. Finally, and this is not the least important thing, the party shouldered responsibility for all past mistakes, and it is leading the current changes, which have not yet produced noticeable results. That has affected the attitude toward the party.

[Leyrac] How can the situation be remedied?

[Prokovyev] I can say that Moscow's organization is advancing at the same pace as the party as a whole. Last June, we decided to start a public debate in Moscow on the party's place and role in the renewal of our society and also on how to democratize it. We had three objectives in doing that. First, strange as it may seem, we wanted to politicize the party's organization. Let us be

frank, in our country the party was the axis of the administrative system and did not really play its political role.

Second, we wanted to know the views of Communists and nonparty people in Moscow on the current process in our society. We therefore decided to start from the grass-roots. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA published a detailed questionnaire to which almost 20,000 people replied, and in addition to that there were grass roots discussions in the party and in other organizations. In that way, the Moscow Committee was able to gain a more specific idea of the Communists' opinion and prepare its electoral platform, although we did not use the words platform or appeal, but political theses, it is a very laconic document.

[Leyrac] What do those political theses contain?

[Prokovyev] I will stick to what concerns us the most. For instance, Article 6 of the Constitution (establishing the CPSU's leadership role—L'HUMANITE editor's note). The party must be a political vanguard and not maintain its position in society by the Constitution. In the new constitution, this article will clearly be pointless.

We in the party think that the elections for the 28th Congress must be direct and with multiple candidates. Before perestroyka, the members of grass-roots organizations could criticize and elect their immediate leaders and so on until the level of city organization was reached. We expressed wishes—never criticism, but proposals—to the Central Committee. Democratization means ensuring that each Communist can influence the drafting of party policy and the formation of its elected bodies. Finally, we must choose officials capable of defending their viewpoint and enjoying authority among their professional entourage.

We are opposed to the party's division, to its division according to regional and national criteria. We think that the party should be unified. We are opposed to the diversity of forms of ownership leading to the restoration of the capitalist method of production.

[Leyrac] The 28th CPSU Congress is being prepared. What proposals has the Moscow Party Committee formulated?

[Prokovyev] Some are of a general character. Several rayons in the capital have concentrated particularly on the party statutes. All the changes envisaged are aimed at democratization. The overwhelming majority of Communists regard the party's unity as vital. The same is true of democratic centralism which must be changed to introduce greater democracy and less centralism.

[Leyrac] What progress has been made in separating the functions of party and state?

[Prokovyev] I have worked both in party organizations and in the soviets. Although I have great respect for the memory of Andrey Sakharov, I cannot agree with his proposal to hand full power to the soviets by decree. This cannot be settled by decree. We have not yet created a new structure for the government organs. We have the higher organ of government with the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. We will now have to form these structures at the level of the republics and the local soviets. It is then that the party will be able to hand over some of its tasks to the soviets. But this is not all. To move from the system of administrative-edict to truly democratic methods, we need a law on self-management and the local economy. This does not yet exist. The administration has more power than the people's organs of power. The law must give priority to the latter. Second, budgets must be established by the soviets and not by the higher echelons of government. Finally, the soviets must have a sound material and technical base. When these three conditions are fulfilled, we will really be able to talk about the separation of functions. For the time being, the party is still obliged to be involved in things which are not its responsibility. For instance, the unloading of railroad trucks is a problem in Moscow, and we had to deal with it. I think that in the spring or early summer laws will be adopted and the soviets will be given a new structure. By the 28th Congress, the separation of functions will be complete.

[Leyrac] What are Moscow's main problems?

[Prokovyev] Economic and social problems. The shortages of goods, empty shelves in the stores, the increase in crime.... I could list many other problems. I do not have any ready-made remedies for the party. The essential thing is to consolidate and unite all society's healthy forces. There are many organizations in Moscow divided into formal and "informal." It would be more accurate to talk of organizations which are registered and recognized by the state and those which have an autonomous nature, without any state function, acting within the framework of the Constitution. This is perhaps to their advantage, because some of those organizations were turned into bureaucratic apparatuses after their registration. However, these "informal" organizations which are voluntary— there are 1,500 in Moscow—are showing initiative among the population. If we analyze their programs, they coincide 80 percent with that of the party. Their election platforms are identical to ours in many respects. They are expressed in different words, but they are very similar, and it is therefore possible to unite all these forces in solving our problems.

[Leyrac] What picture can you give of the political forces?

[Prokovyev] I would say that there is a fragile balance in our society, and that any shift to the right or left is fraught with danger. Our desire is therefore to unite, and we are therefore trying to establish at least relations of mutual understanding with the Moscow People's Front, and with the Union of Moscow Voters, and other "informal" organizations. We have close contacts with the ecologists.

I will divide the political sphere into three groups, although our researchers see eight. One group would like to turn the CPSU into a social democratic party. According to its supporters, social democracy has obtained better results than the Communist Parties in Sweden or France. Others think it vital to return to former positions—a vanguard leadership party based on rigid centralism. Finally, there is a considerable group uniting the vast majority of Communists who think that the Party must continue its reform while continuing to be a Communist Party. At present, this last group has the support of the majority of people. This situation might change if the country, under the party's leadership, does not achieve success in solving social and economic problems, if interethnic tensions are not reduced...in that case, the "radicals" could greatly benefit.

We also have populists, on the right and the left. A large section of the population think as follows: It does not really matter who governs, the essential thing is how we will live. Populism feeds on all the shortages, it promises to provide people with good clothes, shoes, and housing. I have not heard any populist saying that it was necessary to work hard; the idea of the noble lord who will come and put things in their place prevails. The most typical example of populism is Boris Yeltsin. Although others, like Gavriil Popov and Yuriy Afansyev are not reluctant to resort to this.

[Leyrac] The elections to the local soviets will take place in a few weeks' time. How does the situation look?

[Prokovyev] The essential thing for us is to maintain society's fragile balance. That is the reason for our desire for dialogue. In addition, the Moscow Party organization made a serious mistake in last spring's parliamentary elections. Indeed, we are now acting in the framework of a multiparty system. The political spectrum ranges from monarchists to anarchists. We did not take account of that diversity the previous time. We thought that the party's intervention would be seen as a desire to impose its viewpoint. That was the reason for the party's passiveness. The candidates put forward by the party were badly received. The situation has changed. We have analyzed these facts. Where possible we have established joint lists with other organizations. At present there is an average of 13 candidates for the deputy's seat for the Russian Republic and eight for a seat on the Moscow Soviet. We will fight our campaign on the basis of our political ideas.

Commission Orders Medical Supplies Resumption

LD0602211990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] The situation that is taking shape in the country's health service in connection with the sharp reduction in the production of medicines has been examined at the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations.

According to data from the USSR Medical Industry Ministry, local soviet bodies and health services adopted decisions in 1989 and early this year to close, or to stop partially, the activity of a number of factories or enterprises, many of which are the only ones in the country turning out highly important types of raw and other materials which are necessary for the manufacture of medical production.

For instance, the closure of the chlorousulphonic acid section of the Kirovograd copper-smelting combine will lead to a reduction in production of such medicinal preparations as analginum, amidopyrine, sulfathiazole, sulfaguanidine and sulfalene. Closing down the facilities of the Nairit production association in Yerevan will cause the cessation of manufacture of cardiovascular preparations, antipyretic and analgetic medicines and vitamins. Ceasing output of dimethyl formamide at the Azot production association in Kemerovo will make it impossible to obtain medicines of 14 types, including antibiotics, radiopaque substances, cardiovascular and other highly important medical preparations.

It was noted at the commission that the decisions to close, to suspend the activity, or to limit the capacity of industrial enterprises and factories were taken, as a rule, in connection with violations by the enterprises of the requirements of nature-protection legislation. The USSR Chemical and Petroleum Industry Ministry, Forestry Industry Ministry, and the Agrokhim state association were instructed to analyze the reasons why the fulfillment of nature-protection measures has been frustrated at enterprises under their control, and to proceed strictly against the guilty persons.

At the same time, the health of millions of Soviet people must not be put at risk because of the absence of a whole series of vitally necessary medical preparations. Therefore, the commission instructed the above-mentioned departments and the Councils of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, and Armenia to adopt measures to ensure the immediate resumption of work at enterprises and factories producing raw and other materials for the medical industry. They are obliged to report to the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Emergency Situations by 15 February on the measures adopted.

Estonia Reportedly To Issue Own Currency

AU0702081190 Paris AFP in English 0335 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Tallinn, Feb 7 (AFP)—Estonia is to issue its own currency, the Estonian crown, as a replacement for the Soviet ruble and kopek, the Finish news agency FNB reported Tuesday, quoting the Soviet republic's top banker.

Rein Otsason, head of the Bank of Estonia here, told FNB that the Esti kroon would be issued in December

and could become a convertible currency on international dealing markets, as Estonia has gold deposits to back it.

The Esti kroon will start out with the value of a Soviet ruble and is intended to help the republic's economic independence, Mr. Otsason said.

The currency will also protect the domestic market, as it will prevent tourists from other Soviet republics from emptying Estonian shops.

After introducing the crown, the reform should also allow Estonians to buy state housing and foreign goods, he added.

Estonian Communists Respond to Gorbachev

90UN0852A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 Jan 90 p 1

[Letter to M.S. Gorbachev from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia]

[Text] Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich!

We consider it our duty to respond to your remarks, disseminated through TASS channels, made at the memorial to V.I. Lenin in Vilnius on 11 January 1990. They aroused bewilderment and an outburst of negative emotions in our republic. Many communists asked that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia state its position and clarify some of the issues you touched upon.

1. The statement that "40 percent of the people inhabiting Estonia have ancient Slavic origins and have lived here for centuries" does not correspond with reality at all. According to data from a 1989 general census of the population, Slavs (i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) make up 35.2 percent, or 551,000 people in Estonia. And this ratio has only arisen within the last decade. In 1939, 50 years ago, the proportion of Slavs living inside the current borders of Estonia (without considering those areas that joined the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in 1944-45) did not exceed 5 percent. And according to censuses conducted in tsarist times when Estonia was part of the Russian empire, the proportion of representatives of Slavic peoples did not exceed 4 percent.

One gets the impression that someone is deliberately providing you with false data, Mikhail Sergeyevich.

2. In your speech you also mentioned in passing the idea of creating a foreign-language autonomous region on the territory of Estonia. If by this you mean regions where a national minority has lived for centuries enjoying a stable domestic and cultural environment, as in Prichudya for instance, then the matter is understandable and acceptable. But in this instance the subject was apparently other regions where first-generation immigrants predominate, industrial cities in the republic's northeast, as well as its capital Tallinn in part. Here individual leaders of the movements have already spoken in favor of forming a special so-called Russian-speaking autonomy, and possibly detaching it from Estonia.

We believe that any sort of incentive to reshape the territory of a sovereign republic is inadmissible in principle. This contradicts the Constitutions of the USSR and of the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and does not correspond to international law, which regards the consolidation of the rights of immigrants over a new territory as nothing other than colonization.

The Estonian people cannot interpret similar statements about the creation of special regions other than as an encroachment upon their sovereignty and as an allusion that now, 50 years after annexation to the USSR, the age-old land which they have cultivated with their labor somehow no longer belongs to them. We cannot consent to this.

Lately many people speak about the rights of "the more than 60 million people in our country living outside the boundaries of their own national territories." You touched upon this theme too. We understand the legitimate concern of the central authorities in this regard. But as a result, an impression is unintentionally created that the remaining 220 million people have no problems or that their problems are of only secondary importance.

The figure of 60 million itself arouses doubt, as well as other items which are in need of more careful analysis. A large portion of those living beyond the borders of their own national formations consists of Russians (25 million), Ukrainians (7 million), and Belorussians (2 million); that is, representatives of the three largest republics. Many of them have lived for a long time in other areas and in industrial regions, such as Russians in the Ukraine in particular. Incidentally, for some reason TASS arbitrarily estimated their number at 15 million when the last census shows that 11.3 million of them live in the Ukraine. (One asks why censuses are conducted if the data are not used afterward.) In our opinion, the solution to problems concerning those people living outside the borders of their own republics is related first of all to the solution of problems concerning the development specifically of those three republics, especially with the development of Russia and the renovation of the Russian countryside, which from time immemorial was the cradle of the nation. But for that we must overcome the after-effects of the Stalinist policy of crudely shifting peoples about and the unrestrained extensive development of the economy.

On the other hand, the often-repeated 60 million concerns not only migratory processes, but also the fact that boundaries of national and territorial formations do not correspond to the way many nationalities have settled, especially in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. The boundaries of many autonomous formations are quite relative, and 5 million Tatars, 1.4 million Jews, etc. live outside the borders of their appropriate formations.

Furthermore, 2 million Germans and more than 1 million Poles have no national and state territory at all, which is the consequence of arbitrariness in nationalist policy.

In other words, we must differentiate when approaching the "problem of the 60 million" and not artificially lump together the various fates of nations and national groups. And we must do it without reducing the whole problem to the necessity of inevitably shifting millions of people in the event of possible changes in the structure of the USSR. The majority of them grew accustomed many years ago to living in a foreign environment and they do not feel any sort of distress at all. It is the same for those in Estonia.

Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich! Now, when everything in the country is strained to the limit, every inaccuracy or free interpretation in the realm of relations between nationalities is taken in its worst sense. We would hope that our arguments will receive attention and that some of the data and commentaries ascribed to you and reported by TASS will receive appropriate elucidation via that same channel.
[Signed] The Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party

Vagris Address at Latvian Party Plenum

LD0602094590 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 23 Jan 90

[Speech by Yan Yanovich Vagris, first secretary of the Communist Party Plenum—live]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades, at the plenum today, the Central Committee must adopt a decision on convening the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia and on other questions connected with it.

In addition, the political situation in the Republic must be assessed, the necessary conclusions on the situation in the Party must be drawn, and at least the leading reference points for idological and organizational work on the eve of the Congress must be determined.

Before we turn to the exposition of the problem, I must make a brief excuse. When discussing the draft of this report at a session of the Bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee at the end of last week, a full exchange of opinions developed among us on the rather extensive text of questions. Many matter-of-fact, and at the time, also debatable proposals were expressed. I endeavored, of course, to take them into account to a maximum. The volume and overall scheme of the report, however, imposes certain restrictions. Therefore, I am applying to the members of the Central Committee Buro with a request to express their opinions in the course of the plenum as much as possible, if in some instance, i have not succeeded in fully taking into account your recommendations.

The action program of the party adopted at the previous, the 17th Central Committee plenum, on the road to Latvian sovereignty, and the manner in which the principles and tasks included in it are or are not being implemented, serves as a point of account in our exchange of opinions.

Although only not quite 5 months have gone by since the last plenum of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, the processes of restructuring the society have appreciably moved forward. In the presnt day, these have become considerably complicated in the entire country and have arrived at a certain turning point.

Whereas the first 3 years of restructuring were, essentially, a time of searching, it is now dynamically developing in depth. Rapid changes are taking place both in many union republics and in all socialist countries of Eastern Europe. With profound worry, the republic's society and essentially, the entire world is following the tragic swelling of problems in the caucausus area. When the blood of people is pouring, thousands of people become refugees in peace time in their homeland. When the only guarantor of peace and life are the Armed Forces and the state of emergency, then democracy, opennes, and restructuring come to an end.

An end must be put without delay to the civil war, the spilling of blood; all people must be guaranteed normal conditions of life and work. We are joining that common voice of peace and reason that is heard from the entire country, from the entire world with a single appeal: do stop, look into the eyes of your children and grandchildren, and also of those who have already become orphans. Think it over, they will, after all, have to live upon this earth after you. What will you (?leave) to them? Shoots of reason and peace will never sprout from hatred and (?seeds) of blood, but the echoes of shots and shouts of hatred shake not only the Caucaucus Mountains [words indistinct].

In the exceedingly polarized atmosphere and the rather exacerbated relations between different sociopolitical forces and [words indistinct] The (?exposition) and assessments of [words indistinct] of, in thier turn, differ greatly, among them, let us say, from the viewpoint of the center and the republics.

The (?difference) [word indistinct] both in the work of the two USSR Congresses of People's deputies and in the discussions and collisions of opinions caused by the process of restructuring, for example, in the Baltic republics. Also the (?problems) of the Union republics' sovereignty and their party organizations' independence are being understood in quite diverse manners.

We understand very well that the political leadership of the CPSU Central Committee must weigh up and respect the spectrum of all these different standpoints. It must, however, also be seen that a notion has developed historically and that it has been cultivated for many

years (?by a special type), that a compulsory precondition of our country's development is unity, a unified comprehension of the similarity of the development of society, as the saying goes, from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, and from the White to the Black Sea.

Such an approach almost unavoidably interprets any consideration of local interests in the activity of communist parties and every specific attempt of political (?ethics) as a tendency of nationalism and separatism. A new approach in this respect, also in the present day, is opening up a road for itself as yet very slowly in a rather difficult struggle with the old [words indistinct].

I do not want to say at all that there is neither nationalism nor separatism in individual groupings. Therefore, the more extensively democratic solutions, openness, and diversity of interests enter our life, the more vividly one of the natural laws of the processes of restructuring manifests itself. And, namely, the (?development) of restructuring and democratization in the USSR is possible only by the union's leadership increasingly more (?strictly) respecting the characteristics of different areas of the country and the (?rights) of local organs of the Party and soviets to adopt [word indistinct] decisions and also to take full responsibility for them.

An inalienable foundation of democratization is a [word indistinct] of the rights of adopting decisions. If (?it begins with the center's) continued and also inconsistently (?serious) solving of questions, then a situation inevitably develops when the life itself demands adoption in the republics and regions of their own [words indistinct], moreover increasingly more radical decisions. If such a practice is maintained for a longer time then in the psychological perception of small peoples they experience certain national/democratic, as it were, an anticenter combat stance. But the local communists inevitably arrive at an increasingly more difficult dilemma, either to submit to emotional pressure and to take up kind of an essentially unfounded position of combat, or, to (?contradistinguish) themselves, in the comprehension of the people, with its national aspirations.

The new populist movements and organizations, in their turn, with a certain additive of social demagogy on the other hand, energetically ask us the following single question: What do you, communists, really support? A, (?as it were), friendship with the center, or with the people?

Such a contrapositioning is of course wrong. But it must also be clearly stated that this is a significant question of party political authority. We are able to tackle this positively if the central party and government organs are also showing a greater understanding and readiness to solve the pressing [word indistinct] problems, or (?at least) [words indistinct] to an independence and initiative of the party organizations of republics.

An opinion has been already heard a number of times that the tasks of restructuring must be tackled more rapidly, more consistently, and more deeply. This (?problem) is of a topical urgency in the present day not only to the center, its implementation considerably (?concerns) the authority of the local party organizations and the society, and it must be said that here, also, the party organization of every republic must show its initiative.

I think that to a great extent an epicenter of precisely these problems has arisen recently in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and in the Communist Party of Lithuania. Both the extraordinary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in December of last year, and the stay of comrade Gorbachev and other CPSU Central Committee Politburo members in the neighboring republic give a great deal of substance for reflections and conclusions. However, there are not and cannot be any elementary yes or no type answers to these complicated questions on relations between the party and society, between the republics and their union. The overall situation in our neighboring republic and in its Communist Party also directly and deeply influences the restructuring processes taking place in Latvia. The solutions arrived at by our Lithuanian colleagues, their steps, are, however, not mechanically repeatable in Latvia, in the Communist Party of Latvia.

Nobody, I think, doubts that we have to go along a common road of restructuring, of sovereignty of republics, and of independence of parties. But our opportunities for carrying this out, for concrete steps in this direction will be diverse and different. Just as diverse and different are the situations, and also the correlation of opinions and forces in our republic and party.

The strategic goals of restructuring are common to the entire party. These have to be set out clearly and firmly once again. so, first, a cardinal restructuring of the Soviet Union through guaranteeing independence to the republics, which is the foundation to our struggle for a sovereign, democratic Latvia. Likewise, also a deep restructuring of the CPSU itself, democratization, a priority of (?opinions and) values common to all humanity [words indistinct] in the name of implementation of [words indistinct]. This is the foundation for our struggle for an independent Communist Party of Latvia.

There are no restructuring problems and tasks which we could not solve on the basis of an extensive (?democratic dialogue) and constructive cooperation, step-by-step persistently searching for a way forward, by not splitting the camp of the forces of restructuring, by not threatening the restructuring policy itself as a point of departure, its basis [words indistinct] for transformations both in Latvia and in the entire Soviet Union.

The striving of peoples and individuals for freedom, independence, and for self-determination is unquenchable and objective. This is also the deepest essence of the process of restructuring on the road away from a unitary state to a free union of free people.

Under the present-day conditions the Communist Party of Latvia regards as its basic mission the changeover to a demcoratic (?society). Within the framework of the [word indistinct] Latvian SSR Constitution, it advances as its goal the serving of the working man, and satisfying the daily material needs and demands and spiritual interests of people. It will be possible to realize these goals by overcoming the internal differences of opinions, by solving a number of difficult everyday problems which cause considerable tension in the party, thereby diminishing its capacity for action, organizational mobility, and eventualy, its authority among the people.

Precisely during recent months we have seen a new polarization of the masses in the Communist Party of Latvia. We see our party at the fateful threshold of its history and future. Everything must be thoroughly assessed hundreds of times before it is crossed, because this time it does not concern our well-being, peace of mind, or [word indistinct]. The revolutionaries of 1905: the thousands of victims of the Black Hundred; (?all our) Red riflemen; the revolutionaries of Stucka and Razins, Zandreiters and Rudzutaks, and of many other generations; the thousands crushed in the death mills of Stalinism and Hitlerism; those inspired by the (?shouts) and hopes of the 1950's; the communists of Latvia of 1959 [words indistinct]; and also today, when the entire republic is looking at us.

With this burden of responsibility upon our shoulders, and being in the eyes of history and the present [words indistinct], we must discuss the most acute problem, the possible split in the party. With deep concern I follow [words indistinct] speeches, because I am not able to rid myself of (?a feeling) that the major communist leaders are discussing this too lightly and (?thoughtlessy). However critically we assess the party, [words indistinct] who would asume the responsibility of asserting that an attempt to amputate it would not be fatal to society [words indistinct]? Do we not toy with the people's destinies? None of us have the right [words indistinct] because of discord, distrust, or quarrels to place stakes in a game?

There are party members and their groups who, in general, [words indistinct] the party's existence. Such opinions are heard, for example, from the so-called tukums [words indistinct]. The threat of a split is also deepened by those actively expressing conservative opinions who, only in words [word indistinct] restructuring, but in their [words indistinct] any process of democratization [words indistinct] economic reform, also agriculture's priority [words indistinct], are turning sharply against [words indistinct]. Recently we have heard a great deal of this kind, [words indistinct] quite ungracious speeches; also letters and [word indistinct] of such contents are received. It appears that these people are not able to do nor want to look through the window, to open their eyes, to see what takes place throughout Soviet society, throughout Europe.

Polarization of opinions [words indistinct] must not be underestimated, that an acute struggle is taking place in Latvia to stop them taking the upper hand in the party, and in the party in whose hands [words indistinct] not only power and an opportunity of destroying [indistinct words] society's stance and stability, but it also has an immense responsibility [words indistinct]. These matters must not be trifled with. Nevertheless, I am convinced that it is still possible to solve the (?resistance) of opinions in the party itself by way of free, open, and correct political discussions, in the same way as in any democratic society.

Instead of expressing mutual ideological claims and exchanging emotional epithets, it is what is in common and what is at variance, and to what extent there is variance (?between) different platform, that must be evaluated, peacefully and in a principled manner. Dissociating ourselves from [words indistinct] we must find an ideological and organizational basis that will unite the party, that will free it from alienation between the party's lower sections and its leadership, between the communists of various nationalities.

The point of departure is obvious. We are all inhabitants of Latvia, we live and work in one republic, we all want it to be economically strong, spiritually healthy, and democratic, that it be [words indistinct]. [words indistinct] our subjective ones or of groups.

Evidently it is necessary to quote some basic conclusions from the platform [words indistinct] uniting the communists of Latvia. [Words indistinct] the principal fact that we could ensure our sovereignty only in step with the progressive forces in other Soviet republics, and also in Moscow.

The endeavors of the people of Latvia for independence can today manifest themselves freely, and grow, in the first place thanks to the preconditions that have developed in the Soviet Union and in the CPSU for a recognition and realization of the rights of self-determination of nations, for a cardinal restructuring of a unitary state.

The sociopolitical processes of last year vividly confirm that [word indistinct] implementation of independence slogans for Latvia (?in contrast) with the rest of the soviet union a part of society finds emotionally rather attractive, and can for a certain time [words indistinct] acquire a personal popularity, and, it could be thought, also a place in the legislature.

Last year we, however, just as clearly ascertained that the consequences of such slogans and maxims almost inescapably are the loss of the necessary partners and allies of economic and political cooperation with Latvia and a dangerous exacerbation of social relations in Latvia itself.

After all, by that we create great danger ot the policy of restructuring in general, which, in turn, would not be forgiven to us by either the external world or our

descendants, because by doing that, essentially, every hope for independence and national rebirth—and not only in Latvia—would be killed.

The course of develoment of many events in the Soviet Union and also, as it is being said, in the entire socialist system, testifies that a different road has to be taken. Namely, it is the road in active support of the external and internal policy of Gorbachev.

A consistent road of consolidation and expansion of the actual independence of Latvia is outlined by the Latvian SSR state sovereignty declaration, the action program of the Communist Party of Latvia and the laws on economic independence.

On this road we find ever new allies and travelling companions, because essentially in our practice we approve many of the economic, political, and internal party reforms to which, as the practice of a couple of previous years shows, the entire Soviet Union will inescapably come to.

In the end, it is precisely this road which will lead to principle changes in the entire world—and in Latvia and will ensure its independence, stability, and security, and, without doubt, will create a new union.

I am convinced that the Communist Party of Latvia has to take precisely this road, together with all progressive and constructive forces of society.

Realistic policy differs from adventurism precisely by the sense of responsibility for the situation in the entire republic as a whole, not only by subordination to the dominating moods in the conscience of masses in an individual rayon, region, or town, but by a sense of responsibility for the prospects of the entire society's development. Therefore, realistic policy always chooses that road which is guaranteed to lead society to the set goal, although it may be more complicated, more gradual, and, during moments of an emotional surge by an individual strata of society, even unpopular.

Another essential question is what should the future party be like. Restructuring in the party does not mean changing titles, mottos, or slogans on its transformations, but in a sense it means the formation of a new type of party.

Moving toward the 25th congress the Communist Party of Latvia must acquire an ability to effectively operate under conditions of political and economic pluralism, when the monopoly on power is being overcome, when the party is not longer, as previously, a structure run together with state power, under such conditions when the Communist Party competes with other political forces, also within the party, participating in the political process and having opportunities to constructively influence it.

If under the conditions of ideological competition the Communist Party of Latvia wants to maintain itself as a serious political force, then we must be capable of realizing the republic's interests, of comprehending actual problems and energetically and radically solving them, of continuously seeing and respecting their union both with all-union interests and with problems of international policy.

A new problem of principle which should be solved by the Communist Party of Latvia on the roads of political pluralism [words indistinct] how to acquire and implement the ability to be a leader; whether to make the will of the people absolute, in quotes, and consciously transform the party into a mere executor of this, as we frequently hear from various rostrums. I think that with this it is and will be too little. Executors will never be leaders, [word indistinct] system will assume the vanguard position. If the party has no independent policy and clear prospects of the republic's future, if it does not know how to convince the people on the correctness of the road chosen by the party, then it will become superfluous, because the will of the people can be ascertained better in ways other than by the party—by professional sociologists, by regular referenda which are capable of (?fully and) much more efficiently [words indistinct].

You see, such a program must be drawn up by the Communist Party of Latvia in preparation for our regular 25th Congress.

After the alterations made to the corresponding articles of the Latvian SSR Constitution on 11 January the restructuring problems of the party have acquired a new (?significance). This has to be said especially about the drawing up of the program and rules of the Communist Party of Latvia.

A sharp resonance to that (?koran) which has the opposite pole's contrary opinions in society was introduced by the authors of the appeal known to everybody, who not only openly and democratically announced their opinions, but also prepared a draft of the corresponding party political documents.

Apart from the already mentioned one, several more draft rules of the Communist Party of Latvia, and also the summarized proposals of the republic's Communists and party organizations on necessary changes in the CPSU Rules have been published in the republic's press. Thus there are grounds for an extensive exchange of opinions, and it is already taking place both at meetings of Communists and in the columns of the press. And it is, evidently, continuing.

In this report it is, without doubt, premature to dot the i's in a discussion on the fundamental questions of restructuring the Communist Party of Latvia. However, one's share of conclusions on the continuation of the processes themselves, what it causes, cannot, evidently, be left unsaid.

First, we still are not able to overcome the conviction, and now alread a polarization of own goal opinions, that

it is not so much the opinions of the opponents which are being criticized than their adherence to one or another camp.

May the esteemed participants in the discussion forgive me, but one is really left with such an impression after reading some publications, such as SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA and the press publications of many rayons or the LATVIJAS JAUNATNE. I think that (?those are) or that is not without a sin, but would, nevertheless, try more consistently to maintain the culture of discussion and toleration, to avoid attaching emotional epithets and labels.

The internal party discussion in the Communist Party of Latvia is at present being essentially influenced by two, I would say, turning-point character processes. Namely, Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Lithuania and the proposals expressed during it on restructuring the party, on the baltic republics' and their party organizations' role and place in it, and, apart from that, also on the upcoming Central Committee plenum during the last days of January, at which the party's political platform will be discussed in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress.

I myself did not hear it, but comrades say that it has been announced today that this plenum is being moved by one week and will take place in the beginning of February, on the 5th and 6th. Well, following that information, I wanted to say that.

After a deep and all-round study of the materials of these events the Communists of Latvia with all the sense of responsibility must once more consider the topical urgency of the conclusions included in the action program the necessary more accurate definitions and concretizations [word indistinct] in the sociopolitical situation (?where) the processes have not [words indistinct].

This will be kind of the second part of our discussion. In our opinion, a central event in them should be the republican scientific/political conference on the problems of restructuring the Communist Party of Latvia, as proposed by secretaries of many rayon and town party organizations, which (?will take place) around the end of February.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, the appropriate Central Committee commissions and also the party organizational and cadres' work and ideological departments with all responsibility and energy must join in preparing such a conference, must help those comrades who already work in this direction to allot to themselves the necessary instruction and, most importantly, must ensure a proper scientific standard and practical (?significance). But under the guidance of the committees or working groups installed at the conference for the preparation of the congress its results should be operatively interpreted and the final drafts of the Communist party of Latvia political documents should be drawn up and handed over for discussion by party organizations within the framework of the report-back and election campaigns. The opinions and proposals of communists will be summarized by working groups. These will be brought to the congress by delegates. Thus at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia the final full-stop can be put to the discussion on the new appearance of the Communist Party of Latvia.

That is the organizational aspect of the problem. To continue, this is a little about the proposal heard and the contents of the published documents.

The concern of various authors for the role and place of primary organizations must be assessed positively. Several interesting proposals on a considerable extension of their rights and independence have been expressed. I am, nevertheless, left with the impression that these proposals lack an internal logic, consistency, and an initiative on the part of the primary organizations themselves. On the one hand, in many proposals there is purely apparatus-like effort of not granting primary organizations independecne from above, in the spirit of own invention. On the other hand, there is no lack of quite adventurous ideas, but these are meant only to please by their radicalism and the rank-and-file comrades. In either case little thought has been given to how influentially and successfully the most complicated [word indistinct] party housekeeping would function.

Solving the most important question of the present day, the independence of the republic's party organization as a question of status, the authors of many proposals, in my opinion, make the problem primitive, reducing it to the elementary: the Communist Party of Latvia within the CPSU or the Communist Party of Latvia outside of it. Essentially, nothing has been stated on how to actually arrive at one or another result, how will the party organism function in practice in our actual society as (?a result) of one or another consequence.

In forming an independent and in its essence a democratic Communist Party of Latvia, to my mind, it is much more important not to think up one or another designation or phrase but to know what kind of specific content we are putting into it. Let us mention, as an example, if only a few demands of specific content in the search for a new appearance of the party.

The Communist Party of Latvia must be united with the party organizations of other republics, with the leading CPSU organs (?most importantly), loyally to the policy of restructuring, the principles of democratic socialism, and the values common to all humanity.

Our party must be an active, consolidating restructuring force fighting for this in all spheres and level of life of society, therewith only by democratic political methods, by constitutional means, and subjecting its organizational structure and principle of activity precisely to those top tasks.

This would be, let us say, the point of departure only for a coordinate system of the party's structure and functioning. From this, in its turn, it follows that the Communist Party of Latvia must be fully independent in everything internal, e.g., personnel, cadres, organizational structure and party apparatus, the relations of primary organizations toward the ground floor and horizontally, and also capable of influencing and guiding society's development in its activity's natural habitat, e.g., the economic activity of the party itself, the total economic policy in the republic, its realization, the activity of publishing houses, etc....

I think that there are serious grounds to raise as a significant question of ensuring a new status of all party organizations, not only of Latvia but of all republics, the demand of changing over from the principles of positions to principles of proportionality in forming the higher leading organs of the party. This process must of course be democractic to the maximum, but the party organizations of republics must have, on the basis of parity, guaranteed representation in the collective leadership organs of the CPSU.

This is directly connected to the question of guaranteed minority rights in the party. I think that these must also include the rights, by preserving the organizational unity of the party, to come out with their standpoint on any question of society's and party life; also the right to a democratic defense and the right to openly agitate for it.

I think that in one party several standpoints on one and the same problem can exist, and in time, I think, this will become a normal phenomenon in society's democratic practice.

In such an event a bringing closer, coordination, a searching for consensus of diverse standpoints will, of course, become an essentially important task of the party's political leadership, as a basic movement from continuous confrontation to a societally significant result. But a diversity of standpoints in the party must not diminish party discipline and united action in the course of fulfilling democratically adopted decisions.

These reflections could of course be continued, with a bigger or smaller addition of impromptus. By all means, I am convinced that by a [words indistinct] and all-round solving of the proposals on these and other actual questions the republic's party organization would gain much more, would consolidate its actual independence to a much greater extent than by the most passionate polemics and quarrels around one or another slogan.

(?And most importantly) at the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia we should give the congress' answer to the communists and the people how we shall put into practice our independence, what will concretely change and (?what) will change in our judgements and decisions, but, in the first place, in deeds.

So then, we are seeing the guideline of restructuring the Communist Party of Latvia clearly and as having a single meaning: (?That) the administrative command system (?finishes its work) and the fractions integrated in the system itself are democratic/political organizations of persons of like-minded opinions united in common goals in the name of implementing the interests of the people.

The chief priority in this movement forward, which determines everything else, is the realization of the republic's sovereignty through a changing in principle of the entire union of soviet republics, the filling of it with a new contents.

It must be stated that this opinion is in complete harmony with the (?conclusion) fixed in the action program of the Communist Party of Latvia: The status of the Latvian SSR in the Soviet Union and status of the Communist Party of Latvia in the composition of the CPSU are organically connected realities and these must change in a balanced and harmonic manner. In this process, however, we must not lose political allies, therefore groundless and end-in-itself-like is the contrapositioning of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Latvia which only diminishes the purposefulness and constructivism of party restructuring processes.

In reply to the question on what is the essence of restructuring relations between the Communist Party of Latvia and the CPSU, it is important to be aware that the objective and necessary struggle of the Communist Party of Latvia for its independence, declaration of it and, all the more, implementation is possible, and is possible not through breaking off relations with the CPSU, but through a basic transformation of them from centalism's administrative control and subordination relations to mutual cooperation and (?partnership).

Moreover, if we are searching in the present day for preconditions for constructive cooperation between various organizations and movements, then, first of all, this has to be seen in the common concern in establishing an economically independent Latvia.

We have not, after all, properly started establishing the economic state of future Latvia. We have still to prove that we are capable of creating a dynamically functioning economy. If we turn out to be incapable of accomplishing that, then, after all, nobody in the West nor in the East will talk with us or take us seriously as a partner.

The way forward must be taken without internal squabbles and political speculations, being clearly aware that our realistic economic independence is attainable not by creating and preserving an image of the center as an enemy, but in a close unity with all the forces of restructuring in the party and the country, and, of course, in close joint action by all restructuring forces in Latvia itself.

The barriers of mutual distrust and suspicion must be broken down so that the democrats from among the non-Latvians can take a stand for the sovereignty of Latvia, so that the democrats among Latvians can do

everything so that never and in no way will representatives of any national group in Latvia be discriminated against. This probably sounds trivial but, nevertheless, the quality of life will be realistically raised not by fronts in Latvia, but by a common front for Latvia.

Comrades, a formulation of principle has been fixed on our Action program: The Communist Party of Latvia regards it as necesary to engage in an independent dialogue with all public and public/political organizations and to develop all-round cooperation with those which are guided by the interests of the people of the nationalities living in our republic and which recognize the socialist development path.

The relations between the Communist Party of Latvia and the People's Front of Latvia are developing specifically lately, because it cannot be denied that many of the appeals and conclusions of the given program of the people's front basically conform with the theses of the Communist Party of Latvia Action Program, but there are, nevertheless, considerable differences between the two programs.

Moreover, in the People's Front of Latvia program, unfortunately, possibilities for cooperating with the Communist Party of Latvia and representatives of society have not been outlined. The struggle for an independent and democratic Republic of Latvia has been proclaimed the principal goal and the central leitmotiv of the entire People's Front of Latvia program. For implementing the expressed idea of independence, a special transitional period has been laid down, and any other problems are being viewed only through this (?prism). Thereby state independence becomes an end in itself to which all remaining program demands are subordinated.

The Communist Party of Latvia, as I have underlined on a number of occasions, has a different approach to this problem. We are for a sovereign, democratic Latvia. There cannot be any doubts here—this is confirmed by our entire activity during the last year. However, we are not valuing the sovereignty of Latvia as a separate matter, but as the most effective means which under the actual historical circumstances enables achieving our society's restructuring on the basis of principles of democratic socialism and of ensuring the people of Latvia a quality of life worthy of human beings.

The action program of the Communist Party of Latvia, coresponding to democratic norms, does not exclude different versions of realizing the republic's sovereignty. The deciding factor is of course full respect for a nation's right to self-determination, but not restricting them only and solely to road toward independent national statehood.

We think that the further development of Latvia in the name of the interests of the entire people can stably be guaranteed only by basic reform within the Union of Soviet Republics, as a result of which the sovereignty of all the republics, including that of Latvia, will be realized at a new level in principle. The new model of the union, in our opinion, will be able to develop only from relations based upon stable agreements which guarantee the rights of every republic, also of the Latvian SSR of course, of [word indistinct] independently deciding all their state, economic, and public life questions, and to leave for the competence of the USSR those questions which the republics would voluntarily agree to hand over to be decided by the central legislative and executive power organs.

An extensive exchange of opinions takes place in society on our republic's future. Therefore every party organization, every communist must joint a constructive political dialogue with all the forces of society.

It is very important to be mutually tolerant and discussions must be [word indistinct].

I think that the appeal by some comrades is at fault, because of some programmatic (?reasons) denying communists from working in the People's Front of Latvia. They must of course remember that they are communists. Just as much at fault, only, as they say, from the other side, are the recently encountered efforts of some leaders of the People's Front, to actively interfere in the internal matters of the Communist Party of Latvia, to dictate, quite primitively, to the communists, participants in the People's Front, on how they should behave, whom to obey and whom not. Actually these are overt attempts of artificially inflaming contradictions between both organizations, in order for people to be (?blamed) from various sides, of setting off the communists who have joined in the activity of the People's Front against both the non-party People's Front members and the rest of the Communists. The same old administrative-bureaucratic diktat methods are put to use, in ordder to hide demogogically, in the one case, behind the slogan of party unity, and in the other case, behind the people's unity slogan, to put forward the interests of groups to subjugate their supporters to the authoritarian power of small groups without objections.

All that, without doubt, has very little connection with democracy, new thinking, restructuring and other matters sacred to the people. This is in reality what splits and weakens the democratic forces. The only ones who profit from this are the supporters of conservatism and strict centralization, actually antirestructuring forces.

For the time being there is nothing to show that more or less normal relations could develop between the Communist Party of Latvia and the Social Democratic Workers Party of Latvia, whose activity's restoration in Latvia was announced at its congress last December, [passage indistinct]

Moreover, all that is being disguised by the (?policy) of social justice and satisfying of the interests of the masses. I do not want to continue here with these associations. However, I want to hope that the activists of the mentioned party will be able themselves to introduce clarity

into their formulations and to give the necessary explanations on these questions to the republic's society.

When talking about the organizations and movements which more or less openly ignore the specific character of Latvia as a national republic, (?turn against) its interests, and attempt from the positions of interests of the All-Union departments and administrative/bureaucratic power mechanism to hinder the processes of restructuring, democratization, openness, and including in this also the new legal creative processes in the republic, then, first of all, the leadership of the International Front of the Working People of Latvia [Interfront] and the leaders and activists of the newly-created United Council of Labor Collectives must be mentioned. Their efforts to create and maintain among their supporters and among the less informed circles of other union republics a mood of fear and insecurity are readily apparent.

However, the longer it is the more difficult it is to keep people in a state of a perpetual tension.

It must be taken into account that increasinly fewer people are capable of believing that the efforts of the people of Latvia and of the Communist Party of Latvia for the economic independence of the republic, for a democratic and just practice of languages, and for other progressive transformations are only nationalistic ambitions or wrecking of the union. Now these have obtained not only recognition from and the force of USSR law, but also a stable place within the plans for restructuring, in the party restructuring plans and intentions, about which Comrade Gorbachev spoke extensively while staying in the Lithuanian SSR and which will be analyzed by the next plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which, as I said, will evidently take place in the beginning of February.

Undeniably a considerable number of those active in these organizations are party members. And one must try to understand that uncertainty, doubt, and incomprehension which dwells within them—in one's politics such stands must be taken into account. It must be recognized that until now the leadership of the Communist Party of Latvia has not been capable of adequately taking into account the differences between party members of various nationalities—and not only in their opinions on the further development ways and opportunities of the (?nation). In the future we must, without question, correct this mistake.

A certain paradox in the present situation can also be found in those circumstances in Latvia which are exactly the same as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, such as the conservative populism manipulated by the Interfront and the United Council of Labor Collectives with slogans defending socialism and the Soviet power. We were able to perceive this rather vividly when listening to many of the speeches at the meeting of the city of Riga party organization's active in December of last year, at which I had the honor of participating.

How to act in this situation? First of all, as it is said among the people, not to gulp [porridge] while it is hot. One has to act in a composed and balanced manner. Our position is that the road to sovereignty in Latvia must be followed consistently, in a peaceful atmosphere, not missing any realistic opportunity, but also not rushing ahead of events, so as not to create artificial obstacles to restructuring in the entire country.

While loyal to its action program the Communist Party of Latvia of cooperating with other organizations in solving specific problems and in those instances when differences of opinion exist on individual questions. This means that we are still open to dialogue and constructive cooperation on the basis of equal rights and mutual tolerance.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee once more appeals to all Communists and non-party persons, participants in the People's Front of Latvia and the International Front of Working People, and also representatives of other public organizations and movements to comprehend deeply, to undertake responsibility openly, and, during the present period of restructuring, to show political farsightedness and wisdom for the good of the future of Latvia and its people.

Comrades, today we cannot pass over such a significant process as the elections of the republic's supreme and local organs of state power.

It must be said that everything connected with elections influences in a decisive manner the present-time political climate in Latvia, and it must be said frankly that this climate has not changed.

Lately we have been frequently using a term which was formerly so abstract—the struggle for power. Some talk about it with an unconcealed indignation, others with a self-confident hope, still others, in their turn, regard that it is only a political game from whch the ordinary working man cannot, in any case, expect a realistic improvement to his life.

What should the platform of the Communist Party of Latvia be like?

If we recognize, and evidently we are in sympathy with that, that a struggle for power really takes place, then one must ask, who is against it and with what kind of methods actually is the fighting?

I want to underline that the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee has never, also [words indistinct] public/political organization, advocated a crusade against it.

In relations with our opponents we are strictly differentiating between an ideological or political discussion and the irreponsible appeals of those voicing different opinions in a sort of black list to the traitors of the people's interests and the wreckers of unity. But if in the practice

of some party organizations such approaches are encountered, then these [word indistinct] deserve only regret (?the same as) [word indistinct].

We cannot, however, also pretend not to sense a whiff of the past from the opposite side of the political spectrum. We cannot fail to notice the appeal to Latvia's inhabitants by the so-called Democratic Bloc of Latvia which wants to nominate and support only those candidates who, I quote, are not in organizations hostile to the Republic of Latvia—in the (?ranks) of the CPSU and organizations similar to that. This means that the slogan Soviets without Communists, already thrown out in its time on the rubbish heap of history, is again begun to be heard.

We cannot finish without taking notice of the increasing tendency to place party and soviet workers in an unattractive light only and solely through aggressive criticism which not infrequently transgresses the elementary (?norms) of ethics. Such an understanding of the pre-election struggle has not and cannot have anything in common with a truly democratic (?platform).

None of the principal political forces in the republic objects by words against [words indistinct] being elected to the local and supreme soviets. [passage indistinct]. But how does one realize good intention if one does not give up the primitive preconception of preconceptions that the good ones and the correct ones are only one's own?

There is evidently only one way. By informing the electors in a skilled and all-round manner and by trusting their healthy sense of reason. By trusting the people for whom after long years an opportunity has arisen for freely expressing their will, and by giving the people the opportunity for really freely and independently choosing and not by simply dictating a (?single) list of candidates, and to fight, as it was formerly said, for a high discipline of fulfilment at the ballot boxes.

The position of the Central Committee Bureau on this question is clear: We are taking a stand for truly democratic [word indistinct] elections, so that in choosing their deputies people can vote for candidate deputies and personalities—not only for representatives or proteges of public organizations.

The first steps of the work of the newly elected local soviets cause a great deal of thought from the positions of political realism and responsibility. For example, the democratic nature and novelty of elections themselves cannot be doubted, but, nevertheless, the lack of political professionalism is being acutely felt in places among deputies. In this contradiction it is important, in my opinion, to understand that parliamentary forms of work, parliamentary processes were, are, and will be, in the first place, processes of compromise, balance, and harmonization of interests, and not processes of remonstrating conflicts and showing of emotions. Therefore everybody should acquire suitable forms and methods of work. [words indistinct], without a doubt, also if there is, there is a certain previous experience, and, in general it is at the dispoal of the cadres of the party and the soviets. By this I want to remind some public/political organizations of the republic and their leaders that ambitious attempts of proclaiming party workers as persona non grata in the future Latvian legislature is nothing else than putting into practice in the republic a kind of law prohibiting certain professions. Apart from everything else, it could essentially influence the professionalism and ability to work of the next legislature. But the new supreme legislative organ of the state will have to quickly and—most importantly—skilfully confirm the government, and draft and adopt no less than 10 or 20 various laws.

Given an economic crisis and a social tension, both in Latvia and elsewhere in the union, this will be especially difficult. Thus all the republic's inhabitants must incessantly, without considering the ambitions of groups or parties, think about who would be capable of doing this work. Today, new and beautiful and an end in itself pre-election promises are no longer necessary. Our program goals have been set out, and today we shall once more [words indistinct] name them.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee appeals to every party organization to support actively those candidates, who—irrespective of belonging to the party or a front—want and are ready to persevere in realizing those goals.

Comrades, as you already know, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum last September decided to bring forward the regular 28th party congress and to convene this congress this October.

[Words indistinct] processes in the world and especially in Europe do not permit a delay in adopting mature and necessary decisions. Therefore, I admit the thought that we cannot also exclude such a development of events that the time of convening of the 28th congress could be brought still nearer.

Taking into account the aforementioned, and also in listening to the opinions and proposals of the first secretaries of rayon and town party committees and of rank-and-file communists—these opinions are, without a doubt, diverse, but a majority is in favor—the bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee proposes convening the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress in the beginning of June—there was talk about during the first 10 days of June—with the following agenda:

First, on the course of restructuring and the tasks of the Communist Party of Latvia, a report by the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee.

Second, A report by the auditing committee of the Communist Party of Latvia.

Third, On the program and rules of the Communist Party of Latvia.

Fourth, On the proposals by the Communist Party of Latvia to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Fifth, the leading role of the Communist Party of Latvia and elections.

And sixth, well, for the time being we wrote in, because [word indistinct] we operate under the existing status, then also, election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

As you are able to see, the agenda is quite a traditional one. Nevertheless, I think that it will provide an opportunity for analyzing in an all-round manner what has been accomplished since 24th Latvian Communist Party Congress, of [words indistinct] examining in the party itself, of setting out ways to strengthen the party organization and the influence of its committees upon the course of restructuring in all spheres of life.

Taking into account the numerical strength of the republic's party organization, and also the house of political education at which we think this congress will take place, the bureau proposes having one delegate represent each 240 party members. From such a ratio approximately 812 delegates will be elected to the congress.

We regard it as useful to adopt the proposal by the first secretaries of rayon and town committees of the party, [words indistinct] not regulating the report-back and election campaign process at rural primary organizations and at the level of rayon towns. It is important to fix only the ultimate boundary of this process. Thus the bureau of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee proposes determining that the report-back and election meetings and conferences, i.e., at the primary organizations and rayons, must be completed by 15 May, if we want to conduct the congress during the first 10-day period of June.

Various proposals have been heard at party organizations on how to democratize the procedure for electing delegates to the congress both by extending to a maximum the opportunity of every communist to directly influence this process and also by preserving a specific and extensive as possible representation of various social, professional, and ethnic groups among the congress delegates.

There is something to think about, and also members of the Central Committee will, evidently, express their opinions and proposals.

By all means also in this instance we can go diverse ways, remembering that a binding indicator for every rayon or town party organization [words indistinct] is the mentioned norm of representation and its specific number of delegates. In principle, the procedure laid down in the party rules must be taken as the basis. However, it must not be dogmatic, as they say, other versions are possible. In every instance the Communists should only substantiate why exactly [words indistinct] the procedure of electing delegates, their opinions [words indistinct] the corresponding rayon's or town's party organization.

[Words indistinct] diversity which, evidently, are logical and correspond to those differing conditions which are characteristic of [words indistinct] party town and rayon organizations.

For example, one version could be such that at those party primary organizations where the number of party members is 240 or more, delegates to the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress could be elected by a secret ballot directly at the primary organizations, but the remaining delegates, corresponding to the quota of representation, would be elected [words indistinct].

Furthermore, a question which could cause various [words indistinct], in order that there would not be the practice of a so-called central list as in previous years, the bureau proposes plenum members support the proposal of [passage indistinct] electing a part of delegates to the congress directly into the composition of the Latvian Communist Party Control Commission. [passage indistinct]

In conclusion, allow me to reemphasize the immense significance of the preparatory work for the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress in solving the pressing problems of restructuring, in (?searching) for new ways.

An extensive and principled discussion is now an essential element of preparation for the congress. Especially significant is the opportunity created by the policy of restructuring and openness for all communists, for the entire society to come out with diverse stands and drafts of political documents [words indistinct], the way to an independent and democratic Latvia with an independent Communist Party. And only after that, after ascertaining, after discussion of all stands, and after crystallization of the drafts of the precongress documents shall we gather for the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress with conviction and a belief that this will not be the last in the almost 86-year-long history of the Communist Party of Latvia, but the first one [words indistinct].

Latvian Local Soviets Take First Steps

LD0502202690 Moscow TASS in English 2006 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Riga February 5 TASS—By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina:

The Soviet Baltic Republic of Latvia has held its third round of elections to the local soviets of people's deputies, began in December. The deputy corps will take some more time to complete, but where the overwhelming majority of seats have been contested and won, the first sessions are being held.

The agendas are similar everywhere: Electing chairmen of the soviets, their vice-chairmen and the chiefs of the executive committees.

The conference halls not infrequently become arenas of struggle between different public organisations. In some places something of the election campaign atmosphere with its power pressure and intolerance to alternative positions has rubbed off on the soviets. Not infrequently "dissenting" groups have had to leave the halls, thus depriving the sessions of the indispensable quorum.

This has been the case in the towns of Liepaya and Rezekne and in two districts of Riga.

However, the representative and executive bodies of power have been formed at most sessions. The leaderships of the local bodies of power went to Communists, unaffiliated representatives, the Popular Front and Interfront members, representatives of the Agricultural Alliance and people claiming allegiance to social democracy.

Only the deputies of the resort town of Yurmala did not have to engage in a fight—here the leader of the local branch of the Popular Front Janis Lepinsh became chairman through direct election by the voters.

Supporters of the Popular Front in Jurmala received the overwhelming majority of seats. The Popular Front's election platform was based on criticism of the town's party organisation which was accused of responsibility for all of Jurmala's outstanding problems and the injustices committed in the republic during the Soviet years.

The Popular Front itself has not yet had time to perform anything and so there was nothing to criticise it for. And still the failure of the Communists at the elections in Jurmala and some other Latvian cities was in part attributable to their mistakes in the election campaign. Having no competitors for years or a demanding electorate to please, they put up only a half-hearted fight for votes.

So now Jurmala Communists will have to regain lost ground by developing and implementing a programme demanded by the town residents.

Voters are beginning to adopt a more stern attitude to the actions of the Popular Front representatives also. The first session of the Jurmala soviet, which decided on the closure of the pulp production by a local factory, had wide repercussions throughout the whole of Latvia. For several days there were no newspapers in the republic because there was no paper.

"The first steps taken by the newly elected local soviets require pondering over many things from the viewpoint of political realism and responsibility, said Latvian Communist Party chief Janis Vagris at the recent plenary meeting of its Central Committee.

One cannot doubt the democratic nature of the elections held, but one acutely feels the lack of political professionalism among the deputies.

Latvian People's Front Figure To Leave CPSU

LD0502100390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Yanis Shkapars, chairman of the board of the People's Front of Latvia, has stated that he is leaving the CPSU. Certain leaders of this movement have also stated their intention of leaving the CPSU.

The Political Committee of the People's Front of Latvia have imposed an ultimatum that the communists in the front place the goals of this movement above the party's action program.

A session of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee bureau took place; it categorically rejected the trends toward liquidation and the attempts to split the party and intensify confrontation in society.

Front: 'Liquidationist' Trend

PM0502132990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent I. Litvinova report: "Not To Yield to Provocations"]

[Text] Riga—Yanis Shkapars, chairman of the Latvian People's Front Board, has applied to the Kirovskiy Rayon Committee of the Latvian Communist Party to withdraw from the CPSU. Peteris Lakis, another well-known People's Front figure in the republic, applied simultaneously with him. USSR People's Deputy Daynis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front, declared his intention to withdraw from the CPSU in an interview. Is the surrender of party cards by the leaders of the republic's largest public organization a decision reached after much agonizing, or is it lip service to the political situation? Many people in the republic are asking this question today. Here are some facts. The Latvian People's Front Political Committee demanded an ultimatum that the front's Communists place the aims of the People's Front above the party's activity program. But that was only the beginning. A shocking reportage from the People's Front Duma session which approved the list of candidate people's deputies was published in the republic's most popular weekly—LAUKU AVIZE (translated, this means "rural newspaper"). "The procedure for sharing out deputies' seats," as the Lettish journalist called it, in no way differed from the "Democracy for the chosen" that we know from the stagnation times. Convenient districts, solitary candidates without an alternative—incidentally, we are already familiar with this from the elections that have just been held. Nor is it anything new that, as the LAUKU AVIZE journalist wrote, "The gentlemen hope to ride into parliament from rural rayons without difficulties, with every election campaigning convenience." USSR people's deputies supporting the Latvian People's Front were advised not to run for election at all. We will guarantee you suffrage, it was said, given only power and time. The new thing that struck those present at the Duma session was the "almost pathological hatred shown for everything and

for everyone who had ever been linked with communism and communists." The last piece of news was this: Daynis Ivans issued a statement along with several well-known members of the Latvian People's Front. It states that "The only way out of the crisis situation is for the activity of the Latvian Communist Party to cease." It is proposed to transfer the party's property to the republic government and for primary organizations to disband. In this way, as the statement's authors conceive it, the loyalty of former party members to the ideas of a democratic and free Latvia will be confirmed.

A session of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau was held. It categorically rejected the liquidationist trends and the attempts to split the party and to step up confrontation within society. The party committees with the statement's communist authors on their books were recommended to make an assessment of their liquidationist actions. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau appealed to the republic's party organizations, communists, and inhabitants and to all who value Latvia's future not to yield to provocations and to actively join in propaganda work on preparing for the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress.

Election Struggle in Latvia Reported

LD0302204990 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Text] Riga February 3 TASS—By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina:

Different political movements that have sprung up in Latvia over the past few years are jockeying hard for position as the parliamentary election campaign unfolds in Latvia.

Lithuanian communists often come under heavy fire from these movements, eager to use every possible means to derail communist candidates.

At a meeting of the Latvian Popular Front Council, rank-and-file members from the city of Tsesisa nominated their local communist party chief. The Front's Council admitted that the candidate had a progressive platform and .... blocked the nomination because the nominee was a party functionary, according to the LAUKU AVIZE newspaper.

Even the candidacy of Latvia's President Anatoliy Gorbunov, a Communist Party member, drew loud protests from the audience.

At a recent meeting with parliamentary candidates from some 40 public organisations, broadcast by the local television, many speakers demanded that the Communist Party be banned, showing complete disregard to the principles of democracy.

The speakers (?seemingly) forget that compliance with the general declaration on human rights alone can bring stability and that only a strong economy can prevent political forces from capsising the boat.

Representatives from the Agricultural Union—an influential farmers' organisation—did not show up for the meeting. The union is protesting against the Popular Front attempts to dispatch a force of urban candidates to the countryside.

At a recent plenum of the Latvian Communist Party, leader Janis Vagris blasted efforts to stop communists from winning parliamentary seats as "attempts to introduce bans on professions in the republic".

Latvia Power Shortage Problems Chronicled

LD0602185390 Moscow TASS in English 1548 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Riga February 6 TASS—By LATINFORM-TASS correspondent Igor Kovalenko:

While self-accounting has brought a measure of independence to Soviet Latvia, republican leaders are finding that independent relations are not all plain sailing.

Latvia has for many years consumed more power than it produced and it received half of it from Estonia. But in conditions of economic independence Estonia has raised tariffs on its power products. Specialists think that it will cost Latvia tens of millions of extra roubles a year.

Taking into account that the republican budget's deficit is now 150 million roubles, it is not hard to understand that this will prompt spiralling prices of consumer goods and services and finally the lowering of living standards.

But this is not all. Considering environmental protection, Estonia has decided to reduce its power production and its supplies to Latvia will halve by 1993 and then will stop altogether with the growth of Estonia's own power consumption.

There was some hope that power supplies from Lithuania would help resolve the problem as Lithuania produces more energy than it consumers. But Lithuania supplies its extra power to Belorussia and in conditions of economic independence it now plans to sell it to Poland for convertible currency.

It should be remembered that during the discussion at the USSR Supreme Soviet of the draft law on the Baltic republics' economic independence, they were going to jointly work out a new economic mechanism, to resolve mutual problems together and to assist each other. This has turned out to be not so simple in practice.

The power shortage in Latvia appeared after the republic's government rejected all union bodies' suggestions to build electric power stations—hydroelectric, nuclear or thermal—claiming that it cared for the republic's ecology. Now that the republic is switching to cost-accounting this will cost much more.

Not long ago the republic's specialists prepared a programme that would make Latvia self-sufficient in electric power. It is planned to build three thermal power stations.

But it is yet unclear how this programme will be implemented as the government has to find 1.5 billion roubles (half of the annual republican budget), a powerful contractor, fuel suppliers and a way to transport fuel to the republic.

Ethnic Relations Viewed at Sajudis Conference

LD0502133290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1447 GMT 3 Feb 90

[Speech by Vidmantas Povilionis, not further identified, at Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring Electoral Conference in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] Ethnic problems are becoming the main problems of the disintegrating empire. [passage omitted]

We have been one of the empire's nations, and now we are beoming masters in our own home and taking over responsibility for the security of other nations living with us. We already know which communities we can rely on and which we cannot. We are resolved to revive the main historical Lithuanain tradition: tolerance toward various nations, languages, cultures, traditions, and religions. [passage omitted]

The principal attitude of Sajudis to the ethnic problem is as follows: national and ethnic conscience and respect are regarded by Sajudis as the basic values. [passage omitted]

Sajudis is for the revival of all national communities and ethnic groups in Lithuania, for their diversified expression without harming civic rights and dignity of any other national community or ethnic group. The basis of national freedom is the rights of man, the person, and the citizen. [passage omitted] The national community is free unless it disturbs other citizens and harms the interests of the state. [applause]

The nationalities in Lithuania could be roughly divided into the traditional ones residing in our country for a long time—they would include Jews, Tartars, Karaims, Germans, Belorussians, Latvians, Russians, and Poles—and nontraditional ones, that is representatives of the USSR peoples who moved to Lithuania after World War II. This group included many Russian-speakers. They usually did not organize their communities, their families were mostly mixed, and they formed the empire's Russian-speaking population.

The situation is now changing. The Moldavians, Mordovians, Georgians, and others are uniting in their communities. Conditions must be created to develop these communities, develop their culture, protect their families, and prevent their russification. After their countries are restored, some of them will return home and will be useful to their countries. The remaining part will supplement and diversify Lithuanian culture. [passage omitted]

It is a pity that because of the national policy by two totalitarian states in World War II we are unable to mention Jewish-Lithuanian relations as an example of tolerance. But we have found a common language with that community, maybe also because people of that nationality understand our aims in view of the fact that they are resolving similar problems in their state. [passage omitted]

A very important problem is that of new settlers from among the Russian-speaking people. This problem will be solved in negotiations with Moscow, just as it was solved in 1920. One can hear absurd demands from Moscow that Lithuania should take care of the victims of its diktat and perfidy. I would give that description to those poor settlers who have been brought to Lithuania. Now the USSR Government and its departments should explain to these deceived people the opportunities to return home, prepare housing for them, arrange compensations, etc. This is their problem. [applause] [passage omitted]

Conference Concludes Work

LD0502153990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] We have received a report from Vilnius saying that a conference of Sajudis, the Lithuanian movement for restructuring, has concluded its work. The report from Lansbergis, chairman of the Sajudis Council (Sejm), stressed the need to reorganize the republic's legislative and executive powers. The participants in the conference also discussed ways of getting Lithuania out of its economic crisis. The candidates for people's deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, who are being nominated by Sajudis, were presented at the conference. A pre-election platform was adopted.

Leader Ozolas Interviewed

90UN0820 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 14 Jan 90 p 4

[Report on interview with Romualdas Ozolas, member of Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo and council member of sejm of Lithuanian Movement for Perestroyka, Sajudis, by A. Gelbakh; date, place not given: "Displaying Good Will"]

[Text] **When the meeting began each of us first placed our tape recorder on the table and started the tape. This gesture not only showed the improvement of the technical equipment for journalists but also a certain caution, a kind of mistrust of one another on the part of the participants in the conversation. As one can see, there was reason for this polite mutual monitoring.**

[Gelbakh] A most important moment of self-determination has come today for very many people in

Lithuania. Communists and nonparty members are taking positions. You are a member of the Politburo of the Lithuanian Communist Party [LiCP] Central Committee. On the other hand, SOVETSKAYA LITVA readers know you as a person who has permitted himself many sharp statements that smack of Russophobia at least. Don't you regret this, don't you think that without this harshness consolidation and mutual understanding in interethnic relations in the republic could be higher and better?

[Ozolas] I shall begin with the last. No, I don't think so. I think they would be the same as they are now no matter what.

I feel regret not about my own, as you put it, sharp statements but rather about the numerous arbitrary interpretations. The tendentious selectivity, the excerpting of individual phrases from a complicated context.... Many have been successful at this.

The very concept of "interethnic relations" rings untrue to me. It was invented to conceal the idea of a separate nation in people's minds and present it in some kind of totality.... A totality consists of components, and these components are individual nations which have and express their own national interests. So there are the interests of the Russians and the Lithuanians, the interests of the Russians with respect to Lithuania and the Lithuanians, and so forth. National relations are relations of national interests. Interethnic relations are speculative relations, from the area of Soviet scholarship. Interethnic relations simply do not exist. There is only the policy of national relations.

[Gelbakh] Do you think that it is the national interest that dictates the attempts to take excerpts from our articles and public statements?

[Ozolas] Precisely, but I would add that they are distorted. By that great Russian interest that says: Divide and conquer. I have had a chance to formulate this with special orders. I can judge this from my own case if only because the "excerpts" appeared in your newspaper a certain amount of time after the publication of my remarks in the magazine PYARGALE. They were made by a staff worker of the LiCP Central Committee, S. Balyutskiy.

I wanted to respond to this article and spoke about it with the editor V. Yemelyanov. He agreed to my suggestion. But then I decided that it is degrading to lower oneself to debates like this and paid no more attention to S. Balyutskiy's statement. That was a mistake. I had to clarify the way I saw the problem. The more so since it was spread through the entire Soviet Union and ended up considerably enlarged in the chorus of voices hostile to Lithuania.

A shocking impression was made above all by the comparison of a Russian folk dance with the dance of a gorilla. There is a remarkable book by Dzheynvan Lavik-Tudol about the life of the chimpanzee. It shows that these animals have a good sense of beauty and attempt to express it. The aesthetic in human existence originates in the same way. Hence it follows that the primitive is not necessarily negative. That is, sometimes we can get at the essence of a people only by removing layers of "culture" or ideology in the products of creativity, including reshaped "folk creativity."

[Gelbakh] So would it be correct to look for the same sources in Lithuanian creativity?

[Ozolas] In any case, the primordial in cultures lies in our prehuman condition, but their uniqueness lies in these ways this prehuman element is expressed. Therefore, everything should be perceived in a certain context. Anyone who gave this precise reading to my remarks in issue five-six of the magazine PYARGALE should pay attention to the fact that this critical view does not apply to the Russians alone. The same and possibly a sharper criticism can be made of the Lithuanian national culture. But the Lithuanians accepted my criticism with dignity.

We are experiencing a crucial time when interests are being revealed and coming into conflict and important political decisions are being made. But when these interests take precedence over the feeling of responsibility they bring an evil will to life. And if we want to find mutual understanding we should be guided primarily by good will and treat one another kindly.

[Gelbakh] This is indisputable. But when we speak about national relations and interests we fall into a labyrinth of contradictions. The very definition of a nation is still questionable and complicated....

[Ozolas] Why? I consider it fairly clear and simple.

[Gelbakh] Then please give us a definition which you consider to be correct.

[Ozolas] A nation is not something given, that exists through the ages and for all time. A nation is something created by the efforts of certain communities of people which existed in their first manifestation in the form of the ethnos. An ethnos is a substratum of nations. When it creates means of self-cognition and self-assertion it reaches the level of the nation. The minimum guarantee of transforming an ethnos into a nation is the creation of a written language and a state, that is, the reinforcement of its human condition spiritually and physically. The state is the most significant thing that distinguishes the nation from the ethnos for it creates qualitatively new possibilities for the development of culture, that is, the search for originality.

[Gelbakh] Your definition is indeed clear but it might possibly be debatable as well. But I should like to descend to the day-to-day level of consciousness. As far as I know, you have Latvian roots...

[Ozolas] My father is a Latvian from Lithuania. My Latvian origins are reflected only in my name. I was educated and nourished on Lithuanian culture.

[Gelbakh] In this connection I have a question about a person's belonging to a particular nation. This is more a question of his culture. It is not so important who his ancestors were—Lithuanians, Germans, Russians, Poles; what is important is the culture in which one was reared and whether he accepts it as his own.

[Ozolas] Yes, I think that is true.

[Gelbakh] Then let us continue. I have had occasion to participate in a commission on the development of the law on national minorities. You were at a couple of these meetings as well. And you will recall that in one of the first variants of the draft an article was written to the effect that a person is free to select his nationality.

[Ozolas] Yes.

[Gelbakh] Then a sharp change occurred. They wrote that when a person reaches 16 years of age he has the right to select his nationality based on the national origin of his parents. After that he cannot change it. It seems to me that this is not the most democratic decision. And it was adopted, in my opinion, out of immediate political considerations. In a situation where many were experiencing moral pressure, when there was what I would call a too direct discussion of making Poles out of Lithuanians and Lithuanians out of Poles, when the question of national origin had become too significant.

[Ozolas] There were probably not such strong fears. But let me note that I consider the law on the human right to national self-determination to be incorrectly outlined. This legislative norm keeps a person from being free in one of the essential aspects of self-determination. If they wanted to create more favorably for their nation, with this they achieved the opposite. If we are interested not only in preserving the nation but also developing it, we must live as though there was something attractive in the nation itself. You cannot rectify things with bans and self-bans. If we do not rectify this situation in the future we shall develop according to certain ailments or other peculiarities of the past.

[Gelbakh] Then I have one more question. We have spoken about various civil rights and about equality of nations. But in one of your speeches you emphasized that in our republic the Lithuanian people have hegemony with respect to people of other nationalities. Your opponents have sharply criticized you for this.

[Ozolas] I do not recognize this criticism and do not accept it. Hegemony means a guiding or leading role. I do not necessarily insist on precisely this term, which sets many people's teeth on edge, including mine. But we must say that in Lithuania the Lithuanian nation comprises the basis, the nucleus of all the people. And this admission does not depend on man's analytical capabilities. This is a fact we have to deal with.

We must deal with it because it is the Lithuanians on the land which from time immemorial has been called Lithuania who want to restore their own statehood based on their own understanding of a state and on their own national traditions. This is a natural right which is recognized throughout the world. Anyone who opposes this process is showing bad will by refusing the Lithuanian people the right to self-determination and the performance of their duty to the world.

We are always talking about the need for mutual respect. Elementary logic tells us that the Lithuanians, for example, should not assume the role of advisers and offer their models of state structure to Poland or Russia. And we are not doing this. We do not wish to accept unsolicited advice either.

Some people dislike this very much. To such people we grant the natural right to choose their place of residence where they will feel more comfortable. But malicious, uncompromising statements and actions directed against the construction of an independent democratic Lithuanian state cannot be regarded as anything other than antistate activity. And here, I am convinced, there can be no compromises. The more so since the criteria for interactions have been set: It is sufficient to agree to become a citizen of a given state. Even problems of the nationalities of the state are resolved on this basis: By agreeing to cooperate in the creation of the state the citizens are given certain rights (of course, they are rights and not guarantees, that is, privileges) in the possibility of retaining their own uniqueness.

[Gelbakh] You and other members of the LiCP Central Committee Politburo recently participated in a meeting in Moscow with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Many of your colleagues expressed the idea that the conversations made them hopeful and that they were feeling their way through to some compromises. You were the only one who emphasized in your interview that because of several factors it does not seem possible to achieve mutual understanding now. What factors did you have in mind?

[Ozolas] Here we are approaching the essence of our national condition, Lithuanian, Russian, and others. Each nation is developing while revealing its own capabilities. These capabilities are determined primarily by the nation's spirituality. I single this out because all material culture is an expression of the spirit.

Today there is something like this in our national democratic aspirations, which they cannot understand in Russia, which the Russian people as a whole cannot understand. It is that they cannot and not that they do not wish to,. because at the dawn of the 20th Century a terrible, unprecedented slaughter, which exhausted the Russian nation physically and impoverished it spiritually, took place on the Russian land. This is now recognized by many scholars—their intellectual level was reduced practically to primitiveness and an immense blow was dealt to the Russian gene pool. Subsequently decades of Stalinism also led to the destruction of everything thinking and living.

So far, alas, few recognize the tragedy of the condition in which the Russian people find themselves. Now it is even difficult to say the extent to which their voice, which is raising the people out of a sleep that has lasted many years, is being perceived and leading to national awakening. I have in mind the democrats of Russia, Pamyat, Memorial, and so forth. They are exiting the people and making them shudder, but so far I have seen no real idea of Russian self-awareness.

Therefore I would not be in any hurry with such concepts as mutual understanding. In any case, they have to be applied extremely cautiously and without false optimism.

I understand that again my words might irritate some people and even make them angry. Again I am risking bringing disfavor upon myself. But there is no other choice here. I am very happy to observe and evaluate what is going on in the Russian nation: We must continue to live side by side with them. Therefore I say that the nation should be awakened as soon as possible. To remove accusations of national arrogance, I can only add that among us there is a good deal of irresponsibility and inertia which must be overcome. It must be overcome persistently and quickly. But still in national self-awareness and self-determination we have already achieved almost satisfactory acceleration. It is still difficult to find this in Russia. If the risen Russia is determined to be good neighbors we shall be good neighbors.

[Gelbakh] Well, with respect to the national issue your position seems fairly clear. I wish to ask about something else. Once in an interview you stated that you entered the Communist Party for the sake of your career. Now your career is established: You are a member of the LiCP Central Committee Politburo, a member of the Presidium of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet, a USSR people's deputy.

[Ozolas] That was not my statement. I am sorry if you consider this a career. When Lithuania becomes independent I shall leave politics immediately. I hope to leave the party even before then. I am essentially a political independent and I do not wish to be anythi: g else. I understand that I must bear my share of the responsibility as long as we are in danger. I entered the party not out of zeal but because that was the only way I could remove the ban on the profession that existed at the time.

Did I have to do that? That is a separate issue which leads into the area of philosophical justification of my past.

We are now at a very dangerous point in history. I am working in important areas where we are not simply talking about history, we are making it. Many people do not understand me. But even if nobody understands me I shall be in the place where I am now and I shall continue to work. I know that the risk is constant here. But, after all, history is movement into the unknown with equal possibilities of making mistakes and acting correctly. I understand this. Therefore I do not necessarily care about keeping my nose clean.

There has already been a significant democratization of party life in Lithuania. A multiparty system has begun to operate. Parties—each in its own way—reflect the interests of particular groups of the society. The only bad thing is when these parties do not find points of mutual understanding and fields of cooperation, and polemics turn into squabbling. But we have been given goodwill so that we can return again and again to what has been said and done and overcome alienation. We are all learning to work with opponents without calling them enemies and we all need to learn not to lead the people but to recognize their interests and express them as fully as possible. This also requires that we be guided above all by goodwill and not by any idealistic scheme or shady principles.

Landsbergis Eyes 'Mechanism' To Leave USSR

LD0502141090 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 3, 26 Jan-1 Feb 90 p 6

["Readers' letter" by Sajudis Seimas Council member Vytautas Landsbergis; no date given: "Mechanism"]

[Text] Mechanics design various mechanisms and among them, as we have learned recently, a mechanism for dropping out of or leaving the Soviet Union.

A republic which should make that decision (or would petition to be permitted to make such a decision) would have to obtain its fourteen sisters' concurrence. They, in turn, would issue—through the center—an admonition advising of the existence of substantial debts and an additional admonition on how the renegade will be left without brotherly provisions.

In the final analysis, everything would be decided by a USSR Supreme Soviet congress. This would surely be accomplished by a majority vote—the very same one that used to boo down A. Sakharov.

Such are our options, such the supposed innovation of perestroyka, that has deceived many foreigners—oh, you will be permitted to separate!

In accordance with this litte plan—no one will ever obtain that. It is identical to Stalin's constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of the press and demonstration: please, go ahead on 1 May, before tribunals of great and tiny governments. Do not proceed, however, in any manner that might harm the common peoples in any way.

It is a good thing that we can state out loud: this does not apply to the three Baltic states, in general. It is not fitting for those who did not join to ask to leave and those who did not enter have no place to exit from, so we shall not fall into this trap.

Even a referendum on independence, which the USSR would grant us by virtue of some new law it comes up

with, would be a legal deception and a juridical trap of sorts. By complying with such a law, supposedly on a legal basis, we would first have to acknowledge ourselves legally as a union republic subject to these union laws of its own free accord. In like manner, in bargaining for "the return" of our own land and its resources, we would have to acknowledge the quasi USSR sovereignty with respect to, what is cleverly referred to, as all peoples' property, which might now perhaps be kindly relinquished by the USSR.

No, the land belongs to us and freedom is also ours. This must be acknowledged by the other side without direct interference. Let stages, economic and other agreements and possibly, accounting of who owes more to whom, make up the "the mechanism."

Consequently, those, who had in truth joined it, should have the good sense to leave it.

Multiparty System a 'Reality' in Lithuania

PM0502150290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy report: "From Different Parties"]

[Text] Vilnius—The registration of candidates has ended in Lithuania. For each deputy's seat there are 3.7 contenders. This average shows that a second round of elections will be necessary, but in some okrugs as many as six to eight candidates have registered.

In all, some 650 people were nominated as candidate deputies, of whom 522 were registered, for 141 seats in the future parliament of Lithuania. Some of the candidates were not registered because their documents were drawn up carelessly or legislation was violated. But there were other reasons too. Yuozas Bulavas, corresponding member of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences and chairman of the republican electoral commission, says:

"The okrug commissions, ours in particular, repeatedly had to examine the question of the intolerance of certain groups nominating candidates with regard to other groups or to their candidates. The candidates had not even been registered, campaigning had not yet begun, when aggression was already emerging in some places, not to mention the items in the local press. Complaints winged their way to every possible body."

I can testify to that: IZVESTIYA's office received complaints, too. I would describe as particularly heated the situation that arose over the nomination as candidate deputy of Vladislav Shved, first secretary of Oktyabrskiy Rayon Lithuanian Communist Party Committee and secretary of the provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. I was present at a session of the republican electoral commission where the conflict was examined, and to be honest I did not envy the commission members. They had to walk a tightrope between the spirit and the letter of the law and adopt a politically correct decision.

I will not now try to analyze where the okrug commission leadership was right in principle, and where it was right only formally. But the refusal to register Vladislav Shved, one of the leaders of the opposition to the independent Lithuanian Communist Party, was assessed as suppression of democracy, and the reaction of CPSU supporters could have taken various forms, including strikes. It seems to me that the stereotypical view that the main duty of all social, state, and party structures is to ban things prevails in our country even in the present years of perestroyka. I say this because in fact the okrug commission had the same opportunities to register Vladislav Shved as the republican commission. And it should have done so, rather than pouring fuel onto the fire of blazing passions in the republic.

The first stage of the election campaign confirmed that a multiparty system has become a reality in the republic. According to preliminary figures published in the republican press, of the 522 candidates, 219 are members of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and 91 are members of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. This enables us to predict that communists will obtain a significant number of seats. Incidentally, according to a sociological study by specialists from the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, the rating of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is now higher than that of Sajudis.

The Social Democratic Party is represented in the elections by 21 candidates, the Democratic Party by 18, the Christian Democrats by three, the "Greens" by four. In terms of ethnic composition, there are 425 Lithuanians, 32 Russians, 30 Poles, eight Belorussians, and three Jews.

Some 92 percent of candidates have higher education. It must be said that about 100 people from Vilnius who are, as a rule, representatives of the intellectual elite are running in okrugs outside the city. Once again I quote Yu. Bulavas, chairman of the republican electoral commission:

"The law does not forbid it... True, I am rather surprised that the voters willingly nominated as candidate deputies people whom they do not know very well. But that is their affair. On the other hand, many people have already begun to show distrust toward those who promise much but do little..."

As we have already reported, servicemen are not participating in the elections—something unprecedented in our Fatherland. But here it must be pointed out that officers and their families are not deprived of the right to vote, since by law they can obtain Lithuanian citizenship. As the republican electoral commission reports, there have been "hardly any" protests from military units.

The most heated phase of the election campaign is beginning—the preelection contest for the voters' sympathies and for their votes.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Pre-Election Session

LD0602182790 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Vilnius February 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila:

The current Lithuanian Supreme Soviet convened its last session in the Lithuanian capital today, two weeks before the election of a new Supreme Soviet. The elections on February 24 will be contested by nearly four candidates per seat.

The session got off to an unusual start as some of the deputies fanned out across the republic meeting workers at plants, organisations, farms and establishments in Vilnius, the Shaltsinsk, Ignalina and other regions of southeastern Lithuania.

They are discussing possible ways to tackle economic, social, national and other problems in the region, where the population is mainly made up of Poles and other ethnic minorities.

Those who stayed in Vilnius are working today at commissions. There are 18 questions on the preliminary agenda of the session, which is due to be endorsed on Wednesday. There are plans to discuss laws on local self-management, on the Lithuanian bank, on the press and other mass media, and others.

In addition, it is planned to discuss findings of the commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet which studied the 1939 Soviet-German pact and its consequences.

On the opening day the republican newspapers published a draft law of the Lithuanian Republic, on political parties. In addition to the Communist Party, Social Democratic and Democratic parties have been registered in Lithuania, while the Christian Democratic Party has held a founding congress.

According to the published bill any parties may function in the republic provided they do not counter to the existing constitution and this law. It is envisaged that "people who are drafted into the Army, work in the bodies of the Interior Ministry, state security, procurator's office, the state arbitrage, state control and courts, cannot be members of political parties."

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 8 Jan

90UN0821A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 9 Jan 90 pp 1, 3

[Text] A meeting of the LiSSR [Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium was held on 8 January. It was chaired by Vitautas Astrauskas, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The meeting discussed an action committee appeal in connection with the calling of a referendum. It pursues the goal of having LiSSR citizens determine whether servicemen who are temporary residents of the republic have the right to vote in elections to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. Having familiarized itself with the documents submitted, the Presidium recognized as valid the signatures of more than 300,000 citizens supporting a referendum. The documents submitted conform to the requirements of the LiSSR Referendum Act. It was decided to hand over the action committee's concluding document to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium decreed the convening of the 11th LiSSR Supreme Soviet 16th Session on 15 January. The agenda was discussed.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium discussed a draft law of the principles of local self-management of the LiSSR. It was approved in essence and will be published for public discussion. The commission for preparation of the draft was instructed to collate the observations and proposals which had been received and submit them to the Presidium and the appropriate standing commissions.

It was decided to suggest that the Supreme Soviet extend until 1 March the deadline for the nomination of candidates for deputy of the local soviets of people's deputies of the LiSSR. This was brought about by the fact that the candidates who are not elected to the LiSSR Supreme Soviet may run as candidates.

The Presidium adopted an edict on a change in Article 68 of the LiSSR Housing Code. The edict was prepared on the basis of the citizens' wishes that a tenant's guardian or the person caring for him have the right to the use of his accommodations as a member of the family. The new version of the article establishing this provision will afford an opportunity to better secure the interests of the persons being looked after and their guardians.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium registered the USSR law "Status of USSR People's Deputies." Certain ordinances and regulations of the USSR Council of Ministers were registered also. Qualifications grades were conferred at the meeting on members of the LiSSR Supreme Court and judges of rayon (city) people's courts. Resolutions were adopted on the elections of members of the LiSSR Supreme Court and on early release from this office.

The meeting discussed other questions of state life.

Lithuanian Poll on Parties, Politicians

90UN0728A Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Russian 9 Jan 90 p 1

[Unsigned report: "M.S.Gorbachev Most Popular in the World, A. Brazauskas in Lithuania. What is the Rating of Other Politicians? Results of Public Opinion Survey"]

[Text] The center for the study of public opinion at the institute of philosophy, sociology, and law of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences conducted a survey from 29 December 1989 to 2 January 1990. A regional probability sample was taken. Those surveyed represent inhabitants of Lithuania who have the right to vote. Some 1,616 respondents were surveyed.

CONGRESS

Of those surveyed 82 percent were in favor of the decision by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania to create an independent Communist Party of Lithuania. Some 62 percent considered that no other decision was possible. (And 15 percent wanted a different result).

An overwhelming majority (75 percent) are convinced that the congress was empowered to solve this question (seven percent considered otherwise). Roll call voting whereby each delegate signed for which communist party of Lithuania he voted—the independent one or the one that is part of the CPSU was approved by 77 percent. The roll call vote was disapproved by nine percent.

Of the respondents, 53 percent stated that during the congress they did not notice anybody being impeded in expressing his opinion. (Some 14 percent consider that such impediments took place).

PARTY LEADERS

The congress was broadcast on television so that the inhabitants of Lithuania were able to compare the political positions and the personal qualities of the communist party activists. We give their ratings (evaluation of their current performance in their present posts):

SECRETARIES OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST PARTY OF LITHUANIA:

A. Brazauskas—plus 89; V. Berezov—plus 82; J. Paleckis—plus 84; K. Glaveckas—plus 76.

SECRETARIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF LITHUANIA ON CPSU PLATFORM:

M. Burokevichius—minus 57; V. Kardamavichius—minus 59; J. Kuolyalis—minus 61; V. Shved—minus 54.

FORMER SECRETARIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF LITHUANIA:

V. Baltrunas—minus 23; B. Zaikauskas—plus 25; S. Giedraitis—plus 7.

POLITICAL FORCES AND THEIR LEADERS

Even though one could have expected the prestige of the Communist Party of Lithuania to grow with the attainment of independence, the actual result cannot but amaze (first figure—rating at end of November, second—at end of December): Communist Party of Lithuania—plus 16 and plus 73; Sajudis—plus 60 and plus 65; Yedinstvo—minus 64 and minus 75; LSL [expansion unknown]—plus 9 and minus 4.

The independent Communist Party of Lithuania above is evaluated by Lithuanians (was plus 16, became plus 79), and by representatives of other nationalities (was plus 18, became plus 29). If elections were conducted today, 38 percent of the vote would go for the independent communists, 27 percent for Sajudis, eight percent for the Communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform, six percent for the Christian Democratic Party. It is expected that five percent would decline to vote. Naturally, this is not an exact prognosis of future elections, because one does not vote for a party but for actual people.

Let us supplement this information with a list of the most popular social activists of Lithuania. One could name an unlimited number of such activists. Here are the figures in percentages: A. Brazauskas—73 (formerly 63); K. Prunskiene—47 (56); V. Berezov—37 (5); J. Paleckis—26 (3); Z. Vilkas—21 (18); K. Moteka—15 (15); V. Landsbergis—12 (18); Z. Vaishvila—10 (15); K. Antanavichius—10 (6); Z. Bichkauskas—9 (7).

M.S. GORBACHEV

This prominent personality is unprecedentedly popular in the entire world. Some believe that his popularity abroad is higher than in his own country. We attempted to clarify the degree of popularity of this prominent politician in Lithuania. It is true that we did not touch on all of his many sided activities, but only one aspect of it—internal policies. Here are the survey results: plus 63 (in May), plus 40 (in October), plus 42 (in November), plus 55 (at end of December). In contrast to the ratings of many other political forces and leaders, the popularity of M.S. Gorbachev is almost independent of the nationality of the respondent.

Vilnius Vigil Ends Outside KGB Premises

LD0602115490 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] The nearly fortnight's vigil of Vilnius residents outside the premises of the State Security Committee was ended today. This civic action was staged to prevent the possible dispatching of security archives from Lithuania. The suspicion was caused by the refusal of the Security Committee's chairman, Eduardas Eismuntas, to let the deputies inspect the archives. Thursday morning [8 February], before the opening of Lithuania's parliamentry session, a picket is to be staged outside the parliament in order to draw the deputies' attention to the status of the State Security Committee of Lithuania. The point is that though the committee is under the repubic's jurisdiction, its chairman refused to obey the MPs on the archives issue, explaining that he could permit the inspection only if authorized by the chairman of the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union. At the forthcoming session of the Supreme Soviet a group of

MPs are going to express non-confidence to chairman of the Lithuanian State Security.

Lithuanian Bishop Holds Farewell Service

LD0602114790 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 5 Feb 90

[Text] Yesterday Bishop of All-Lithuania, Anthony, held a farewell service at the Vilnius Orthodox Church of the Holy Spirit. Bishop Anthony, 53, grew up in Vilnius and was appointed here only last spring. His senile parents also reside in Vilnius. Now the Supreme Synod, the supreme authority of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, took an unexpected decision to transfer the bishop to Siberia and to bring over a new bishop to Lithuania from the Siberian town of Chita. Bishop Anthony is distinguished for his sermons, of which yesterday's was another example of [words indistinct], urging people of all nations to live in concord, and emphasizing that a Lithuanian, a Russian, and a Pole are, first of all, God's children.

Bishop Anthony, the only clergyman in Lithuania was nominated for the elections to the Supreme Soviet in the town of Snieckus, inhabited mostly by non-Lithuanians. The Supreme Synod of the Orthodox Church disregarded the request of religious communities and influential individuals to leave Bishop Anthony in Lithuania.

Lithuanian Workers on Gorbachev's Visit

90UN0821B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 13 Jan 90 p 3

[Views of Lithuanian Workers: "'Ineradicable Impression'"]

[Text] On the first day of his visit to Vilnius Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, visited the "50th Anniversary of the USSR Vilnius Fuel Equipment Plant" Production Association, where he met with the thousands-strong multinational work force of the republic's leading enterprise.

Our correspondent S. Bykhun visited this plant and asked its workers to share their impressions of the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. Over to them.

L. Adamovich, mechanic of machine assembly shop No. 9:

There's no denying it. It is not often that ordinary workers get to meet the head of state and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I was very lucky in this respect: I had the honor to stand next to him and talk candidly about our state, party, and day-to-day affairs. I am even now still under the ineradicable impression of this meeting.

When M.S. Gorbachev approached me and said, "How do you do," I did not know what to do. But my inhibitions and inner tension began to pass after his opening words. Although we only talked for a short time, he asked me many things: How many years I had been working at this enterprise, what my grade was, what operations I performed and how many.... When it came to interethnic relations, I said that in 20 years of working here I had not noticed any friction or disagreements in the shop on these grounds. And Lithuanians, Russians, Poles had worked alongside me, and do so now also, incidentally. But that I felt this tension now.

Mikhail Sergeyevich asked: "Has there been a chill wind?" "Not chill, cold," I told him. But he reassured me and said that everything would be all right.

And I have to say this also. Before, when I saw M.S. Gorbachev's trips and meetings on television, I did not always approve of the presence at these meetings of Raisa Maksimovna. But now, when I saw her standing next to him, I realized that she sincerely feels for him and his cause and is helping him here by her presence. And, as a woman, I approve of this.

The most important result of this meeting—this is not just my opinion—is the fact that we ordinary workers, communists and nonparty people, have put our trust in M.S. Gorbachev and have recognized in him a real state-minded party leader and sober-minded person. I would even say: I saw in him the No. 1 politician. It is a very good thing that there emerged in all of us confidence in the future and a desire to work even better. This is the main thing.

Yu. Ragelevich, deputy secretary of the plant party committee:

It was clear to me from this meeting that M.S. Gorbachev has a good understanding of the difficult situation which has taken shape in the republic and in the Lithuanian Communist Party itself. And it is very important even now to initiate extensive explanatory work in the republic's work force connected with Lithuania's various relations with other republics of our country. We need to make available to people full information on what would await each of us in the event of Lithuania's withdrawal from the USSR.

In regard to the separation of the Lithuanian Communist Party, there is no need to hurry here either. For instance, a situation has taken shape with us where some communists are categorically for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, but others, for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party only on the CPSU Platform. But voting, as they say, is simple, but what next? This is what many of the participants in the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev at our plant said.

P. Makshetskas, lathe hand of the repair and machine shop:

I, as a communist, previously had a dual attitude. On the one hand I fully understood that I was a Lithuanian and that I should be a member of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party. But, on the other, I could not fully

accept the program and statute. They were not to my liking as a working man. Some things in these programs were left unsaid. Nor could I understand why Lithuania's communists had decided to separate from the CPSU and I thought that the aims of the country's party members were the same as for Lithuania's communists.

But following the meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, my doubts were dispelled. He explained in layman's terms that if we were looking for new ways toward economic and political cooperation, the cementing, integrating force, given the decentralization of the country's whole society, remained the party. And this applied to Lithuania also. I therefore believe that only together with the CPSU can Lithuania's communists improve the life of the whole Lithuanian people. I see no other way as yet.

E. Raybis, leader of a team of repairmen of the precision shop:

Truthfully speaking, I did not entirely agree with General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's speech. Why is he unwilling to fully understand Lithuania's communists? What is bad about the fact that the Lithuanian Communist Party will decide political and economic issues in its own republic independently?

But regarding the Lithuanian Communist Party's relations with the CPSU, they must be built on an equal basis. I believe that, instead of the CPSU Central Committee, we need to form a council of secretaries of the republic communist parties, say, so that they could together coordinate their actions and tackle the strategic tasks of the party as a whole. And all the remaining issues should be tackled locally.

Turkmen 1989 Economic Development Discussed

LD0202113490 Ashkhabad Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 31 Jan 90

[Text] At today's joint meeting of the Turkmenistan Central Committee and the republic's Council of Ministers, the question of the results of the republic's socioeconomic development in 1989 and of the tasks of party and local soviet bodies in fulfilling five-year plan assignments was discussed.

As was noted, alongside the social reorientation of the economy which has taken place and the positive processes which are having a positive effect on the development of the republic's national economy, a few adverse trends which are holding up the resolution of planned tasks persisted last year.

The national income produced on the republic's territory rose by 2.1 percent in 1989 instead of the 4.7 percent envisaged by the five-year plan. Productivity of social labor rose by 1.1 percent compared with a target of 2.8 percent.

Some 4.4 million rubles [R] worth of consumer goods less than planned were produced last year.

Five-year plan tasks for the production of nonfood goods were underfulfilled by R13 million.

The slackening of attention by leading officials of the executive committees of soviets of people's deputies, ministries, and departments to the development of the material base of the social sphere has led to the failure to ensure fulfillment of the annual task of opening dwelling houses, vocational-technical colleges, and outpatient and clinical institutions, from all sources of financing.

At the republic's collective and state farms, plans for the procurement of vegetables, cucurbits, potatoes, fruit, grapes, and fodders were not fulfilled.

The 1989 results show that the program for the republic's financial improvement for 1988-1990 and the decision of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee and the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers on measures to make the economy financially healthy and back up the money in circulation [ukrepleniye denezhnogo obrashcheniya] in the Turkmen SSR [with goods] in the 1989-1990 period and in the 13th five-year plan period are being implemented too slowly, without due supervision by ministries and departments.

Leading officials of republican ministries and departments and of executive committees of soviets of people's deputies and managers of industrial enterprises have been instructed to take thorough measures to eliminate shortcomings and oversights in their industry, in particular, to improve the supply of food to the population, to strengthen the state discipline of deliveries of output to all-union stock, to remove factors holding up the opening of housing, especially from state capital investments, and to raise the efficiency of utilization of capacities in operation at light industry enterprises.

The meeting was addressed by Akhmedov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers, and Rebrik, secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee.

Taking part in the meeting were members of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Central Committee Buro Mogilevets and (Sakhatmuradov).

Turkmen Party Journal To Go on Sale

LD0302195690 Ashkhabad Domestic Service in Turkmen 1645 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Excerpts] The political journal of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan Central Committee, [SIYASY SOKHBETDESH [POLITICAL COMPANION], will soon be on sale. Saranasov, senior secretary of the journal, gave the following information to the TURKMENINFORM correspondent about this new publication:

[Begin Saranasov recording] We are concerned, above all, about turning our journal into an exciting companion for our readers. [passage omitted] We are prepared to

make is possible for everybody who has an interesting view to express his opinion in our journal. [passage omitted]

Articles by the Mufti of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and materials about relations between the republic and Turkems living abroad are published. To put it briefly, every reader will find his article in the journal. [end recording]

Tajik Party Sets Up New Briefing Center

PM0502162390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 First Edition p p 3

[TASS correspondent S. Trofimov report: "'Army and Restructuring' Press Center Formed"]

[Text] Dushanbe, 31 Jan—A new information service, the "Army and Restructuring" Press Center, has been established under the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. Today saw the first meeting with representatives of the republic's press, radio, and television. The following took part: Sh. Shabdolov, secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee; Lieutenant General A. Zakharov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Turkestan Military District Political Directorate; and officers from the Central Asian Border District, the republic military commissariat, and the Dushanbe Garrison.

In his speech, Lieutenant General A. Zakharov assessed the situation in the Central Asian region and restructuring processes in the Army. He did not gloss over negative trends either: the loss of officer cadres, the reluctance among some young people to do service in the Armed Forces, the poor training of conscripts, and evidence of irregular relations in the military district's military collectives.

Correspondents had their questions answered during the news conference.

Tajik KGB Conference on Treason Conviction

90US0458A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 1

[Article by I. Semykin: "And He Said He Lost It All...."]

[Text] Dushanbe—At a Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB news conference, journalists were briefed on the results of an investigation and decision by the Tajik Supreme Court in the case of Abdulkhamid Davlatov.

What prompted this individual to set out on the path of treason to the Motherland? He himself answers the question in this manner: During the summer of 1988, after losing a lot of money once again at cards and being unable to pay the 20,000 rubles [R] he owed, he decided to cross the border.

Crossing it, the cook of a public catering cafeteria in Ordzhonikidzeabadskiy Rayon of the Tajik SSR wound up right away in a mujahidin gang and a short while later in a special Pakistani camp for training saboteurs. In December 1988, Davlatov traveled with an arms caravan to northern Afghanistan. In the beginning of January last year, he illegally crossed over into USSR territory with guides, a sizable cargo, instructions, weapons, and subversive literature. Today we have the opportunity of citing the instructions he obtained in Peshawar: "Send 20 men from among the Muslims of Tajikistan to the city of Nangarkhar (center of Jalalabad Province) for initial religious and military training; following training they will return to Tajikistan. Then send the following group..."

"Establish warehouses in the republic to store arms and food provisions, a headquarters (strong point), and mujahidin bases."

"Those brothers who obtain a mission and are to serve in the Russian Army are obliged to inform the mujahidin of Tajikistan of the locations of depots where weapons and ammunition are stored. They must use any means possible to take these depots or blow them up..."

Davlatov's return was spotted and registered by the KGB. He attempted to hide and wait it out, but realized this would not succeed. He then attempted a ruse: On 16 February he gave himself up to the Tajik KGB and admitted that he had illegally crossed the border. Davlatov decided to remain silent about the rest.

"It was a complicated trial," states N.A. Kolobova, member of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court. "In court Davlatov suddenly repudiated his former testimony and categorically denied the fact of treason to the Motherland. It was necessary to expose him, confront him at the trial."

The trial is over. Davlatov was immediately found guilty with respect to three articles of the criminal code: treason against the Motherland (assistance to a foreign state in the conduct of hostile actions against the Soviet Union), illegally crossing the border, and swindling. He was sentenced to eight years in a high-security prison and confiscation of property. A separate decision was handed down with respect to the border guard detachment in whose sector the criminal freely penetrated the border.

Data on 1989 Crime in Moscow Announced

PM0502164590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by A. Illesh: "Moscow Prosecutor on Facts And Rumors"]

[Text] A complex situation—this is how law and order in the city was described by G. Ponomarev, Moscow prosecutor and state legal adviser third class, addressing a press conference on Friday.

He announced that 54,500 crimes had been recorded in the capital in 1989. This is 40 percent more than in the previous year. Serious crimes (murder, rape, robbery,

mugging, and other crimes) constituted 15 percent of the total and the rate of increase was 75 percent. Some 18,500 people were prosecuted, 2,500 of them adolescents. Some 21,000 crimes were unsolved (9,000 in 1988), including 89 murders, 93 rapes, 544 robberies, 1,128 muggings, 2,506 thefts of state property and 13,175 of personal property. Administrative action was taken against around 690,000 offenders.

According to G. Ponomarev, the situation is made worse by adverse socioeconomic trends. There was a letup in the struggle against drunkennes and alcoholism all over the city. The job of finding accommodation and work for former convicts is being tackled unsatisfactorily. There have been serious misdemeanors in the cooperative movement, on the part of cooperative workers and officials of management organs. In the municipal economy there have been numerous cases of mismanagement, shortages, and spoilage of commodities and materials. The resultant losses in 1989 amounted to more than R126 million. Known cases of "shadow" redistribution of goods in Moscow trade amount to R19 million. There has been a decline in labor, state, and public discipline at industrial enterprises, in the construction industry, and in the transport sphere. Manifestations of collective contempt for the law are becoming increasingly noticeable.

Last year there was a failure to neutralize the intensive process of crime development, the significant structural changes, and the increasing element of organization and aggression toward law-enforcement organs. At the same time, the city prosecutor stressed, there are no grounds for dramatic assessments of the situation: The causes of the situation are well-known and obvious. And this enables one to monitor the development of events to some extent and devise ways of helping to combat crime.

Our correspondent conveyed to the Moscow prosecutor some of the questions our readers are frequently asking IZVESTIYA. It seems to them that serious cracks have appeared in glasnost in recent days. Therefore, people have been worried by various rumors:

"IZVESTIYA has reported an incident that occurred at the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic permament mission in Moscow. But let us return to this topic. The thing is that for two years the city has been abuzz with the most incredible rumors and journalists have been quite unable to obtain reliable information on the incident involving the arrest of E. Mamedov, one of the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front. The city law-enforcement organs, on whose territory this extraordinary event took place, had nothing intelligible to say to the press..."

"Unfortunately, that is true. I know as much about the event as your readers. No more than that. So I cannot comment."

"Following the disgraceful spectacle organized by members of the 'Pamyat' society in the Central House of Writers, some more alarming rumors swept Moscow—about impending pogroms. What information do you have about this?"

"We do not have any reliable information about impending mass disturbances or any anti-Jewish pogroms. At any rate, I want to assure Muscovites that the city has the manpower and resources to stop each and every attempted breach of public order."

"Now for the incident in the Central House of Writers. Again, plenty of rumors and all manner of evidence. One thing is clear at the moment: In the House of Writers a group of individuals committed a gross breach of public order and this represents grounds for a criminal prosecution under Article 190/3 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code, which is what the prosecutor's office in Krasnopresnenskiy Rayon did on 26 January. Incidentally, the criminal action was taken within the procedural timeframe, without haste, without procrastination."

"What is the state of affairs as of now?"

"In view of public opinion, I instructed one of the most important investigators in the city prosecutor's office to handle the investigation. It is sure to be a high-quality investigation. The classification may well change when the investigation is complete: One may find in the suspects' actions elements of both Article 206 (hooliganism) and Article 74 (violation of ethnic and racial equality). But I do not want to impose my opinion on anyone, and I am not going to try. I will take this opportunity of urging journalists and public leaders to display restraint. Give the investigators time and the opportunity to calmly analyze the criminal case and make a legal judgment. A swift judgment is not always correct...."

Further on Crime Statistics

LD0202225790 Moscow TASS in English 2222 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 2 TASS— More than 54,000 crimes were registered in 1989 in Moscow—40 per cent up against the 1988 figure. Criminal proceedings were instituted against 18,500 people last year, 2,500 of whom are adolescents. Some 21,000 crimes remain to be uncovered, including 89 premediated murders, 93 rapes, 544 hold-ups, 1,128 robberies and 2,506 cases of the larceny of state property. These grim statistics were disclosed today at a news conference held at the Moscow Public Prosecutor's Office.

When describing the criminogenic situation in the city, Moscow's Public prosecutor Gennadiy Ponomaryov said that it continued to be complicated. It is of special concern that the share of grave crimes continues to grow. Last year it amounted to 15 per cent.

Ponomaryov believes that the criminogenic situation is aggravated by negative trends in the economic, social

and cultural life of the city. The struggle against alcoholism was slackened everywhere. Problems connected with the accomodation and employment of people with a criminal record are not resolved properly. Facts revealed last year show that the value of goods sold outside the state retail trade network amounted to 19 million roubles.

Ponomaryov stated that law-enforcement agencies had not managed last year to neutralise intensive processes of crime growth, its structural changes, better organisation and growing aggressiveness. However, the law-enforcement agencies know the causes of the situation that has formed in Moscow, which permits them, to a certain extent, to control it and to work out measures for improving it. In his opinion, the only thing we can hope for this year is the reduction of the crime growth rate.

Trade Crime Worse Since Last Major Review

PM0602110990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Committee Session"]

[Text] A routine session of the interim committee for crime-fighting in the USSR was held 1 February under the chairmanship of A.I. Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Leaders of law enforcement organs who are members of the interim committee spoke about the measures they have been taking to implement the resolution adopted by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies "On Strengthening the Fight Against Organized Crime."

The central question on the agenda was the strengthening of the fight against abuse in trade and speculation. Speeches were made by S.A. Shalayev, chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions; V.I. Runyshkov, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for the Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation; P.D. Kondrashov, USSR first deputy minister of trade; P.S. Fedirko, chairman of the USSR Central Union of Consumer Societies Board; and V.P. Shcherbakov, chairman of the Moscow City Council of Trade Unions.

In the period since this question was examined at the committee's previous session in October 1989, the situation in trade has not only failed to stabilize but has considerably worsened evidenced by critical phenomena appearing on the consumer market. They could worsen if the most resolute and radical measures are not adopted in the near future.

In the current conditions, individual links in the state and cooperative trade are becoming the material bases for organized crime and corruption in parts of the state and economic apparatus. By exploiting imperfections in the economic mechanism, deformations in the cooperative movement, and the shadow economy, criminal groups have concentrated considerable resources in their hands. A particular danger is presented by the artificial creation of a deficit of goods by letting them build up in storehouses, warehouses, unemptied containers and railcars, and stores, and by selling them from subsidiary premises.

This provokes justified dissatisfaction among customers from broad strata of the population who deal with trade every day and who view the existing situation as direct sabotage of perestroyka being carried out in the country.

At the same time, attention was paid to the need to activate strict supervision by the public of trade and public catering enterprises and to strengthen the protection of customers' interests by legal means. A draft USSR law on strengthening responsibility for abuse in trade and speculation was approved. It was recommended that the USSR Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General submit it for examination at the next USSR Supreme Soviet session.

The committee heard a report by V.T. Saykin, chairman of the interim committee for crime-fighting in Moscow, and approved the measures outlined by the Moscow City Council to guarantee lawfulness and reliable security in the lives of the city's population as soon as possible.

Materials concerning crime trends in the past year and certain other questions concerning the strengthening of law and order in our country were also discussed.

Soviet Printing Industry Abilities Scored

90US0459A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 31 Jan 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Abramov: "A Stepchild of Industry"]

[Text] The disappearance of yet another daily necessity from the stores tomorrow may not cause a major commotion. We have gotten used to this.... What if central newspapers are not published one day? Commotion does not begin to describe it! Until recently, this was inconceivable. However, even now, when disruptions in the supply of paper make this possible we want to believe that there will not be a failure due to technical deficiencies.

We want to believe.... However, the overall condition of printing facilities in our country is unenviable: Even money is printed in our country by machines created approximately 40 years ago. They have long become morally and physically obsolete. As far as the central newspapers are concerned, there are printing plants at which the printing machinery is on its last leg among those oblast and republic plants involved in printing the largest share of their press runs. This is easy to see. It is enough to put side by side copies of the same newspaper published in Moscow and, say, Khabarovsk. There is a perceptible difference in their quality. The copy which is printed worse indicates old ills of the printing plants.

We are now talking about equipment or, more precisely, the newspaper printing machinery. For about five years

now, the newspaper lines for relief printing, the traditional kind for our country, have not been produced. This appears to be good: The course has been set for equipping the printing plants with more up-to-date offset printing machines. They will bring quality, convenience, technological progress. The problem is that offset machines are manufactured only at the Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant in an amount substantially smaller than that needed. It turns out that the renewal of the pool of newspaper-printing machinery proceeds slowly, and there is a danger of it ultimately wearing out in at least some cities. This may happen in the future though the current picture is not good either.

A printer from Astrakhan, N. Kastalskiy says: "Even if our equipment is superbly tuned we will still not be able to provide better than average quality. You cannot make old machines new."

The production of newspapers and its problems have sort of remained in the shadow despite the great attention the public pays to the press and a tremendous increase in press runs. For glasnost, it is something of a stepchild: It is swamped with work without any help from the outside.

The severely restricted domestic production of offset machines compelled the printing industry to make purchases abroad. At first sight, this appears to be a way out. Why build new printing equipment plants when printing machinery of a quite good standard may be purchased abroad? Many have been purchased. However, many more are necessary. Where are we to get hard currency for this? It is in short supply in our state.

Is this to say that we need to step up the development of our own machine building for printing? There are many problems involved in this: The training of high-quality cadres which you cannot do without in this industry, providing modern machine tools and rigging for the plants, and expansion of the facilities. However, nobody is about to solve these problems. After all, printing equipment is as much a stepchild as printing, except that it is the stepchild of different parents. For example, the NPO [Scientific Production Association] Poligrafmash which has produced quite respectable developments in the last three years has wandered among three ministries. Did anybody at all care about its scientists and engineers? In the course of this, the latter are even more surprised at the patience of the production personnel who remain faithful to their profession under unbearable conditions.

V. Rumyantsev, department chief at the NPO Poligrafmash, says: "The Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant has been accomplishing a collective labor feat year after year. No funds have been invested there in production or social and cultural development for a long time. People work out of dedication alone. The director does everything in order to keep the best specialists. However, this enterprise deserves better!"

However, it should be understood that a rapid increase in the stock of offset machines for newspapers will not come about even if we focus on implementing the promising developments of the NPO Poligrafmash now, even if we replace the entire pool of machine tools at the Rybinsk Printing Equipment Plant and provide all the amenities possible for its workers. The capacity of the experimental production shop of the NPO and the plant itself is too small.

There are several ways; however, we have not embarked on any one of them. Unfortunately, the idea of long-range integration-type cooperation with foreign companies delivering printing equipment to the Soviet Union failed to gain the approval of the Goskomizdat [State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade] due to bureaucratic delays. The steps taken in the sphere of joint ventures are timid. Conversion is yet another way. However, as of yet no defense plant has been found which would risk embarking on this precise, one might say capricious, production.

Under the circumstances, various decisive measures are needed to ensure that machine-building for the printing industry and the industry itself do not end up in an ultimate impasse. Have they been envisaged?

Yu. Proferantsev, chief specialist of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for Machine Building, said: "A draft resolution of the government which provides for the rapid growth of capacity of machine building for printing, by a factor of more than three, has been ready for two years now."

Alas, the draft has not been considered to this day. The supreme executive organ of our country has many urgent matters in need of solutions as soon as possible. This is why matters which can still wait are postponed until later. Do the issues of newspaper production and the support for it belong in this last category? Specialists believe that they do not. The situation in this sector is close to critical. If this industry is left unattended in the future as well we will soon start talking about ensuring that the newspapers are published rather than about improving the quality of newspaper printing.

Coordinating Council Takes Over Volgograd

PM0602090190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Own correspondent V. Kornev report: "Public Council Founded"]

[Text] Volgograd—Late in the evening of 3 February broadcasts being relayed from Moscow were interrupted and local television started up at a nonappointed time. On this occasion Oblast Soviet Executive Committee [oblispolkom] Chairman A. Orlov, USSR People's Deputy V. Sobolev, and representatives of the public voters' committees from Volgograd and Volzhskiy had driven to the studio. The very start of the oblispolkom statement which A. Orlov read out attracted everyone's

attention: "Having examined the socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation that has taken shape in the oblast jointly with USSR people's deputies and representatives of public formations, the oblispolkom declares that it assumes full authority and responsibility for the further development of events and urges everyone to pool efforts to eliminate negative trends."

A. Orlov went on to report the chief event, of which it had been decided, in view of the acuteness of the present situation in the oblast, to inform the people of Volgograd Oblast without delay. The obkispolkom session which had just ended had founded a public coordinating council. It consists of USSR people's deputies and members of autonomous [samodeyatelnyy] public organizations. The aim is to strengthen the real power of the soviets at all levels.

A totally new formation, without analogues, has been created.

As already reported in previous IZVESTIYA articles, a temporary bureau headed by three secretaries along voluntary lines has been elected to replace the oblast party committee bureau which resigned following a demand from the people of Volgograd Oblast. Preparations for an extraordinary oblast party election conference have now begun. But, at the same time, many complaints are being made against the soviets and their executive committees at rallies and meetings. This is what has led, in the final analysis, to the creation of the public coordinating council. Saturday's unscheduled oblispolkom session lasted more than 12 hours. Public voters committees and autonomous public organizations proposed meeting together and discussing urgent questions. Why do the local soviets still make timid, cautious use of the power which belongs to them by right? Why do people still frequently encounter indifference toward their needs and red tape when they turn to executive committees? Not only were these and other questions raised—there was talk of changing the situation.

The program for surmounting the crisis, which was adopted after a sharp and careful discussion and of which the people of Volgograd Oblast were informed in a special report, is quite earnest. I will cite some points in the oblispolkom statement: To prevent a deterioration in the food supply; to increase sales of consumer goods 15 percent compared with the previous year; to mothball the construction of the Volga-Don Canal-2 and channel the resources released into the oblast's socioeconomic needs. With the assistance of the public coordinating council the local soviets will be able to make fuller use of their rights in shaping the budget so as to construct more housing and allocate more money to the needs of health care, public education, and culture.

Military

Yazov Discusses Current Military Issues

LD0602131190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1200 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 6 Feb (TASS)—The protection of the citizens, the guarding of vital public installations, and the halting of violence: These are functions which the Soviet Army is carrying out in Transcaucasia under the state of emergency. Army General Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, stated this in an interview today with the weekly PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK.

In the Soviet minister's view, it was precisely the resolute actions of the troops in curtailing the actions of armed terrorists that has enabled the situation in Baku and certain other rayons of Azerbaijan and Armenia to stabilize comparatively quickly, and the most dangerous centers of violence to be localized.

Not everything worked out as one might have wished, said Dmitriy Yazov. At first a psychological aspect, which he called the "Tbilisi syndrome," impeded and fettered initiative. The hesitation connected with it sometimes hampered the military from acting precisely according to the situation, according to orders, and according to duty. This is a new phenomenon that requires analysis. [This and following additions and variations are reported by Moscow TASS in English at 1758 GMT on 6 February in a similar report. Here TASS English reads: "This is a new phenomenon that requires study."] In his view there is a need for a legislatively consoldiated mechanism for implementing a state of emergency in which involvement of troops is unavoidable. As the latest events have confirmed, only military units are capable of stabilising the situation, said General Yazov.

He expressed absolute disagreement with assertions that there is no military threat today. He said that today's political realities are so obvious that they cannot go unnoticed. The general cited as an example information according to which NATO's military expenditure rose from $460,00 million in 1988 to $469,400 million in 1989. [Here TASS in English reads: "The general gave as an example data according to which NATO's military spending grew from 460.1 billion U.S. dollars in 1988 to 469.4 billion dollars in 1989."]

Among the more significant changes in the USSR Armed Forces, General Yazov named above all the construction and preparation of the tenets of a new, defensive military doctrine, of the principle of sensible and reliable sufficiency. He said that these determine the main parameters of the restructuring of the Army and Navy, the essence and direction of that restructuring, and the radical changes in the composition, structure, equipment and training of the Armed Forces. Approaches to performing the tasks of building, developing, and improving the Armed Forces have changed and are continuing to change. Quantitative and extensive approaches are being

replaced more fully and actively by qualitative ones. This not only results from but is also wholly in line with the overall strategy of the restructuring of Soviet society. The process of democratization of military life is gaining strength in the Army and the Navy. For the first time in the history of our Armed Forces, officers' meetings have been conducted at all levels of their structure.

Touching on the idea of the formation of a volunteer professional army, which is now being discussed, Dmitriy Yazov said that at the present time and in the immediate future, it is unlikely that the system of manning in the Armed Forces in line with such a principle would be acceptable, as it is incapable of meeting the requirements for efficiency, reliability, and economy.

I am convinced, he stated, that calls for the immediate renunciation of universal military service and also proposals for a shift to a militia-style system or for the Army to be split up according to nationality do not take into consideration the country's real opportunities today and do not meet its defense needs.

The defense minister also called for retaining political bodies in the Army and Navy, stressing at the same time that their activity is in acute need of radical restructuring. [Here TASS in English reads: "...radical reorganization."]